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ABSTRACTS

The Soviet Conception of Regional Security

By S. NEIL MacFARLANE

Differences between East and West on issues of regional security in the Third World stem in part from fundamentally different ways of looking at the sources and significance of Third World conflict, the roles of outside actors in that conflict, and the relationship between such conflict and East-West relations. Examination of Soviet views on these topics suggests that conceptual dissonance is a considerable obstacle to substantial durable East-West cooperation on Third World security issues. Despite basic differences in doctrine and in objectives, the Soviet Union's concern about escalation, desire for equal status, concrete security interests in the Third World, and sensitivity to Third World opinion, along with the vulnerability of its established positions, create a Soviet interest in limiting superpower competition in Third World areas.

Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development

By J. M. McCONNELL

Over the last several decades, the U.S.S.R.'s long-term military development strategy seems to have altered course on a number of occasions. There was a brief shift in emphasis from nuclear to conventional in the last years of the Khrushchev regime, a return to nuclear war-waging in 1965 and, beginning with Brezhnev's speech at Tula in 1977, a new declaratory policy of conventional weapons as the sword and nuclear weapons as the shield. Each of these shifts seems to have been preceded by a shift in U.S. development strategy in the opposite direction. Therefore, instead of an action-reaction model of the arms race, implying symmetrical responses to initiatives by the opposing superpower, perhaps we need an action-inaction, inaction-action model, implying *asymmetrical* responses.

Theories of General War

By J. S. LEVY

This study examines the theories of general or hegemonic war advanced by Toynbee, Modelski and Thompson, Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn, Gilpin, and Doran, and the related theories of Organski and Kugler, and of Väyrynen. These theories have generated conflicting hypotheses and different lists of general wars. A major impediment to the empirical testing of these divergent hypotheses is the fact that complete operational criteria are rarely provided for the central concept of general war; instead, general war is usually defined broadly in terms of its systemic consequences, so that some key hypotheses on the consequences and causes of general war are reduced to tautologies. An alternative definition, and a compilation of general wars, is offered for the modern great-power system, which is conceived in terms of a Eurocentric focus and the primacy of military security issues.

Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade

By B. CRAWFORD and S. LENWAY

In order to reach and implement joint decisions on regulating trade with the Soviet Union since 1950, NATO states, whose security interests coincide but whose economic interests conflict, have shifted the utilities they have attached to alternative consequences of East-West trade. The authors offer an explanation for these shifting utilities and their impact on collaboration through a conceptualization of three decision modes: compliance, compromise, and problem solving. The effects of each mode and of change from one mode to another are illustrated by an examination of the events leading to the trans-Siberian pipeline dispute of 1982 and the process by which the dispute was resolved. New information generated in the problem-solving mode causes actors to re-evaluate net benefits flowing from alternative policies. Collaboration is strengthened when the information creates a basis for joint action in the face of conflicting interests, or when it triggers reevaluation of the utility of various instruments for attaining joint goals.

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Struggle for the Turf
By H. TROFIMENKO

The author dissects the memoirs of former National Security Adviser Brzezinski and former Secretaries of State Vance and Haig. While he finds nothing really surprising in them, they prove to be revealing in many aspects. For instance, when the choice between principles and power politics had to be made, power generally prevailed. The memoirs also show that current U.S. foreign policy is a product of a rather narrow circle of people around the President, and is much influenced by the prevalent stereotypes of the moment. Despite the attempts of recent U.S. administrations to relegate the Soviet Union to an insignificant place on the scale of U.S. foreign policy priorities, the central character of the interrelationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is undeniable. Without some *modus vivendi* between them, one can hardly hope for a more peaceful world.

Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanation
By A. N. WALDRON

Recent studies of nationalism do not accord sufficient causal power to the concept to justify the way it is used in many historical explanations. This fact raises questions about the validity of much writing—particularly that dealing with the non-Western world—in which nationalism generally plays an important role in explaining social changes and serves as a criterion for identifying significant political actors. Historical writing about 20th-century China, for example, provides many instances of faulty uses of the concept. A better approach might follow the lead of recent works on European history, notably about France, that reveal the extensive role politicians have played in creating national feeling and identity (usually for their own purposes), in ways that are amenable to conventional political analysis. Theoretical warrant for such an approach is provided by studies that incorporate nationalism into broader models of politics.

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

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

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THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY

By S. NEIL MacFARLANE*

I. Introduction

DISAGREEMENTS between East and West on questions of regional security in Africa, South West Asia, and South East Asia have, since the mid-1970s, contributed considerably to the deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the current period of poor relations, one of the most plausible avenues to the outbreak of nuclear war is that of escalation from crisis and confrontation in the Third World—specifically in the Middle East, where the interests of the two blocs most clearly intersect.

For the U.S., one way to reduce the likelihood of such an eventuality is through clearly defining—and subsequently displaying the capacity and resolve to defend—vital Western interests in the Third World, with a view of forestalling Soviet challenges to these interests. But this strategy is expensive, and carries within itself the danger of entanglement in local disputes as well as the very posssibility of confrontation that it is designed to forestall. Moreover, it is difficult to sustain for any length of time in a pluralist democracy, and it may have ethically questionable consequences. Conventional deterrence alone, therefore, may be inadequate as a strategy for dealing with Soviet initiatives in the Third World.

A second approach is to enter into a dialogue on Third World security with the U.S.S.R. in the hope of reaching agreements on mutual restraint in situations of regional conflict that carry the potential for a superpower confrontation, and on cooperation in the attempt to limit or resolve such conflicts. Along these lines, Donald Zagoria argued in 1979 that it was time to "engage the Russians in a broad dialogue on regional security issues and offer them a role in helping to maintain regional security."[1]

* The author wishes to thank several colleagues—among them Alexander George, Paul Marantz, and George Breslauer—for their comments on previous drafts. The research was conducted at the Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, with financial support from the Canadian Department of National Defence.

[1] Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Spring 1979), 743.

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More recently, such appeals have been heard with growing frequency.[2] The moment may be propitious for such a dialogue.[3]

For an interchange of this type to be useful, there must be something to talk about. In contemplating such an approach, one should recall that disagreements over Third World issues may be ascribed in part to faulty Western perceptions of the Soviet attitude toward conflict in the Third World, as well as the relationship between superpower involvement in such conflicts and East-West relations. An understanding of Soviet thinking about regional security and political change in the Third World would, therefore, be useful in assessing the prospects for a dialogue on regional issues, and in defining the parameters of such a dialogue. It is curious that, although Western scholars have accepted that an understanding of Soviet *strategic* doctrine is a precondition for the development of a durable deterrence and arms control relationship,[4] there appears to be far less acceptance of the notion that an understanding of Soviet thinking on regional security and political change in the Third World is essential in the attempt to arrive at agreements on behavior in the Third World.

In this essay, I will examine Soviet discussions of change and conflict in the Third World. In so doing, I address a number of specific issues:

1. the sources of instability and conflict in the less developed world;
2. the role of external actors in regional crises;
3. the character of Western attempts to resolve Third World conflicts;
4. the dimensions of Soviet regional security proposals;
5. the implications of Third World conflict for East-West relations;
6. the nature of Soviet interests in Third World conflicts.

This analysis provides a basis for assessing whether a coherent Soviet conception of regional security exists, how Soviet thinking on regional conflict resembles or differs from Western thinking, and what implications these similarities or disparities have for America's capacity to engage the U.S.S.R in meaningful negotiations on Third World security.

In Section II, I argue that Soviet doctrine concerning political and social change in the Third World, the respective roles of the two superpowers in Third World politics, and the linkage between Third World conflict and East-West relations suggests a way of thinking with

[2] See, for instance, "An Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski," *Maclean's Magazine* (February 20, 1984), 26; Steven Larrabee, "Start Rehabilitating Relations with Soviet," *New York Times*, February 15, 1984, p. 29.

[3] See S. Neil MacFarlane, *Soviet Intervention in Third World Conflict* (Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1983), 26-50.

[4] See, for example, John Erickson, "The Soviet View of Deterrence," *Survival* 24 (November/December 1981), 242.

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regard to Third World issues that is largely incompatible with American perspectives. This difference justifies considerable pessimism about the likelihood of reaching wide-ranging durable accords on issues of regional security in the Third World.

In Section III, however, I find that this conclusion should be modified in a number of ways. The Soviets' recognition of the possibility of escalation from confrontation in local conflicts, their desire for equal status in global affairs, and their awareness that specific security interests of the U.S.S.R. may be jeopardized by regional instability, all suggest some potential for bilateral cooperation in the control of certain categories of regional conflict. Moreover, to judge from the Soviet literature, the degree of Moscow's stated commitment to revolution in the Third World and the assessment of the dangers of escalation appear to be related to its assessment of the degree of tension in the East-West relationship, to its appraisal of Western willingness to use force in regional conflicts, and to its perception of improvement or regression in the international position of the U.S.S.R. Finally, as a rule, the Soviets' quest for influence renders them supportive of (or at least not actively opposed to) regionally originating efforts at conflict resolution. In other words, there is considerable tension between a doctrine of more or less blanket support of revolution and instability in the Third World, on the one hand, and concrete Soviet diplomatic and security interests, on the other.

These qualifications bear upon prospects for East-West accord on regional issues in a number of ways. The Soviets' desire for equal status gives them a stake in bilateral negotiations that recognize their equality and legitimize their role in the Third World. Their recognition of the dangers of escalation, particularly in periods of tension, establishes an interest in agreements on crisis management and perhaps crisis prevention in areas where the critical concerns of the two superpowers overlap (e.g., the Middle East). It also favors, in practice, and perhaps in putative agreements, noninterference by one superpower in situations where well-defined vital interests of the other are at stake (e.g., Central America and Afghanistan). Soviet sensitivity to regional opinion and the U.S.S.R.'s consequent reluctance openly to undermine regional attempts at conflict resolution (as in OAU Africa) would suggest that the West, as a means of curbing Soviet opportunism, should cooperate in efforts by regional organizations to resolve or limit regional conflicts. Finally, the relationship between the Soviet Union's perception of change in the international correlation of forces and the character of the international situation on the one hand, and change in the tenor of its official comment on Third World security issues on the other, suggests that the capacity for bilateral

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cooperation in crisis management and regional security issues rests largely on the credibility of U.S. conventional deterrence in the Third World.

My analysis is based primarily on CPSU documents, the speeches of Politburo members with significant foreign policy responsibilities, and on a survey of commentary on Third World conflict by *Pravda* and *Izvestia* from 1975 to 1984.[5] Although complete harmony of views on Third World affairs does not exist in the Soviet literature as a whole, there generally is an authoritative perspective that can be culled from these sources, and that apparently reflects a substantial consensus among policy makers.

In relying on public Soviet doctrine in this analysis I do not mean to suggest that, in a crude sense, doctrine determines policy, or that Soviet behavior may be consistently predicted by reading the Soviet press. Clearly, much commentary on these topics is rhetorical and propagandistic. Yet, as Robert Packenham once observed in another context, "to a considerable extent, the rhetoric *is* the reality. Much rhetoric [is] in fact firmly and widely believed by officials." Even where statements are tactically motivated, "sheer repetition may induce belief," while the insistence on a single line of argument precludes or impedes "thoughtful consideration of alternative courses."[6] There is little reason to assume that this assessment of the beliefs of American policy makers does not hold *a fortiori* for Soviet ones. Moreover, public statements act as constraints on policy makers in that actions ostensibly inconsistent with long-held commitments draw into question the credibility of the latter. This constraining effect is of particular importance in the foreign policy of a state that purports to be the leading proponent of a universal revolutionary ideology, and whose international and domestic legitimacy is to some extent rooted in this claim. At a level farther removed from policy, doctrine influences perception in that is serves to some extent as a conceptual framework in which policy makers operate and which structures their interpretation of events. For all of these reasons, attention to stated Soviet doctrine is useful in the attempt to understand Soviet foreign policy.

II. Regional Conflict and East-West Relations

The conventional Western view of Third World conflict and regional security rests on a number of propositions:

[5] Citation of Soviet sources is limited to instances where the source is quoted directly. A complete listing of the sources upon which generalizations concerning Soviet doctrine are based is available from the author.

[6] Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), xix.

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1. Stability—a state of affairs in which incumbent regimes or political systems are free from serious internal challenge to their efforts to cope with and adapt to evolving indigenous and external political realities[7]—is preferable to instability and civil conflict.
2. Where change is desirable, reform within the context of existing political institutions or through orderly constitutional renovation is preferable to violent revolution. Radical change is generally seen as detrimental to Western interests and inconsistent with Western values.
3. Instability is generally stimulated by outsiders, usually communists, rather than originating internally.[8]

As President Reagan put it recently, "Let us not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."[9] This perspective on stability and change is status quo-oriented; in view of the fact that, historically, Western influence in the Third World has been stronger and more pervasive than its Soviet counterpart, it is asymmetrical.

The Soviet view of the sources and significance of civil and regional conflict is fundamentally different. In the first place, Soviet policy makers see no intrinsic merit in stability in the less developed world. To the contrary, they consider change and conflict to be unavoidable and, in general, desirable. Moscow's attitudes toward regional security center on the concept of national liberation. Soviet writers regard national liberation as a process that brings about not only political independence, but also the achievement of economic independence and antifeudal and anticapitalist social revolutionary change. In the Soviet view, the process of national and social liberation culminates in the transition to socialism. The process of change in this direction is considered to be an objective, natural one. Its outcome is assured. It necessarily involves struggle against the established, exploitative, and reactionary elites that the United States tends to favor as allies. The quest for stability (in the Western sense) constitutes an attempt to impede this desirable and inevitable process. As Vasilii Kuznetsov stated with reference to Africa: "For the imperialists, 'stability' in Africa signifies above all securing continued possibilities, as earlier, to exploit in an unhindered way the African people

[7] Samuel Huntington, "Remarks on the Meaning of Stability in the Modern Era," in Seweryn Bialer and Karen Sluzar, eds. *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age*, Vol. III (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), 269-82.

[8] Helen Kitchen, "Introduction," in Kitchen, ed., *Africa: From Mystery to Maze* (Toronto: D. C. Heath, 1976), 4.

[9] As quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, "Foreign Policy and the American Character," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Winter 1983), 3.

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and the riches of this continent."[10] Real peace, in the Third World as elsewhere, is "organically" connected to the achievement of socialism. According to Brezhnev, "Genuine peaceableness implies in our age resolute action to counter the aggressive moves of imperialism."[11] Far from being inconsistent with peace, then, support for revolution in the Third World is *part* of a "peace policy." The political utility of these semantics is obvious, as is their incompatibility with analogous American views.

The forces in the Third World struggling for liberation and against "imperialism" and "internal reaction" are seen as an important, though secondary component of a world revolutionary process led by the CPSU and the forces of world socialism. National liberation movements make an important contribution to this effort by weakening the imperialist camp and thereby altering the international correlation of forces in favor of world socialism. For this reason, the cause of national liberation is considered a just one. This attitude reflects an attempt to coopt revolutionary Third World nationalists into the broader struggle against the West. It also justifies Soviet assistance to nonproletarian forces in the Third World.

In the Soviet view, the basic source of conflict and tension in the Third World lies in attempts by "imperialist forces" and their local allies to impede this objective, revolutionary process. The problem in Angola, for example, was caused not by internal revolution or Soviet/Cuban involvement, but by "imperialist" interference. In the words of Georgii Arbatov,

> Another negative influence on the political situation was [the administration's] attempts to attribute to Soviet "intrigues" many failures of American foreign policy (in South East Asia, in the south of Africa, and others) connected with *the stubborn effort of Washington to keep in power rotten regimes and social orders doomed by history*.[12]

In the Horn of Africa, the problem was "imperialist" or "reactionary" opposition to the Ethiopian revolution. *Izvestia*'s commentator Vladimir Kudryavtsev noted:

> Now, when a national democratic revolution is taking place in Ethiopia, bringing with it fundamental social and economic transformations, the U.S. is interested in the converse—i.e., in weakening and dismembering revolutionary Ethiopia. For this reason, American diplomacy is encour-

[10] Kuznetsov, "Druzhba krepnet i razvivaetsya" [Friendship grows stronger and develops], *Pravda*, September 12, 1978, p. 4. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.

[11] As cited in "A Guarantee of Security," *New Times* (No. 28, 1970), 1.

[12] Arbatov, "Sovetsko-Amerikanskie otnoshenia segodnya" [Soviet-American relations today], *Pravda*, December 11, 1976, pp. 1-2 (emphasis added).

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> aging internal counterrevolutionaries composed of monarchists, feudal lords, reactionary tribal leaders, and separatists of all types. It is also egging on the Somali chauvinists who have decided to take advantage of this difficult situation in Ethiopia to realize their great power designs.[13]

With regard to the Shaba conflict, TASS observed that the emergence of this "dangerous new hotbed of tension" in the center of Africa was, again, not the result of any incursion of insurgents from outside Zaire, but of "interference by imperialist forces."[14] Such statements abound with regard to other African conflicts, or concerning instability in Africa as a whole, but the point was perhaps best made by Brezhnev:

> Instability in Africa is born differently. It is caused by external forces that are trying to prevent African peoples from choosing that path which they consider most appropriate. These forces are trying to set some African countries against others, they kindle and fan discord, and provoke quarrels over problems which came to the African peoples from colonial times.[15]

In the case of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the problem is said to be caused by Israeli expansionism and intransigence, made possible by the support of American imperialism. The United States desires to split the Arab national liberation movement and to strengthen its own position in the region.

The situation in Afghanistan is attributed not to dissatisfaction with the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime, but to external subversion—the sponsorship, by the imperialists, of bands of renegade "*basmachi*." The Iran-Iraq war, like inter-Arab disputes, is ascribed to the incitement of conflict by Western imperialism in order to split progressive forces in the region, to divert attention from the struggle for Palestinian national liberation and against Israel, and to facilitate the pursuit of narrow Western interests in the region.

Why would the West engage in such destructive behavior? The dominant Soviet answer is that the West seeks to generate regional crises as pretexts for military intrusion in order to prop up reactionary regimes, thereby preserving or obtaining strategic and economic benefits. The latter principally take the form of access to raw materials and oil. As the *Pravda* commentator Petrov put it:

> Africa, the Near East, and other regions of the world have experienced for themselves how imperialist, and above all American, monopolies are

[13] Kudryavtsev, "Dark Spots on the Globe," *Nedelya* (No. 4, 1970), as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 30 (No. 3, 1978), 11.

[14] TASS, "Zayavlenie" [Statement], *Pravda*, May 18, 1978, p. 5.

[15] "Otvety L. I. Brezhneva na voprosy gazety *Mond*" [Answers of L. I. Brezhnev to questions from *Le Monde*], *Pravda*, June 16, 1977, pp. 1-2.

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> actively pursuing a policy of inciting conflicts and reciprocal territorial claims, and setting some countries against others with a view to the strengthening of their domination where there are oil and other sources of raw materials and where there are important sea routes.[16]

A complementary view is that such activity is intended to close off these regions to Soviet influence, and in certain instances to use them to threaten the Soviet Union.

In other words, "hotbeds" of tension in the Third World are the result of a collision between an irresistible force (the struggle for national liberation) and an object which, though perhaps not immovable, is difficult to budge (Western, and especially American, imperialism). The way to peace in the Third World is for the West to get out of the way of revolutionary transformation. There would be no "hotbeds" if the imperialists, through their attempt to suppress national liberation and reestablish hegemony, did not create them. This is, of course, a mirror image of President Reagan's remark quoted above.

This assessment of the West's role in Third World conflict spills over into Soviet discussions of American and Western-sponsored regional security initiatives. These are seen merely as one instrument in the imperialists' attempts to defend or expand their positions in the Third World at the expense of progressive forces. This attitude is evident in official commentary on Western attempts to resolve the Rhodesian dispute, the Namibia question, and the Afghan conflict, as well as on Camp David, Western mediation in Lebanon, and peacekeeping efforts in the Sinai and Beirut.

It follows from the Soviets' assessments of the *sui generis* character of the processes of sociopolitical change in the Third World, and the attribution of conflict to Western attempts to impede these processes, that they should systematically reject Western assertions that the Soviet Union is responsible for tension in the Third World; in fact, they do. This impasse leads to the broader question of Soviet treatment of the relationship between Third World conflict and East-West relations. The fact that processes of change in the Third World are seen as internally generated implies that Third World conflict should be considered distinct from the basic issues of Soviet-American detente. To link "progressive" change in the Third World to inter-state relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. is, in the Soviet view, at best a misunderstanding of historical processes. Issues involved in the process of detente (e.g., expanding economic ties, the easing of tensions in Europe, and

[16] Petrov, "Faktam vopreki" [In defiance of the facts], *Pravda*, May 9, 1978, p. 5.

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arms limitation) are seen as issues of mutual interest unrelated to Third World events. Because these issues are distinct, they can and should be compartmentalized. According to an *Izvestia* commentator,

> It is indeed clear that the easing of tension in relations between states and internal processes within these states are different things. Each country and each people has the right to sort out its own affairs. Detente is not a barrier on the path of the national liberation movements and progressive sociopolitical transformations.[17]

The fact that during the SALT talks, the Soviets did not attempt to link the Vietnamese and American invasion of Cambodia or the mining of Haiphong harbor to the process of strategic arms control suggests that this compartmentalization in doctrine is reflected in Soviet diplomatic practice.[18] Soviet writers apparently believed, moreover, that the acceptance of "peaceful coexistence" as the basis of Soviet-American relations in the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972 signified American acquiescence in the Soviet definition of that concept, one of the basic premises of which was the "drawing of a clear line" between the sphere of class struggle and that of inter-state relations.[19] Indeed, many Soviet commentators have argued that detente, and the recognition of objective changes in world politics that it reflects, facilitates these transformations by fostering an environment in which change can take place without external hindrance.

Soviet writers have never denied their support for "the forces of progress" in the Third World and their commitment to the processes of transformation subsumed under the concept of national liberation. They have, however, insisted that the Soviet role in this process is permissive and ancillary. The rise of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system has created, in their view, the environmental conditions that allow the consummation of the process of national liberation. It has given new states an alternative to continuing dependence on the world capitalist system, by deterring imperialist attempts to reverse the process and reestablish Western positions in the Third World; indeed, the socialist states may assist the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to repulse such attempts as do occur. In the latter context, Soviet writers have argued that the Soviet Union's active role in the process is one of resisting Western export of counterrevolution rather than of exporting

[17] V. Osipov, "Razryadka i eyo protivniki" [Detente and its opponents], *Izvestia*, May 22, 1975, p. 4.

[18] On this point, see Gerard Smith, *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Stategic Arms Limitation Talks* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 136-37, 382-83.

[19] Georgii Arbatov, "Problemy i suzhdenia: Manevry protivnikov razryadki" [Problems and judgments: Maneuvers of the opponents of detente], *Izvestia*, September 4, 1975, p. 3.

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revolution. That is not only good Marxism, but good politics. To accept Soviet responsibility for the export of revolution would be to undertake commitments that could severely strain Soviet capabilities and seriously destabilize international relations.

In view of the Soviets' definition of the character of political development in the Third World and of their own role in this development, it is not surprising that they should deny not only that processes of political change in the Third World are linked to inter-state relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. but also that there is a connection between detente and the Soviet role in this struggle. Although not completely hostile to the concept of "the rules of the game,"[20] they categorically reject codes of conduct that would preclude Soviet assistance to progressive forces in the Third World. They view as hypocritical what they perceive to be Western attempts to curb Soviet support for national liberation movements via some such code while the United States intervenes actively in Third World politics to prop up opponents of the "forces of progress." According to a *Pravda* commentator,

> American diplomacy supports in every way reactionary, antipopular regimes—such as the fascist junta in Chile—and considers this "legitimate." At the same time, an absurd noise is raised about "expansion" when the forces of progress aid freedom-loving peoples subjected to imperialist and racist aggression. This is an awkward attempt to put into effect what Americans call a "double standard."[21]

Cutting away the rhetoric, this appears to be a Soviet call for American recognition of the fact that, under the new historical conditions of the 1970s, the U.S.S.R. has an equal right to involvement in Third World affairs.

There are several ways in which Soviet writers explain Western attempts to link Third World issues to the process of detente. First, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they posited the resurgence in American politics of right-wing circles connected to the "military-industrial complex." These groups are purported to have a vested interest in sabotaging detente and renewing the arms buildup in order to achieve military superiority and to be able to dictate to the U.S.S.R. from a position of strength. Because such a policy is difficult to pursue under conditions of detente, these circles have sought to destroy the latter through unsubstantiated assertions that the U.S.S.R. is violating the rules of detente, and that the Soviet threat is reaching alarming dimensions. They are

[20] See, for example, "V Druzhestvennoi Obstanovke: Rech' Tov. L. I. Brezhneva" [In a friendly situation: Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev], *Pravda*, April 8, 1981, p. 2.

[21] Obozrevatel' [Commentator], "Opasnaya kampania" [Dangerous campaign], *Pravda*, May 14, 1976, p. 4.

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also said to use propaganda about Soviet violations of detente and about the "Soviet menace" in order to divert the American public's attention from domestic issues such as unemployment and inflation, and in the attempt to reestablish U.S. hegemony in Western Europe by bringing the European allies in line behind America's anti-Soviet bellicosity.

In the Third World, U.S. assertions about the "Soviet threat" are seen by Moscow as providing a pretext for a renewed American military presence, and as designed to intimidate the new states into permitting its establishment. The purpose, again, is to defend American economic interests and to threaten the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is not *Soviet* actions in the Third World that threaten peace and violate detente; it is *Western* intervention in an attempt to reverse the process of national liberation, coupled with rhetoric concerning purported Soviet infringement of the "rules" of detente, that constitutes violations of and threats to detente. Such actions are said to create "hotbeds of tension," which damage relations between the superpowers. Hence, to the extent that linkage exists, it is not intrinsic or the result of any Soviet action: the West creates it through the use of force to prevent objectively determined social change.

It is true that this line may to some extent be merely self-interested propaganda, designed to discredit Western and particularly American policy toward the Soviet Union. But there is some evidence to suggest that Soviet commentators believe that issues could be compartmentalized in this way. Writings from the mid- and late 1970s indicate the conviction that detente was an objective process with its own momentum, a process that was supported by the broad masses of political opinion in the West. Shifts in the "international correlation of forces"—the result of a rise to equality by the U.S.S.R.—created a concrete basis for the "easing of tension," the logic of which could not be contested. These shifts also opened the way for a more assertive pursuit of the Soviet Union's own interests. Such opposition to detente as did occur was unrealistic and reactionary, doomed to failure. Brezhnev stated as late as 1980:

> Those who define American foreign policy today obviously do not see or do not want to see the historical changes in the global arena, the new correlation of forces in the world. ... Now everyone sees that these attempts to bury detente, to plunge the world into a new "cold war" by no means meet with the approval of the broad popular masses and the majority of governments and have not brought benefits to their initiators. ... In general, one can say that there is growing an understanding that none of the essential problems of today's world can be resolved "from a position of strength" and by sabre-rattling.[22]

[22] "Rech' Tov. L. I. Brezhneva" [Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev], *Pravda*, August 30, 1980, pp. 1-2.

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Hence, it is plausible that an underestimation of the degree to which Soviet involvement in the Third World *could* damage East-West relations may have been underlying the rejection of linkage. It is hard to account otherwise for Soviet policy in Angola and Ethiopia.

When it became clear to Soviet writers that the process of detente was in trouble, they dismissed this fact as a temporary aberration, a "zig-zag,"[23] and accounted for it in terms of shifts in American politics favoring those opposed to cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Events in the Third World fostered this decay only in the sense that they were employed by the U.S. as pretexts to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria.

It is not my purpose to judge the merits of these perspectives. No doubt there is more than a grain of truth in much of the Soviet analysis of the origins of regional conflict in the Third World. My purpose, however, is to outline the relationship between Soviet thinking and prevailing Western attitudes on this subject. The Soviet evaluations of the sources of Third World conflict, and their perspectives on the role of the two camps in these struggles, on Western attempts to resolve regional crises, and on the impact of Third World conflict on East-West relations leave little room for optimism with regard to prospects for constructive dialogue and durable accord on issues of Third World security. The views that stability is artificial and unrealistic, that anti-Western revolution is inevitable and desirable, that the West is to blame for regional tensions while the U.S.S.R. is blameless, as well as the absolute denial of any connection between Soviet behavior in the Third World and detente, are all difficult to square with American conceptions of regional conflict and security. Moreover, these attitudes betray a profound suspicion of American motives and policies and a strong competitive dimension to Soviet thought concerning the Third World.

If these elements of Soviet doctrine were mere rhetoric and unrelated to Soviet policy and interest, one could dismiss them as irrelevant to East-West dialogue. However, they are reflected in or reflect Soviet policy in the Third World—the support of anti-Western movements and governments as part of a sustained quest for influence at the expense of the West. Soviet doctrine on these issues reflects the interests of the U.S.S.R. and its leadership in at least three ways. First, the domestic legitimacy of CPSU rule is to some extent predicated on its being perceived to play a revolutionary role in world politics. Second, the same can be said of its claim to leadership in the international communist movement. Finally, to the extent that expanding Soviet influence in the

[23] Georgii Arbatov, "SShA - Sto dnei" [The USA - 100 days], *Pravda*, May 4, 1981, p. 6.

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Third World may be considered to be an interest of the U.S.S.R., this requires a revisionist anti-Western posture since, historically and economically, Western interests in the less developed world have been dominant, while the Soviet Union has had few ties with Third World states. As a newcomer in these regions, the U.S.S.R. must challenge the status quo in order to establish itself. The fact that its challenge centers around armed conflict reflects the paucity of instruments other than military ones with which it can compete. For these reasons, it would be difficult for Moscow to jettison or to alter radically its public attitudes on Third World security.

III. Qualifications

The foregoing should be qualified in a number of ways. Several specific aspects of Soviet interests, doctrine, and policy suggest that there is room for movement in a number of areas related to regional security. First, the Soviet rejection of the "export of revolution" indicates that there are limits on the degree to which Soviet policy makers are willing to challenge Western interests in the Third World. Soviet behavior in Third World conflicts suggests that, as a rule, U.S.S.R. does not itself create conflicts, but instead avails itself of opportunities for involvement which emerge from instability originating in the region or state concerned.

Second is the issue of escalation from local conflict. The danger of nuclear war has been the basis of Soviet pursuit of peaceful coexistence since the 20th Party Congress in 1956. The struggle between socialism and capitalism had to be constrained through cooperative action in order to prevent nuclear annihilation—a phenomenon that transcends the laws of historical development. During the Khrushchev period, it was evident that Soviet writers viewed confrontation between East and West in local wars as one possible source of escalation. Khrushchev displayed the Soviet sensitivity to the prospect that such confrontations could lead to nuclear war when he argued in 1960 that local wars should be avoided because, where they involved the nuclear powers, they would escalate to general war.[24] Sokolovskii's 1962 edition of *Military Strategy* noted that any local conflict involving the nuclear powers would inevitably lead to general war.[25] No doubt there is much truth in Mark Katz's assertion that the Soviets took this line in order to deter the United

[24] As cited in Mark Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 18.

[25] Vassilii Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 299.

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States from involving itself in situations where the U.S.S.R. lacked the capacity to respond conventionally;[26] but there is no reason to doubt that there was in this line of reasoning an element of genuine concern, particularly in view of American adherence, in the late 1950s, to the principle of massive retaliation. The Soviet leadership had considerable experience with the effects of World War II on Soviet efforts to build socialism. There was every reason to assume that the impact of a nuclear exchange would dwarf previous destruction.

In 1962, the walk to the brink over Cuba reaffirmed this Soviet perspective on escalation and the benefits of collaboration in crisis; incidentally, it produced one of the most durable and effective crisis prevention accords between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—that concerning superpower behavior vis-à-vis Cuba. This accord and the one dealing with Laos in 1962 were hailed by Soviet spokesmen as examples of the promise of superpower cooperation in Third World crises in order to prevent escalation and reduce tension. Gromyko noted in October 1962:

> The crisis in the Caribbean Sea is further evidence of how closely the fate of the contemporary world is tied to relations between the USSR and the USA. History has developed in such a way that, without mutual understanding between the USA and the USSR, it is impossible to settle any international conflict, it is impossible to achieve agreement on any important international problem. . . . Even in situations where the interests of these two powers are not immediately conflicting in one region or another, events there also do not evolve without being influenced by Soviet-American relations. If the USSR and USA combine their efforts in order to settle conflicts and complications arising in these regions, the stubborn flame of war goes out and tension subsides.[27]

The Soviet concern over escalation from Third World conflict faded, however, with the passage of time. Military writings in particular show a considerable erosion in the mid- and late 1960s of the proposition that local wars involving the superpowers would inevitably escalate to general wars.[28] Parallel to this shift in military thought, there was a fairly clear reduction in party commentary concerning the dangers of general war growing out of regional crisis. This presumably reflects a number of factors. Improvements in Soviet force projection capabilities made it possible for the U.S.S.R. to engage in military competition in the Third World. Hence, the need to deter U.S. conventional power in Third World conflict situations, through underlining the likelihood of esca-

[26] Katz (fn. 24), 21.

[27] "Rech' ministra inostrannykh del SSSR, Deputata A.A. Gromyko" [Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Deputy A. A. Gromyko], *Izvestia*, December 14, 1962, p. 4.

[28] Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 123-41; Katz (fn. 24), 39, 67, 97.

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lation, was less telling. Drift in this direction was further encouraged later by the collapse of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam and the consequent growing American unwillingness to commit forces in other peripheral conflicts. In other words, deterioration in the credibility of Western conventional deterrence of Soviet involvement in local wars paralleled the increase in Soviet interventionary capabilities. Beyond this, Soviet movement toward strategic parity removed the constraint of American nuclear superiority and escalation dominance from the calculations of Soviet policy makers. Garthoff presciently observed in 1962 that,

> [I]f the Soviet Union can stalemate the US in the intercontinental arena, the way is clear for gradual expansion of power through any variety of methods, military and non-military, in the entire Eurasian periphery. While the optimum Soviet aim of the annihilation of the major center of hostile power remains deterred and frustrated, the suboptimum aim of improving the Soviet position in peripheral areas is now enhanced by the neutralization of the enemy power center.[29]

In this sense, the shift in the international correlation of forces may have led Soviet commentators to believe that Third World issues could be separated from broader East-West ones.

The Soviet fear of escalation from local crisis—particularly in regions where critical interests overlap (e.g., the Middle East)—never disappeared completely, however. Even in the mid-1970s, at the height of Soviet self-confidence and optimism, the party literature occasionally refers to the need to eliminate the "hotbed of tension" in the Middle East and to the possibility of escalation from conflict in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

References to the Middle East as a potential venue for dangerous confrontation between the two superpowers increased as relations between East and West deteriorated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and as the United States began to enhance its capacity to project force into the region and to display a willingness to deploy and maintain force there. With the Iranian hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War, Soviet writers extended this argument to the Persian Gulf. Recent participants in exchanges with Soviet specialists in international relations report that their counterparts display considerable concern about the possibility of confrontation in the Middle East, and that the tenor of discussions about security problems and cooperative efforts to prevent escalation from crisis in this region was surprisingly concrete and constructive. This concern suggests that the Soviets are in fact quite worried about the Middle East—presumably not only because of overlapping security interests, but also because of the unpredictability and bellicosity of regional

[29] Raymond Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 13.

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clients, and the consequent possibility of being propelled into unsought confrontation. There is therefore an incentive for limited cooperation. Persistent unconfirmed reports of recent information exchanges on Persian Gulf deployments between Soviet officials and officials of the present U.S. administration suggest that such cooperation may already be occurring.

More generally, as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated, and the U.S. and NATO began to increase arms expenditures and to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe, there has been a growing emphasis on the danger of war. During the mid-1970s, there was a certain complacency in this regard—when the issue of war was mentioned at all. The period was seen as one of the "affirmation in the practice of international life of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states," leading to a deflection of the "threat of thermonuclear war."[30] By the early 1980s, however, the Soviet literature displayed an awareness of and considerable nervousness about the growing possibility of nuclear war. As Brezhnev put it in 1982, the situation had not been so serious since World War II.[31] As a result, considerable caution on the part of all states was considered a necessity: "Today a rash, adventuristic policy by any country, even a small one, presents a danger to the entire international community. And what if a power like the U.S. followed such a course?"[32]

This type of warning was coupled with a growing gloominess in Soviet appraisals of the character of the international situation and of the process of detente. Changing views of international politics suggest some rethinking of the position noted earlier—that detente was an objective process which could be impeded but not reversed, because of its roots in changes in the international correlation of forces and its purported popularity with the "broad masses" throughout the world.

Beyond this, Soviet commentary displayed a growing preoccupation with peace as an overriding priority of Soviet foreign policy (peace apparently being used here in a narrow sense referring to the avoidance of war) and a corresponding reduction in emphasis on class struggle in international relations. It is perhaps significant in the latter regard that

[30] "Postanovlenie Ts. K. KPSS ot 31 Yanvarya 1977 Goda: O 60-i Godovshchine Velikoi Oktyabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revolyutsii," [Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of January 31, 1977: On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution], *Pravda*, February 2, 1977, pp. 1-2.

[31] "Priom L. I. Brezhnevym predstavitelei Konsul'tativnogo Soveta Sotsialisticheskogo Internatsionala po Razoruzheniu" [Reception by L. I. Brezhnev for representatives of the Consultative Committee of the Socialist International on Disarmament], *Pravda*, February 4, 1981, p. 1.

[32] Arbatov (fn. 23), 6.

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Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Congress in 1981 dropped the usual subsection dealing with the "world revolutionary process" and the national liberation movement.

In short, although it would be naive to assume that there had been any fundamental change in Soviet attitudes on Third World security, the Soviets reacted to the deterioration of East-West relations in the early Reagan administration with moderation, seeking to avoid taking positions that would further exacerbate East-West relations, and stressing the need for restraint. The fact that Soviet comment on the United States has recently become more vituperative may signal not so much a radicalization in Soviet attitudes as a conclusion that there is no basis for collaboration with the present American administration. Recent Soviet practice in the Third World supports the contention that the U.S.S.R. has reacted to the worsening international situation by moderating its approach to Third World conflict. There have been no substantial Soviet military initiatives since the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have shown considerable caution in their responses to the latest stages of the Lebanese and Gulf crises. Such policies may reflect not only concern about dangers in the relationship with the United States, but also the growing pinch on Soviet resources (particularly in the context of a renewed arms race), the policy immobility associated with the prolonged succession crisis, greater skepticism about the balance of costs and benefits from Soviet military activism in the past decade, and growing disillusionment with a number of Third World clients. Whatever the cause, current Soviet practice in the Third World suggests that Moscow sees wisdom in restraint. In such circumstances, there is an interest in a dialogue that would induce similar restraint on the part of the United States.

Beyond the desire to reduce dangers of escalation in crises, Soviet writers have recognized, and continue to recognize, a number of incentives for a policy of peaceful coexistence: the legitimation of the territorial settlement in Europe, access to Western credit and technology, the possibility of transferring resources from military expenditures to more productive uses, and so forth. As noted above, they refuse to acknowledge a *direct* link between Soviet activity in the Third World and detente. However, the fact that they accept that such activity can be used as a "pretext" to justify the abandonment of detente suggests some recognition that Soviet unilateralism in the Third World may work to the advantage of forces opposed to detente, and, hence, may indirectly undermine it. Recent visitors to the U.S.S.R. note a willingness on the part of some Soviet scholars to admit informally that Soviet actions in the

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Third World in the late 1970s damaged East-West relations. To the extent Soviet leaders remain committed in the longer term to a stable, orderly, and mutually beneficial relationship with the United States (though they may have given up on the Reagan administration, there is no clear evidence that dominant elites have abandoned the principle of peaceful coexistence[33]), this awareness gives them an interest in restraint and dialogue.

Such a dialogue would go some distance toward satisfying a basic objective of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World and elsewhere: that of recognized equality of status with the United States. Since the attainment of parity in the early 1970s, Soviet policy makers have viewed an equal say on security questions in the Third World as a right commensurate with their status as a superpower with global reach. As Gromyko noted in 1971, "There is not a single significant question which today can be decided without or in defiance of the Soviet Union. And if anybody were to try to show that one could manage without the Soviet Union in the resolution of these issues, people would consider him odd."[34] One reason, no doubt, for the Soviet leaders' hostility toward Western-sponsored attempts at regional settlements such as those concerning Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the Arab-Israeli dispute is their exclusion from the process. Their claim to equality has been expressed with particular vehemence in the Middle East, where they have maintained that no settlement is possible without Soviet participation. Indeed, one might argue that much of their Middle Eastern policy is designed to ensure this. The claim is reflected most clearly in their insistence on a return to Geneva, where they share the chair with the United States. Their spokesmen display considerable nostalgia for earlier Soviet-American cooperation in this framework.[35] The reconvening of the conference and inclusion of the Soviet Union in a broader dialogue on problems of East-West competition in the Third World would, therefore, in and of itself, satisfy a significant Soviet desire. To the extent that the Soviet role as a "spoiler" in the Middle East and elsewhere stems from being

[33] See, for example, "Priom Tov. Yu. V. Andropovym profsoyuznogo deyatelya SShA" [Reception by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov for a U.S. trade unionist], *Pravda*, August 18, 1983, p. 1; Yu. Andropov, "Gruppe Sotsial-Demokraticheskikh deputatov Bundestaga FRG" [To a group of Social Democratic deputies of the Bundestag of the FRG], *Pravda*, September 21, 1983, p. 1.

[34] "Rech' Tov. A. A. Gromyko" [Speech of Comrade A. A. Gromyko], *Pravda*, April 4, 1971, p. 8.

[35] Leonid I. Brezhnev, "Otchot Ts. K. KPSS XXVI S'ezdu KPSS i ocherednye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrennei i vneshnei politiki" [Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 26th Congress of the CPSU and subsequent tasks of the Party in the area of domestic and foreign policy], *Pravda*, February 2, 1981, pp. 2-9.

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denied what Soviet elites believe to be their due, such an inclusion might well contribute to conflict resolution or limitation.

A further point of qualification concerns concrete Soviet security interests in the Third World. Here again, the discussion bears principally on the Middle East and South West Asia. Soviet statements on the Middle East suggest that events there—and particularly Western military deployments in the region—are perceived to have a direct bearing on Soviet security. In view of the proximity of the region to the southern frontier of the U.S.S.R., there is considerable plausibility to such assertions. They are as credible, for example, as comparable American statements to the effect that events in Central America, and specifically the involvement of foreign powers in regional conflict there, have a direct bearing on American national security. It could be argued that this, too, gives the Soviet Union some stake in preventing crises in the region that are likely to lead to deployments of Western forces, and in acting cooperatively to limit or defuse such crises as do occur. The record of Soviet diplomacy during the War of Attrition and during the October War suggests that there may be considerable scope for cooperation along such lines.[36]

Soviet writers have steadily maintained that events in Afghanistan prior to Soviet intervention constituted a "serious threat to the security of our southern border."[37] To some extent, this argument may be a spurious justification for an intervention undertaken for other reasons. Yet, during the relevant period, the Soviet Central Asian press carried references to the possible extension of the "Islamic revival" into Soviet territory, to subversive activity among the Muslim population, and to the need, therefore, for greater attention to "atheistic work" and greater vigilance on the part of the region's internal security organs. This amount of attention suggests a genuine concern about the possibility that disorder in South West Asia might affect parts of the U.S.S.R.[38] The apparent tilt toward Iraq in Soviet attitudes about the Iran-Iraq War (and this despite frequent disputes between Iraq and the U.S.S.R. in the recent past) supports this suggestion. Here is an instance where regional instability clearly is perceived to threaten Soviet interests rather than to further them. To the extent that the U.S.S.R. is unwilling to

[36] See George Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972," in Alexander George, ed., *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 77-79, 81, 83, 85; Alexander George, "The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973," *ibid.*, 140-46.

[37] See, for example, Leonid I. Brezhnev, "Predvybornye sobrania trudyashchikhsya: Nash kurs—mirnoe sozidanie" [Preelection meetings of workers: Our course is peaceful construction], *Pravda*, February 23, 1981, pp. 1-2.

[38] For a recent discussion of this question, see Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims," *Problems of Communism* 33 (November/December 1984), 28-44.

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engage in further projection of force into the region in order to pacify it—and such actions appear improbable in a tense international environment where the U.S.S.R. is faced with an assertive American presence in the region, and the results of its intervention in Afghanistan are ambiguous—there may be some basis for tacit or even explicit cooperation in working to minimize such instability and to contain the forces encouraging it.

As a result of previous expansion, the U.S.S.R. has acquired a number of positions in the Third World which it has a stake in defending (*inter alia*, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Vietnam). In a limited sense, the Soviet Union itself has become a status quo power in the Third World. Thus, although it has an interest in the promotion of instability, it also has a stake in preventing challenges to friendly regimes and reversals in the process of national consolidation and socialist transformation in countries ruled by such regimes. There is little doubt, for example, that the Soviet Union would welcome a settlement in the Horn of Africa that leaves Ethiopia intact and permits a solution to the Eritrean problem. In southern Africa, the Soviet Union's interest in instability is balanced by its interest in the survival and consolidation of the Angolan and Mozambican regimes. For this reason, understandings that would remove external threats to client regimes, along the lines of the Soviet-American agreement on Cuba, are attractive to the U.S.S.R.

Finally, the quest for influence in the Third World makes the Soviet Union hesitant to undermine security initiatives which originate within the region in question or within broader Third World groupings (e.g., the nonaligned movement and the Islamic Conference), and which enjoy considerable regional and/or Third World support. This factor bears upon Soviet policy particularly in regions where Moscow's security interests are not immediately concerned (e.g., Africa). Soviet commentary on initiatives sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (concerning Chad and the western Sahara, for example), has consistently been positive. The same is true of the Soviet attitude toward initiatives on the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Conference, and the nonaligned movement. In other words, the Soviet Union's solicitude about its image in the Third World gives its leaders an incentive to support, or at least not to undermine actively, local efforts at conflict resolution.

To summarize, there are a number of factors that give the Soviet Union a limited interest in conflict prevention, limitation, and resolution in various parts of the Third World. They are: concern about confrontation and escalation, the threat of war, and the atmosphere of East-West relations; the Soviet desire for equal status in international politics;

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Soviet security interests that are perceived to be at stake in specific Third World contexts; the U.S.S.R.'s emergence in a limited sense as a status quo power with positions in the Third World that can be threatened; and Soviet sensitivity to Third World opinion. For reasons already noted, this interest is perhaps strongest in the Middle East, along the southwestern periphery of the Soviet Union. One might say, therefore, that there is a certain tension between doctrine and interest as they relate to conflict in the Third World. Although the considerations outlined in the previous section encourage skepticism about the degree to which the U.S.S.R. can be expected to collaborate in regional security regimes, one should not dismiss the possibility of meaningful cooperation.

IV. Policy Implications

Several considerations relevant to Western policy emerge from the above discussion. First, because of the Soviet commitment to anti-Western activity and Moscow's profound suspicion of Western intentions in the Third World, it is unrealistic to expect any meaningful comprehensive agreement on rules of the game in relation to Third World conflict, or any Soviet adherence to Western conceptions of stability. Expectations of broad-ranging accord on such issues are likely to be counterproductive, since subsequent perceived infringement of such accords will draw into question the utility of the process as a whole. It makes more sense to seek limited agreement on specific questions that are related to concrete Soviet interests. Moreover, in view of the long-standing and open Soviet commitment to transformation in the Third World and the importance to Soviet diplomacy of an anti-Western posture, it is quite unlikely that formal public accords can be concluded that draw these commitments into question. Informal, private approaches to regional security issues are likely to yield more useful results.

Second, many of the Soviet interests in some degree of cooperation on specific issues (for example, superpower restraint in the Middle East) are dependent to a considerable degree on the Soviets' perceiving the United States as a credible military force in the Third World. That is to say, credible deterrence is a prerequisite for meaningful discussion of regional security issues. On the issue of escalation from local wars, for example, it is the danger of confrontation that creates concern about escalation. Where there is no such danger, there is little need for such concern, and the basic anti-Western animus of Soviet foreign policy may emerge unfettered. Paradoxically, therefore, it is in periods of tense relations that progress is likely to be made on crisis avoidance and

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management. Agreements may be expected to endure only as long as the threat of retaliation remains credible. Hence, any understandings that do emerge from a dialogue on Third World issues should not be taken as a basis for dismantling conventional deterrence and diverting resources and attention to other issues.

With these propositions in mind, the analysis in Section III suggests a number of avenues for dialogue that have some potential. Soviet concerns about escalation, particularly in the Middle East, can perhaps be parlayed into formal or informal arrangements for consultation in crises and, possibly, agreements on nondeployment of combat personnel in regional disputes. Some benefit might also derive from the reinvolvement of the Soviet Union in the search for a Middle East peace settlement; in view of the intransigence and unpredictability of local actors, however, the prospects for such a settlement would remain low even with constructive Soviet participation in the peace process. Concrete Soviet security interests in South West Asia and the stake of the U.S.S.R. in the survival of a number of allied regimes elsewhere might be parlayed into agreements to the effect that neither superpower would challenge well-defined and mutally recognized interests of the other. Because of the political problems involved in subscribing to anything that might be construed as a "spheres of influence" arrangement, such agreements would probably have to be tacit or highly informal. Finally, Soviet sensitivity to Third World opinion suggests that one way to limit Soviet "misbehavior" would be to support more strongly attempts by regional organizations such as the OAU to resolve security problems within their regions. In this context, one may wonder what the outcome of the Angolan question would have been if the United States had strongly supported OAU initiatives in early and mid-1975 to ensure an orderly transition to independence, and if it had sought Soviet cooperation in such an effort.

All of the foregoing is predicated on the assumptions that it is in the U.S. interest to recognize that the U.S.S.R., as a global power, has a right to a role in regional security, and that there is sufficient flexibility in the American foreign policy process to permit action based upon such recognition. I do not intend to defend these assumptions. Suffice it to note that the first has not thus far been accepted by the present administration. This is itself one of the more substantial impediments to limited Soviet-American cooperation on security issues in the Third World.

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SHIFTS IN SOVIET VIEWS ON THE PROPER FOCUS OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

By JAMES M. McCONNELL

THERE is a widespread view in the West that Soviet strategic doctrine has not changed much since the early 1960s, and still concentrates on fighting and winning an all-out nuclear war. The Soviets are said to be reluctant to recognize thresholds, and therefore have no limited nuclear options, much less a true conventional war-fighting option. To the extent they do have a conventional option, it is contingent on surprise and a two-week blitzkrieg; if the war is not won quickly, they will have to escalate.

In this paper I propose a different thesis, based on an analysis of Soviet politico-military writings. Over the last three decades, the U.S.S.R.'s long-term military development strategy seems to have altered course on several occasions. Its orientation in the first half of the Khrushchev era was overwhelmingly nuclear, with programs maturing in the seven-year plan ending in 1965. In the single-minded pursuit of that goal, however, all other military options had to be sacrificed; Moscow evidently believed that all-out nuclear warfare was its only viable recourse.

The problem, then, was where to go next. In Khrushchev's last years in power the authoritative view apparently pushed for conventional warfare as the next focus of long-term development. Before this view could bear fruit in forces and doctrine, however, it came under open attack in 1965 by a contrary argument that nuclear war could eventually be made viable; the approach actually taken in the ensuing five-year plans—the development of nuclear options—was compatible with this argument. In 1977 (with Brezhnev's speech at Tula the apparent turning point), the Soviets returned to a primary conventional orientation, but without indicating any timetable for realizing it. Since the 1981 Party Congress, however (judging by Soviet statements and exercise scenarios), it has looked very much as if achieving an independent option for protracted conventional warfare with NATO is an immediate objective.

I will present evidence in the chronological order outlined above. Following that, I will attempt an explanation of the Soviet shifts in long-term military development, with special emphasis on the *asym-*

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metrical character of Soviet responses to Western initiatives. The Kremlin shies away from confronting U.S. strength, preferring instead to take advantage of any American weakness. Normally, it observes Washington's shifting choice of options and then moves in a completely different direction. Right now, the stress is on exploiting NATO's incapacity for protracted conventional conflict. In this approach, success is not predicated on surprise and a quick victory, but on staying power.

We may tentatively conclude that Marxism-Leninism furnishes the grounds for Soviet military competition with the West, but does not determine the form it assumes; that an admittedly distinctive strategic culture has done little to inhibit the Soviet Union's selection of options; that Moscow, in fact, has in the long run proved to be as flexible in its strategic choices as Washington; and that the Kremlin and General Staff recognize thresholds when it is in their interest to do so, and reject them when it is not. There is no qualitatively different Soviet approach to war-waging and deterrence. Rather, there is a mode of military-political reasoning common to both East and West, which may at any time result in different strategic doctrines because of the different force postures taken as premises. Swap the chosen force postures, and you swap strategic doctrines. The rub is that the two superpowers, apparently out of deliberate calculation, do not choose the same postures at the same time; their grand strategies are therefore never in phase. Today, as the United States moves toward nuclear war-waging, with conventional improvements designed to raise the nuclear threshold, the Soviet Union seems to be moving toward a full-fledged conventional option, with its nuclear capabilities basically intended to forestall U.S. escalation.

The Character of Soviet Discussions on Military Development

The Soviet press material under review here has long been a subject of debate in the West. There seems to be a common view among most of the debaters, encouraged in part by the Soviets themselves, that this material is marked by a divergence between the political leadership and the military scientists, who approach the problem from different perspectives and with different axes to grind (external propaganda requirements, concern for military morale, etc.).

I take the contrary view: that there has been no such divergence, that what appears at first sight to be a divergence is ultimately reconcilable. Whenever the political leadership has taken a stand, as was the case throughout the Khrushchev era and during the late Brezhnev, the Andropov, and the Chernenko eras, there seemed to be a "unity of views" in the Soviet press. It was only between 1965 and 1976 that disputes

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were aired; this period was characterized by the *failure* of the leadership to take a stand—perhaps either because there was no consensus in the Politburo or because the consensus did not wish to foreclose its options until it became a matter of committing vast resources.

Military science as such, the proper sphere of which is strictly the "armed struggle," was not directly involved in these discussions, which dealt with the "correlation of war and policy," especially in the context of the ongoing "revolution in military affairs." This subject is the concern of a special discipline, ponderously referred to by the Soviets as "Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War and the Army." It is a relatively independent "science," with roots in other sciences. Its sociological-philosophical aspects overlap with "historical materialism"; its sociopolitical aspects with "scientific communism"; and its economic aspects with "the political economy of socialism." As such, it tends to attract the efforts of philosophers, historians, and economists both in and out of uniform; those with degrees in military science have been few and, for the most part, had managed to expand their horizons. Their institutional affiliations included academies and institutes of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee, and the Academy of Sciences. Their media have been much of the civil and military press—wherever readers could be found who were interested in "the problem of war and peace," which is the central concern of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army.

No segment of this literature is specifically aimed at foreign readers; the principal target is domestic.[1] It is a peculiar form of inflated Western self-esteem that turns a literature read for profit in the Soviet Union into a performance for its own benefit. Moscow is, of course, aware of alien eavesdropping; hence, much of the rigid propaganda conventions, the misleading statements, the guarded language that borders on the opaque. The substance of the message is not affected, however; the Kremlin cannot afford to deceive its own cadres. If disinformation be defined as a communication that the Soviet elite, skilled in reading the literature of its specialty, would declare to be an untruth, then there is very little disinformation in the Soviet press.

As a "science," the findings of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army are not necessarily authoritative, except for their base in the Soviet classics. Only if the tenets are accepted by the political leadership do they become part of the "military policy of the CPSU,"[2] the strategy of

[1] This is true even of the *Soviet Military Review*. Western analysts tend to forget that this journal is also published in a Russian version, and not just in English and French.

[2] M. Sobolev, "Party Development in the USSR Armed Forces," *Soviet Military Review* (No. 9, 1983), 2; G. Sredin, "Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War and the Army," *ibid.* (No. 10, 1983), 5-8.

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which is said to be the equivalent of our concept of strategic doctrine, grand strategy, or national-security strategy.[3] From there, the findings can presumably also be incorporated into the subordinate "military doctrine of the Soviet state." The substantive relationship with military policy is emphasized here because of the difference in time horizon between military doctrine and military policy. Military doctrine, which is formulated by the U.S.S.R. Defense Council (a state, not a party, committee), deals only with "the present and near future," a code expression for the period five years in the future; in practice, this means the current five-year plan.[4] Military policy, which, as an "integral part" of general party policy is presumably formulated by the Politburo itself, deals with the foreseeable future—i.e., not only the near but also the more remote future, ten to fifteen or more years ahead.[5] And it is this more remote future that is of particular interest in the Soviet discussions examined below.[6]

Shifts in Long-Term Development Strategy, 1954–1965

The U.S.S.R. had hardly entered the nuclear era before Premier Malenkov, then in the ascendancy, declared that a war with these weapons could mean the end of civilization. The apparent implication, in view of the subsequent history of this concept, was that nuclear weapons could be used only for retaliation, and that the Soviet Union's basic reliance should be on conventional warfare. Khrushchev saw things differently: capitalism, not civilization, would perish in a nuclear war. He evidently expected that the Soviets' early R&D lead in ballistic missiles and ballistic-missile defense would achieve nuclear superiority. From the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War and the Army, the notable event of this period was the publication, in 1959, of a work in

[3] G. A. Trofimenko, *SShA: politika, voyna, ideologiya* [USA: policy, war, ideology] (Moscow, 1976), 3, 14-16; Yu. V. Katasonov, "Voennaya doktrina i voenno-strategicheskie kontseptsii" [Military doctrine and military-strategic concepts], in R. G. Bogdanov, M. A. Mil'shteyn, and L. S. Semeyko, eds., *SShA: voenno-strategicheskie kontseptsii* [USA: military-strategic concepts] (Moscow, 1980), 40-42. Translations are by the author of this article.

[4] James McConnell, *A Possible Counterforce Role for the Typhoon* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses Professional Paper No. 347, 1982), 1. The economic plan orientation of doctrine is also evident from the fact that the expression "near term," normally five years away, was extended in usage to cover the extra two years of the 1958–1965 seven-year plan. E. I. Rybkin, *Voyna i politika* [War and policy] (Moscow, 1959), 135-37.

[5] A. A. Epishev, "Voennaya politika KPSS" [The military policy of the CPSU], in A. A. Grechko and others, eds., *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya* [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], II (Moscow, 1976), 191-93.

[6] Since the remote future in the theory of War and the Army is often at odds with the vision of the near future enjoined by doctrine, this produces a tension in the literature which is not always easily resolved. This tension is not unknown in U.S. declaratory policy, either. In 1963, McNamara had to inform the Air Force privately that his counterforce rhetoric was to be taken as a guide to force employment rather than to force acquisition.

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support of Khrushchev's position by young Major Eugene Rybkin. It marked the beginning of a long career that has rung all the changes in Soviet development strategy.

Rybkin's target in 1959 was the theory of nuclear war's "self-elimination" because of its destructiveness. He agreed that the imperialists, expecting retaliation, were apprehensive about making a direct nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. The problem was their lack of fear of "little wars," which in Rybkin's view were likely to be the "prologue to a big war."[7] Since the imperialists ought to have been just as afraid of *escalating* to nuclear war as of *starting* one, the U.S.S.R. was the implied agent of escalation. A will to victory founded on nuclear strength was evidently needed to remedy an anticipated weakness in conventional warfare.

The opportunity costs to the U.S.S.R. of joining the nuclear club have generally not been appreciated in the West. Conventional capabilities were reduced to "near-austerity levels";[8] Moscow had no limited nuclear options; and the apparent expectation of strategic offensive and defensive systems that would make victory in all-out war possible at an acceptable cost did not prove out in developed hardware. The result was a single-option posture that was credible in only the direst of circumstances. Throughout the decade 1960–1970 the only scenario for coalition war that Moscow ever admitted was a threat to the very existence of the Soviet system.[9] Because the U.S.S.R. had no limited options, it could not participate in wars with limited objectives.

Before Krushchev's new systems could be fully deployed, the Kremlin apparently decided to shift direction. In the first half of the sixties the old pro-Malenkov theory of nuclear war's "self-elimination" was resurrected as the theory of nuclear war's "self-negation," which was elaborated at greatest length by the historian N. M. Nikol'skiy of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to this school, it was foolish to think a nuclear war could be limited;[10] it would "inevitably" escalate to all-out warfare. At that level, "superiority" is not a realistic objective, at least for the foreseeable future, because of the lack of means for shielding the population and troops against nuclear effects.[11] According to Rybkin—who, ever the disciplined communist,

[7] Rybkin (fn. 4), 129-31.

[8] Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Selective Nuclear Options and Soviet Strategy," in Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, eds., *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 84-85.

[9] James McConnell, *The Interacting Evolution of Soviet and American Military Doctrines* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum 80-1313, 1980), 37.

[10] General-Major N. Talenskiy, "Razdum'ya o minuvshey voyne" [Reflections on the late war], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 5, 1965), 23.

[11] G. Gerasimov, "Pervyy udar" [First strike], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 3, 1965), 61; G. Gerasimov, " 'Pentagoniya,' 1966," *ibid.* (No. 5, 1966), 41; G. A. Trofimenko, "Nekotorye

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had joined the new consensus—the victory of the offense in its age-old competition with the defense had "obviously become final," since an effective nuclear defense "cannot be created."[12] This in turn meant, according to Fedor Burlatskiy of the State and Law Institute, that world nuclear war "has become unthinkable as a result of the threat of mutual annihilation or of the infliction of unacceptable damage"; it has "made the victory of either side in a world conflict doubtful (or impossible)," "inasmuch as the victors will be in no better position than the vanquished."[13]

The upshot was that nuclear war had reached its historic limits and dialectically "negated itself" as a rational instrument of policy, an impasse long ago forecast by Lenin.[14] The school was at one in quoting the leader's words to his wife, Krupskaya: "There will come a time when war will get so destructive that it will be altogether impossible." Khrushchev himself urged wisdom in the same vein: "V. I. Lenin warned that the use of imposing achievements of technology for the mass extermination of millions of human beings ... would inevitably lead 'to undermining the very conditions of existence of human society.' ..."[15]

For this reason, nuclear systems had to be reserved for retaliation in

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aspekty voenno-politicheskoy strategii SShA" [Some aspects of U.S. military-policy strategy], *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (No. 10, 1970), 15, 17, 23, 26; V. Pechorkin, "O tak nazyvaemoy 'priemlemoy voyne'" [On so-called "acceptable war"], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 3, 1963), 34, 36; Yu. Sheynin, "Strategiya samoubiystva" [A strategy of suicide], *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [hereafter cited as *MEMO*] (No. 1, 1963), 144.

[12] E. Rybkin, "Zakony materialisticheskoy dialektiki i ikh proyavlenie v voennom dele" [The laws of materialist dialectics and their manifestation in military affairs], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (No. 7, 1964), 48.

[13] F. M. Burlatskiy and A. A. Galkin, *Sotsiologiya. Politika. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [Sociology, Politics, International relations] (Moscow, 1974), 284, 287.

[14] N. M. Nikol'skiy, *Osnovnoy vopros sovremennosti: problema unichtozheniya voyn* [The basic question of today: The problem of eliminating wars] (Moscow, 1964), 356-81, 412; Colonel P. Derevyanko, "Nekotorye osobennosti sovremennoy revolyutsii v voennom dele" [Some specifics of the present-day revolution in military affairs], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (No. 1, 1964), 24; V. I. Zamkovoy, *Kritika burzhuaznykh teoriy neizbezhnosti novoy mirovoy voyny* [A critique of bourgeois theories on the inevitability of a new world war] (Moscow, 1965), 46-51.

[15] "Rech' N. S. Khrushcheva," *Pravda*, July 11, 1962; General-Major N. Talenskiy, "Voennyy aspekt problemy sosushchestvovaniya" [The military aspect of the coexistence problem], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 7, 1960), 86; I. Sokolov, "Glavnaya problema sovremennosti" [The main problem of today], *MEMO* (No. 2, 1963), 16; A. Galkin, "Massy i tekhnika v sovremennoy voyne" [The masses and technology in modern war], *ibid.* (No. 10, 1963), 18; D. Aleksandrov, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i sud'ba chelovechestva" [Peaceful coexistence and the destiny of mankind], *ibid.* (No. 11, 1963), 10; B. Dmitriev, "Mednye kaski, Pekin i Klauzevits" [Brass helmets, Beijing, and Clausewitz], *Izvestiya*, September 25, 1963, p. 2; Colonel P. Trifonenkov, "Voyna i politika" [War and policy], *Krasnaya zvezda*, October 30, 1963, p. 3; General-Major K. Bochkarev and Colonel I. Sidel'nikov, "Novaya epokha, novye vyvody" [New era, new conclusions], *ibid.*, January 21, 1965, p. 2; N. V. Pukhovskiy, *O mire i voyne* [Of peace and war] (Moscow, 1965), 108; G. A. Trofimenko, *Strategiya global'nogo voyny* [The strategy of global war] (Moscow, 1968), 9.

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kind; "the Soviet Union," Khrushchev pledged, "will never use these weapons first."[16] This restraint had an ethical dimension. Communists, declared General-Major Bochkarev, do not subscribe to the bourgeois principle that "the end justifies the means." The retaliatory use of nuclear weapons is "legitimate retribution," but the U.S.S.R. cannot morally endorse the initiation of action "threatening the very existence of human civilization" simply by reference to the justness of its cause.[17] Colonel Sidel'nikov, Bochkarev's sometime collaborator, concurred. Traditionally, the character of the weapons used has not been a factor in determining a war's "essence," about which moral judgments are made. It would be "manifestly wrong," however, to observe this methodological rule in the case of weapons threatening to undermine, in Lenin's words, "the very conditions of existence of human society."[18]

If nuclear weapons cannot be used first, they obviously cannot be used for extended deterrence—i.e., to use A. I. Krylov's expression, the deterrence of "military threats of a lesser scale." Conventional threats will have to be met by a conventional war-fighting strategy, since "such traditional concepts of military science as the concept of 'military victory' retain their importance for conventional . . . wars." If the U.S.S.R. can prevail at that level, reserving its nuclear weapons for direct deterrence and retaliation, there is no morale problem for the Soviet armed forces in proclaiming the "futility" of global nuclear war for achieving political objectives.[19] (A similar argument was contemporaneously advanced by U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara.)

Up to 1965, this position seemed to prevail in the U.S.S.R. It apparently had the backing of Khrushchev and enjoyed some standing in the Ministry of Defense. In 1964 a collection of articles was sent to the printer, with a list of authors that read like a *Who's Who* of prominent Soviet military spokesmen—the Minister of Defense, his senior political officer, the Chief of the General Staff, distinguished strategists from the General Staff Academy, and so forth. Especially noteworthy was the article contributed by the compiler of the collection, Colonel P. M. Derevyanko,

[16] "Miting sovetsko-vengerskoy druzhby," *Pravda*, July 20, 1963; I. Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i oboronnaya moshch' SSSR" [Peaceful coexistence and the USSR's defense might], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 11, 1963), 43, 46.

[17] K. Bochkarev, "O kharaktere i tipakh voyn sovremennoy epokhi" [On the nature and types of war of the modern era], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (No. 11, 1965), 10-11.

[18] I. Sidel'nikov, "V. I. Lenin o klassovom podkhode k opredeleniyu kharaktera voyn" [V. I. Lenin on the class approach to determining the nature of wars], *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 22, 1965, pp. 2-3.

[19] Krylov, "Oktyabr' i strategiya mira" [October and the strategy of peace], *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 3, 1968), 5-11; N. M. Nikol'skiy, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya: mirovaya ekonomika, politika, naselenie* [The scientific-technical revolution: World economy, policy, population] (Moscow, 1970), 162-63; Burlatskiy and Galkin (fn. 13), 277.

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which blandly pronounced nuclear war's "self-negation."[20] (The other contributors could hardly claim a lack of foreknowledge in their association with him, since his article, like all the others, had been previously published elsewhere.)

Starting in late 1965, however, before any of its programs could be implemented, this consensus gave way to a new mainstream line. Since it amounted to a revival of the nuclear orientation of the early Khrushchev period, its proponents will be referred to as the "neo-nuclear school."

The Shift to Nuclear Strategy, 1965–1976

The attack on the theory of the self-negation of nuclear war was led off by two defectors from its ranks—General-Major Bochkarev, the Deputy Commandant of the General Staff Academy,[21] and Lieutenant-Colonel Rybkin of the Lenin Military-Policy Academy. Bochkarev's critique of Krylov and Nikol'skiy has been characterized as "more sophisticated";[22] in fact, it was cruder. He simply followed the standard Soviet tactic of attributing his own strategic preferences to the United States, and justifying the former by the latter.[23] He thereby obscured the essentially asymmetrical force postures assumed for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the neo-nuclear theory. American force acquisition at the time was guided by the concept of conventional arms as the sword and nuclear arms as the shield; with the neo-nuclear enthusiasts in the U.S.S.R., it was just the reverse.

Despite the dense, elliptical quality of the articles published by Rybkin beginning in September 1965, he and the others who wrote after him were more revealing on this score—for instance, in their treatment of the ethics of the use of nuclear weapons. Rybkin granted that these weapons had occasioned certain "adjustments" in the essence of war,[24]

[20] Derevyanko (fn. 14), in Derevyanko, compiler, *Problemy revolyutsii v voennom dele* [Problems of the revolution in military affairs] (Moscow, 1965), 111-12.

[21] In 1963, Bochkarev had declared: "Today enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons have already been accumulated on the globe, ... many more ... than required for the complete annihilation of the entire population of the earth. Thermonuclear war ... will create a real threat to the very existence of mankind." See "Voprosy mira i voyny v programme KPSS" [Problems of peace and war in the CPSU program], in K. Bochkarev, ed., *Programma KPSS o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva* [The CPSU program on the defense of the socialist Fatherland] (Moscow, 1963), 12. Bochkarev adhered to this view as late as June 1965: see Bochkarev (fn. 17), 11. However, in the second edition of his 1963 work, which was in galleys at the end of August 1965 and signed off to the press the following December, the above and a similar passage (p. 25) from the first edition were excised.

[22] Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 269.

[23] K. Bochkarev, "K voprosu o sotsiologicheskom aspekte bor'by s silami agressii i voyny" [The question of the sociological aspect of combatting the forces of aggression and war], *Voennaya mysl'* (No. 9, 1968), 10-11.

[24] This concession got Rybkin into trouble with the tougher-minded Colonel I. Grudinin;

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but at bottom he considered the question of nuclear use to be a matter of "expedience."[25] As one of Rybkin's colleagues at the Lenin Academy put it later, "an objective scholar in his assessment of war should be bound by general moral criteria based, not on the technical means with which it is fought, but on the political ends that it serves"[26]—the wartime political ends of socialist and imperialist states being just and unjust, respectively, by definition. Since the previous line had been willing to concede the morality of nuclear *retaliation*, the return to neutrality on the ethics of means must have been due to the perceived likelihood of escalating first-use by the U.S.S.R. I use the term *escalating* first-use, because the neo-nuclear school was no more anxious than its opponents to *start* a war. Both sides took their stand on the 1961 Party Program: "War may not and must not serve as a method of resolving international disputes."[27]

The fundamental asymmetry in projected force postures is most clearly revealed in Rybkin's revival of his 1959 argument against the theory of nuclear war's "self-elimination." Once again, he indicated that his principal anxiety was not over the Soviet Union's ability to deter a direct nuclear attack by promising assured destruction. In the past, to be sure, the criterion for success in deterrence had been a favorable correlation of war-waging forces that could deny the opponent a victory or lead to his defeat; at that time, "no country was able to neutralize the threat of aggression by a reciprocal threat to annihilate the aggressor." This situation changed with the advent of nuclear weapons. "Even if a present-day aggressor expects to succeed in salvaging some part of his population and national wealth, the cost of aggression gets too high and does not justify the objectives for which it was undertaken."[28] Analysts should linger over this passage. It appears to vitiate the argument that the neo-nuclear school's disenchantment with assured destruction and unacceptable damage lay in the deficiencies of these concepts as a guide to action, should direct nuclear deterrence fail.

As in 1959, the source of Rybkin's disenchantment lay elsewhere—in escalating first-use rather than reactive second use. In his view, a

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see Grudinin, "K voprosu sushchnosti voyny" [The problem of war's essence], *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 21, 1966, pp. 2-3.

[25] E. Rybkin, "O sushchnosti mirovoy raketno-yadernoy voyny" [On the essence of world nuclear-missile war], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (No. 17, 1965), 50.

[26] Rear-Admiral V. Shelyag, "Dva mirovozzreniya—dva vzglyada na voynu" [Two views on the world—two views on war], *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 7, 1974, p. 2.

[27] Editorial, "O sushchnosti voyny" [On the essence of war], *ibid.*, January 24, 1967, p. 3.

[28] E. I. Rybkin, "Obshchestvenno-politicheskie posledstviya revolyutsii v voennom dele" [Sociopolitical consequences of the revolution in military affairs] in N. A. Lomov, I. I. Anureev, and M. I. Galkin, eds., *Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i revolyutsiya v voennom dele* [Scientific-technological progress and the revolution in military affairs] (Moscow, 1973), 268.

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capacity for assured destruction is suitable for deterring an all-out attack, but it "is not to be regarded as a condition or a means for preventing all wars in general," including "little wars" fought with conventional means. The previous school of thought had wanted to meet the conventional threat with a response in kind, but there was no hint of this in Rybkin's approach. Bochkarev had foisted the onus of first-use off on the bourgeoisie; Rybkin followed the equally acceptable Soviet practice of foisting it off on objective processes—an immanent logic of escalation that automatically transforms conventional conflicts "into limited nuclear and then into world nuclear wars." The U.S.S.R. therefore had to prepare, not for conventional, but for nuclear warfare. Moreover, it had to have different deterrence criteria than in the case of a direct nuclear threat. As we have seen, to deter an all-out nuclear attack (deterrence proper), the threat of unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike was deemed sufficient, but to deter a conventional attack by the threat of escalation (extended deterrence), nuclear war-waging criteria had to prevail; the U.S.S.R. must be able to "defeat" the aggressor and gain a victory.[29]

This approach put the new school at loggerheads with the old. Rybkin proclaimed it "dangerous from the political point of view" to maintain that "victory in nuclear war is altogether impossible."[30] Given the different assumptions of the two schools—nuclear retaliation for one, nuclear first-use for the other—both can be easily accommodated in the mainstream of Western thinking on deterrence; no special Marxist-Leninist strategic culture is needed to account for Rybkin's emphasis on war-waging. Mainline deterrence theory has always taken the position that the threat of assured destruction is credible for deterring an all-out attack, but it lacks credibility in extended deterrence. There is no morale problem whatsoever—for the armed forces, the general public, or the leadership—in the decision to make an all-out response to an all-out attack that has already been unleashed. A decision to retaliate in kind involves no costs for one's own side; the costs are all upon the enemy, who has already inflicted all the damage he can. The decision-making calculation is quite different, however, in extended deterrence. There is a serious problem of morale—for the army, the public, and the leadership—in any decision to escalate in response to a conventional attack,

[29] *Ibid.*, 269; E. Rybkin, "Leninskie printsipy sotsiologicheskogo analiza voyn i sovremennost' " [Lenin's principles of the sociological analysis of wars and the present day], in A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, eds., *Filosofskoe nasledie V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny* [The philosophical legacy of V. I. Lenin and problems of war today] (Moscow, 1972), 42; E. Rybkin, "Leninskaya kontseptsiya voyny i sovremennost' " [Lenin's concept of war and its present-day relevance], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (No. 20, 1973), 27; Rybkin (fn. 25), 54.

[30] *Ibid.*, 55.

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because escalation implies the same gruesome consequence for one's own side as for the enemy. Unless we appreciate the special strain on the political will imposed by first-use, we will be at sea in understanding the issue at stake. As Bochkarev pointed out, there is more to deterrence than the simple possession of nuclear weapons; there is also the matter of the resolve to use them.[31] That resolve could not be mustered by threatening "unacceptable damage" (which would be the same for both sides), but by holding out the prospect of exclusive benefits from victory. It is not rational, in the value systems of either East or West, to advance national suicide as a motive for action.

The argument has been made that the dispute between the two schools was political and not theoretical,[32] but that is belied by the express words of Rybkin: it is not only politically harmful but also "theoretically incorrect" to say that a nuclear war cannot be fought and won at an acceptable price. Rybkin's sanguine attitude on this point, like Bochkarev's, was based primarily on the prospects of future military technology. He attacked General-Major Talenskiy for denying that acceptable forms of nuclear war could be found,[33] and later we see why: "all the available nuclear weapons might not be used in the war." Instead of the "hundreds of millions" of casualties expected from all-out war, you might get only the "tens of millions"[34] associated with a counterforce exchange.[35] Moreover, in the long run "there is a possibility of developing and creating new means of waging war, capable of effectively parrying an opponent's nuclear strikes."[36] This latter argument was in direct contradiction to what Rybkin had said only the year before.

These two points—(1) that limited nuclear options could be developed and (2) that eventually a first-strike solution could be found to all-out war—were the stock-in-trade of the neo-nuclear school. In 1971, the journal of the General Staff published an article by Captain First Rank Balev, which was later hailed by the editors for its role in forming "common views" in the officer corps,[37]—a tipoff that it enjoyed official

[31] Bochkarev (fn. 23), 8. [32] Freedman (fn. 22), 269. [33] Rybkin (fn. 25), 55.

[34] Rybkin in Lomov and others (fn. 28), 260; Georgi Arbatov, "Strength-Policy Statements," *World Marxist Review* 17 (No. 2, 1974), 61-63; Henry Trofimenko, "The Theology of Strategy," *Orbis* 21 (No. 3, 1977), 511-12; M. A. Mil'shteyn and L. S. Semeyko, "Ogranichennaya strategicheskaya voyna" [Limited strategic war], in Bogdanov, Mil'shteyn, and Semeyko (fn. 3), 208; L. Baturin, "Razryadka v Evrope i ee protivniki" [Detente in Europe and its opponents], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 6, 1982), 15.

[35] Sokolov (fn. 15), 17; B. T. Surikov, *Boevoe primenenie raket sukhoputnykh voysk* [The combat use of missiles of the ground troops] (Moscow, 1979), 82.

[36] Rybkin (fn. 25), 55; Bochkarev (fn. 23), 8; General-Major A. Kornienko and Captain V. Korolev, "Ekonomicheskie aspekty sovetskoy voennoy doktriny" [Economic aspects of Soviet military doctrine], *Voennaya mysl'* (No. 7, 1967), 30.

[37] "Konferentsiya chitateley na dvazhdy Krasnoznamennom Baltiyskom flote" [A readers' conference in the twice Red-Banner Baltic fleet], *Voennaya mysl'* (No. 9, 1973), 95-96.

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favor.[38] Balev took issue with the view that a nuclear war would be short as a result of the inevitable countervalue damage. He granted that existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons were sufficient to have this effect. However, these weapons could be used "at any moment," not necessarily all at the start. "And, in the second place, it is deemed indisputable that, in all the countries that have nuclear weapons, means and methods of active and passive defense against these weapons and their carriers will be perfected." As a result, nuclear war might be appreciably prolonged.[39]

The same message came through in a 1972 collection of articles co-edited by General-Major Milovidov of the Lenin Military-Policy Academy. One of the authors, Colonel A. A. Shirman, rejected "the opinion of bourgeois ideologues" that "a nuclear war ... can have only one consequence—the physical destruction of mankind." This bourgeois nuclear fatalism

> is founded on three main premises: a) an awareness of the great destructiveness of modern means of warfare; b) the notion that there are no limitations at all on the use of the latest weaponry in a nuclear war; and c) a recognition of the overwhelming superiority of modern means of attack over means of defense.
>
> The first of these premises is manifest. The other two arouse serious objections. ... Nuclear weapons, like other means of warfare, are an instrument of policy. ... The very nature of these weapons presupposes an especially strict control over their development and use as instruments of policy. And a serious deterrent effect is exerted on the policy of the imperialist powers by ... the nuclear weapons at the disposal of the USSR.
>
> One also cannot dogmatically absolutize the correlation of means of attack and means of defense that has taken shape in the initial stage of the present-day military-technological revolution. Historical experience attests that there are no means of attack that it would be impossible to oppose with effective countering means. To the extent military affairs undergo development, the correlation of means of attack and means of defense has changed and will continue to change. ... Raising the effectiveness of means of defense can substantially limit the number of casualties and the destruction associated with the use of nuclear weapons.
>
> Consequently, the existence of technology making possible the annihilation of hundreds of millions of people does not at all mean the extinction of mankind if a nuclear war breaks out. ...[40]

[38] James McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy," in Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 606-7.

[39] B. Balev, "Morskie i okeanskie kommunikatsii i bor'ba na nikh" [Sea and ocean communications and combat on them], *Voennaya mysl'* (No. 10, 1971), 42-43.

[40] Shirman, "Sotsial'naya aktivnost' mass i zashchita sotsializma" [The social activism of the masses and the defense of socialism], in Milovidov and Kozlov (fn. 29), 172-73.

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Proponents of the theory of nuclear war's self-negation had been fond of citing Lenin in their support, but the neo-nuclear school was also able to use this source of authority. Lenin was quoted in the Milovidov collection: "No matter how much the destruction of culture, it is impossible to strike it from historical experience; it will be hard to restore, but no destruction will ever lead to culture completely disappearing."[41] Since both schools could so easily find comfort in the classics, it is hard to see how the dispute can be termed ideological.

The neo-nuclear program for limited nuclear options was realized in the military doctrines and hardware of the seventies. From the turn of 1970–1971, a whole series of Soviet statements indicated that doctrine provided for a limited intercontinental option, based on multiple-warhead ICBMs for intitial counterforce and on withheld SS-N-8 missiles aboard the new Delta-class missile submarines for intrawar deterrence of U.S. attacks on Soviet cities. Similar communication techniques from the turn of 1975–1976 indicated an independent theater-nuclear option based on the new SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile and the Backfire bomber. This option eventually existed in two versions. The initial version postulated the employment of U.S.-based Minutemen and other strategic systems for hitting military targets in the European theater, avoiding Soviet territory; the implied Soviet counterpart was the use of U.S.S.R.-based SS-20s and Backfires for similar strikes. When NATO resolved to recouple the theater to the superpower homelands by deploying the Pershing-II and the ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, Moscow implicitly threatened to decouple once again with another version of the theater-nuclear option: NATO could use its Pershing IIs and Tomahawks, but their mobile SS-20 targets would no longer be in the U.S.S.R.; they would be redeployed to Eastern Europe.[42]

Although the neo-nuclear school had not achieved the second item on its agenda—a first-strike capability—this ambition was not dropped, even after the signing of the ABM Treaty. As late as 1976, Colonel Bondarenko of the Lenin Academy was still openly attacking N. M. Nikol'skiy by name for his 1964 thesis that the technology of nuclear warfare had reached its inner dialectical limits, leaving the world with "weapons whose use would have consequences so catastrophic for mankind" that governments would renounce them. "It is impossible," said Bondarenko, "to agree with this view," if only because "such hopes ignore the dialectic of means of attack and defense."

[41] Colonel V. F. Khalipov, "Problema voyny i mira v sovremennuyu epokhu" [The problem of war and peace in the modern era], *ibid.*, 24.

[42] McConnell (fn. 9), 42-88.

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> Granted the potential opponents do have the weapons for mutual destruction, then the side that first manages to create a means of defense against them will acquire a decisive advantage. The history of military-technological development is replete with examples where weapons that seemed invincible ... have, within a certain time, been countered by effective enough means of defense. Thus, an absolute limit to the development of military strength from the standpoint of the inner development of military affairs and scientific-technological progress cannot exist.[43]

Bondarenko thus came down foursquare on the side of a nuclear perspective in future military development. He acknowledged that "the prospects for developing traditional types of combat equipment and weaponry are quite promising. However, one should expect the greatest results in those fields where traditional military technology is combined with nuclear missile weapons." The example he gave was the conventional submarine; when equipped with nuclear power, automated control, and ballistic missiles, it rises into the category of a "highly effective strategic instrument."[44] If that was the measure of Bondarenko's concession to conventional options, it is evident that he and Nikol'skiy had little common ground indeed.

And yet it was Nikol'skiy, after all, who would have the last word. Bondarenko's 1976 essay is the last of its kind encountered in the literature. The long-term perspective of his school seems to have been decisively undermined by Brezhnev's speech at Tula in January 1977.

The Return to a Conventional Emphasis, 1977–Present

It is important to determine the positions that Moscow did, and did not, abandon at Tula. Brezhnev and his expositors were at one in the notion that, for the foreseeable future—contrary to the line running from Rybkin in 1965 to Bondarenko in 1976—neither side could achieve "superiority" in the form of a "first-strike" capability.[45] This was understood strictly in the Western sense as a unilateral, damage-limiting capacity in all-out war, achieved through some combination of offensive means and active and passive defensive means (ABM, counterforce against land and sea, civil defense).[46] Because defense of the population against

[43] V. M. Bondarenko, *Sovremennaya nauka i razvitie voennogo dela* [Modern science and the development of military affairs] (Moscow, 1976), 131-32.

[44] *Ibid.*, 133.

[45] "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," *Pravda*, January 19, 1977, p. 2; "Otvety tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva na voprosy ezhenedel'nika Sotsial-demokraticheskoy partii Germanii 'Forverts'," *Izvestiya*, May 4, 1978, p. 1.

[46] D. Ustinov, "Strazh mirnogo truda, oplot vseobshchego mira" [Guardian of peaceful labor and stronghold of universal peace], *Kommunist* (No. 3, 1977), 17-18; R. Simonyan, "O riske protivostoyanie," *Pravda*, June 14, 1977, p. 4; O. Bykov, "Glavnaya obshchechelovecheskaya problema" [The main problem common to mankind], *MEMO* (No. 3, 1980), 6; Henry Trofimenko, *Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence* (Los Angeles: University of Cal-

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an inevitable retaliatory strike is "unattainable," both technologically and financially, "that stage has thus been reached in the dialectics of war when it negates itself as a means of resolving conflicts and as a continuation of policy."[47] Once again it became fashionable, even for former neo-nuclear partisans, to quote Lenin's forecasts on the future impossibility of war due to its destructiveness, and on the threat it would pose to the very conditions of existence of human society.[48]

Brezhnev's speech at Tula, however, did not mean that Moscow had renounced its limited nuclear options. It was deemed impossible, in Soviet terminology, to achieve "superiority" (the ability to disarm or neutralize all three legs of the triad); but the possibility was not ruled out of achieving "partial counterforce advantages" (the capacity, say, to threaten one leg of the triad) within the constraints of "general countervalue parity."[49]

This reservation was reflected in the first timid steps toward a no-first-use formula for nuclear weapons. While Brezhnev did unilaterally renounce first use against powers that had no nuclear weapons and did not permit them on their territory, his words were carefully crafted to indicate the contrary in the case of nuclear powers. He did not say that the U.S.S.R. would use nuclear weapons only against another power committing *nuclear* aggression; he said that the U.S.S.R. would use them only against "another nuclear power" committing "aggression," which would include the non-nuclear type. Commentary by Soviet writers implied that the first-use contemplated in the Brezhnev formula was based on a limited-nuclear, not an all-out option.[50]

In spite of these reservations, one ultimately has to conclude that, from the standpoint of long-term military development, the Tula line had the effect of downgrading *all* nuclear options. The best index of this was the rehabilitation of holdouts from the old school, including

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ifornia Center for International and Strategic Affairs Working Paper No. 25, 1980), 6, 15-16, 31-36; E. Velikhov, "Nauka i aktunal'nye problemy bor'by protiv ugrozy yadernoy voyny" [Science and the urgent problems of combatting the threat of nuclear war], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 7, 1983), 24.

[47] M. V. Igolkin, "Istoriya i kompromissy" [History and compromises], *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 8, 1983), 117.

[48] *Ibid.*; A. S. Milovidov and E. A. Zhdanov, "Sotsial'no-filosofskie problemy voyny i mira" [Socio-philosophical problems of war and peace], *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 10, 1980), 33; G. V. Sredin, "Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennuyu epokhu" [Problems of war and peace in the modern era], *ibid.* (No. 10, 1982), 4; A. Bovin, "Neprekhodyashchee znachenie leninskikh idey" [The enduring importance of Lenin's ideas], *Kommunist* (No. 10, 1980), 78.

[49] Trofimenko (fn. 46), 20-21, 25; G. A. Trofimenko, "Strategicheskie metaniya Vashingtona" [Washington's Strategic gambles], *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (No. 12, 1980), 55-56; A. G. Arbatov, "Strategicheskiy paritet i politika administratsii Kartera" [Strategic parity and the policy of the Carter administration], *ibid.* (No. 11, 1980), 30, 35.

[50] Milovidov and Zhdanov (fn. 48), 36-37.

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Nicholas Nikol'skiy and Fedor Burlatskiy. The latter was brought back from the obscurity of the State and Law Institute to head up the Philosophy Department of the Central Committee's Social Sciences Institute; today he appears on the same platform with former opponents—all espousing a common antinuclear line.[51] As for Nikol'skiy, one year after Tula—about the time it takes to write a book—he and a collaborator were out with a new book, but with the same old thesis: once again nuclear war's self-negation was proclaimed,[52] and once again conventional war was specifically exempted from this judgment.[53]

> All of the above pertains to world war with the use of nuclear-missile technology and thus cannot be extended to armed conflicts and wars with the use of conventional arms. In the present era the imperialist powers have a very elaborately worked-out strategy for waging wars with the use of conventional arms. . . . This makes it necessary also to oppose to the imperialist powers a corresponding power on the part of peaceloving forces. . . .[54]

This statement did not reflect simply one other, tolerated view; Nikol'skiy was now in the mainstream. Although a recommendation of his work by the Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's Bloc Relations Department and other civilian reviewers[55] may not impress some Western analysts, they should take notice of two favorable citations in an article by General Milovidov of the Lenin Academy.[56] Eugene Rybkin, by then promoted to full colonel at the Institute of Military History, seems to have ignored the appearance of Nikol'skiy's book. However, he did the next-best thing to show theoretical reconciliation. In two major works published in 1979, Rybkin commended a 1965 book by V. I. Zamkovoy,[57] whose antinuclear views are indistinguishable from those of Nikol'skiy.[58]

Nikol'skiy's thesis was avowedly not a program for immediate action;

[51] See the entire section entitled "Sotsial'no-filosofskie problemy mira i progressa" [Socio-philosophical problems of peace and progress], *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 12, 1982), 57-96.

[52] N. M. Nikol'skiy and A. V. Grishin, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [Scientific-technological progress and international relations] (Moscow, 1978), 248-55.

[53] *Ibid.*, 249-50. [54] *Ibid.*, 261.

[55] G. K. Shakhnazarov, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i razryadka mezhdunarodnoy napryazhennosti: obshchie voprosy teorii" [Peaceful co-existence and international detente: general problems of theory], *Obshchestvennye nauki* (No. 1, 1981), 107; N. Lebedev and I. Tyulin, "Mezhdunarodnye aspekty nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii" [International aspects of the scientific-technological revolution], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 11, 1979), 122-23.

[56] Milovidov and Zhdanov (fn. 48), 35, 39.

[57] E. I. Rybkin, *Kritika burzhuaznykh ucheniy o prichinakh i roli voyn v istorii* [A critique of bourgeois doctrines on the causes and role of wars in history] (Moscow, 1979), 127-28; E. I. Rybkin, V. T. Login, and others, *Filosofiya i voennaya istoriya* [Philosophy and military history] (Moscow, 1979), 295.

[58] Zamkovoy (fn. 14), 46-51. More recently, Zamkovoy has collaborated on a book with

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it was set in the context of events taking shape "by the year 2000."[59] However, what was of only long-term, military-policy concern in the immediate aftermath of Tula would appear to have become a matter of mid-term doctrinal concern starting in 1981.

The conventional option had not come entirely out of the blue. In the mid-sixties, Soviet doctrine had begun to accept the possibility of an initial conventional phase to a "war-by-stages" that would "inevitably" escalate. For about a decade, planning for this phase was evidently in terms of a theater "front operation" (eight to twenty days in World War II). In the last half of the 1970s, conventional planning was expanded to cover at least a theater "strategic operation" (up to thirty days for a World War II offensive).[60] It may even have included an independent conventional option, provided the war would not last too long and could be confined to either the European or the Asiatic theater, but not both. The basic emphasis, however, was on escalation to nuclear warfare in the theater; the Soviets considered this the "most likely" option.[61]

Only in 1981, the same year that the Soviet armed forces reportedly carried out their first all-conventional exercise since 1960,[62] did Soviet doctrine avowedly make the transition to full-fledged conventional warfare as the basic option.[63] The principal "threat" that the U.S.S.R. now had to meet was a "general conventional war," with the combat action encompassing Europe, the Near, Middle, and Far East, and all sea and ocean theaters. As many countries could get involved as in World War II, and the war would be protracted, "extending over many years."[64] In

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L. S. Semeyko, *Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennoy ideologicheskoy bor'be* [Problems of war and peace in the present-day ideological struggle] (Moscow, 1978).

[59] Nikol'skiy and Grishin (fn. 52), 234, 248. The publisher's synopsis on the obverse of the title page emphasizes that the author's "scientifically valid and convincing analysis of the prospects for ensuring universal peace out to the year 2000 is of special interest." It is conceivable, then, that Tula was part of the background for drafting the 20-year program soon to be promulgated for the period 1981–2000.

[60] McConnell (fn. 9), 92-97.

[61] R. Simonyan, "Voyny glazami Pentagona" [Wars through the eyes of the Pentagon], *Krasnaya zvezda*, May 27, 1976, p. 3; P. A. Zhilin and R. Bryul', eds., *Voenno-blokovaya politika imperializma* [The military-bloc policy of imperialism] (Moscow, 1980), 254, 360, 363; G. I. Korotkov, "Obychnaya voyna" [Conventional war], in Bogdanov, Mil'shteyn, and Semeyko (fn. 3), 248-51.

[62] See Arch Shero and Richard Oden, "Exercise Zapad-81," in *Review of the Soviet Ground Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency DDB-1100-362-82, 1982), 1.

[63] M. M. Kir'yan, ed., *Voenno-tekhnicheskiy progress i Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR* [Military-technical progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR] (Moscow, 1982), 312-13; G. A. Sredin, D. A. Volkogonov, and M. P. Korobeynikov, *Chelovek v sovremennoy voyne* [Man in modern war] (Moscow, 1981), 132; N. V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva* [Always in readiness for the defense of the Fatherland] (Moscow, 1982), 34-35. For a discussion of these sources, see James McConnell, "The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine," unpub., 45-50.

[64] Ogarkov (fn. 63), 14-17; *Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru* [Whence the threat to peace], 2d.

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the 1960s, and even in the late 1970s, the theater "campaign" (three to five months' duration in World War II) had been treated as a "historical" category, without current relevance.[65] The fact that this is no longer the case in the 1980s[66] suggests a return to multiple campaigns as the basis for war plans.

The protracted character of the Soviet conventional option has to be emphasized. Countries and alliances tend to hold theories about the enemy that fit comfortably with the effort they are willing to put into coping with him. According to the prevailing view, general staffs do not plan for long wars. Marxism-Leninism in particular, it is said, holds that economic strength is decisive in such wars. Since the Soviet Union is economically weaker, it realizes that it must end the war quickly before the Western economy can be brought to bear fully. Hence the Soviets' obsession with blitzkrieg and their belief that surprise is essential to success.

Would that this were so; the problem would still not be simple, but it would be simplified. In Marxism-Leninism it is not gross economic strength that is considered crucial, but the share of that strength which is allotted to war production; the Soviet socialist system is repeatedly praised for its allocation superiority.[67] Nor is surprise deemed essential. With the return to a conventional option, the Soviets have revived, with word-for-word fidelity, the old Stalinist pre-nuclear formula that surprise is one of the war's "temporarily operating factors," which can have

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ed. (Moscow, 1982), 67; R. Simonyan, "Ocherednaya doktrina agressii" [Another doctrine of aggression], *Novoe vremya* (No. 49, 1982), 8-9; Anonymous, "Formirovanie voenno-politicheskoy strategii administratsii Reygana" [Molding the military-policy strategy of the Reagan administration], *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (No. 5, 1982), 119-20, 123-24, 127; *ibid.* (No. 6, 1982), 118; V. V. Zhurkin, "Respublikanskaya administratsiya: formirovanie voenno-politicheskoy strategii" [The Republican administration: molding its military-policy strategy], *ibid.* (No. 11, 1981), 6-8; V. A. Mazing and S. K. Oznobishchev, "V pogone za voennym prevoskhodstvom" [In pursuit of military superiority], *ibid.* (No. 9, 1982), 46; R. Simonyan, "Agressivnaya strategiya Vashingtona" [Washington's Aggressive strategy], *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 27, 1982, p. 3; V. Larionov, "Strategiya voennykh avantyur" [A strategy of military adventures], *ibid.*, May 29, 1981, p. 3; L. Semeyko, "SShA—istochnik voennoy opasnosti" [The U.S.—source of the military threat], *ibid.*, September 18, 1981, p. 3; G. Trofimenko, "Strategiya 'pryamogo protivoborstva'" [The strategy of "direct confrontation"], *ibid.*, June 2, 1982, p. 3; D. F. Ustinov, "Otstoyat' mir," *Pravda*, June 22, 1981, pp. 2-3; I. Perov, "Amerikanskaya strategiya 'pryamogo protivoborstva'—ugroza miru i bezopasnosti" [The American strategy of "direct confrontation"—a threat to peace and security], *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (No. 9, 1982), 10-11.

[65] "Kampaniya, voennaya" [Campaign, military], in General Staff Academy, *Slovar' osnovnykh voennykh terminov* [Dictionary of basic military terms] (Moscow, 1965), 102; M. I. Cherednichenko, "Kampaniya" [The campaign], in N. V. Ogarkov and others, eds., *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya* [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], IV (Moscow, 1977), 55.

[66] "Kampaniya" [The Campaign], in N. V. Ogarkov and others, eds., *Voennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* [Desk military encyclopedia] (Moscow, 1983), 313.

[67] See, for example, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov, "Opyt i uroki istorii," *Pravda*, April 2, 1983, p. 3.

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an "enormous" influence on the war's course and no influence worth mentioning on its final outcome.[68] (In the hierarchy of Soviet terminology, an enormous, great, serious, or significant influence is the weakest; it does not rival a "vital" influence, much less a "decisive" one.)

The Soviet Union is not obsessed with blitzkrieg. From the early days of the Soviet regime right down to World War II, its doctrine postulated that a future conflict would be protracted.[69] Planning obviously went forward on that basis. It was not until December 1942—eighteen months after the U.S.S.R. entered the war—that peacetime reserves to sustain war production were basically exhausted, so that Moscow had to be satisfied with current output.[70] The war had demonstrated that it took a year to reorganize the national economy fully on a war footing.[71] This experience probably accounted for the postwar belief, down to the early 1960s, that "the basic thing strategy needs to establish is the requirements of the armed forces for the first year of conducting military action."[72] Only for less than a decade—from about 1962 to the end of 1970—did the main emphasis rest on a short war. This accent was not the result of any obsession with blitzkrieg; it was associated with the all-out nuclear option. Subsequently, when Moscow made the transition to limited-nuclear and conventional options, the emphasis gradually shifted back once again to a longer-war perspective.[73]

No country would prefer to fight a long war if it could win quickly. Soviet strategy is evidently conservative in its calculations. Moscow may hope for a blitzkrieg if all goes well, but evidently thinks it cannot count on it. Unlike in the Great Patriotic War, the correlation of forces for the "initial phase" is not considered in the enemy's favor, but there is also no claim of a decisive advantage for the Soviet side.[74] The Kremlin may believe that the Warsaw Pact is not so strong, nor NATO so weak,

[68] O. A. Rzheshevskiy, I. S. Vasil'tsov, and others, *Vnezapnost' v operatsiyakh vooruzhennykh sil SShA* [Surprise in the operations of the U.S. armed forces] (Moscow, 1982), 3-5, 18; General-Colonel V. Popov, "Nekotorye voprosy vnezapnosti" [Some problems with surprise], *Voennaya mysl'* (No. 12, 1951), 17-21.

[69] Kir'yan (fn. 63), 72; General of the Army S. P. Ivanov, ed., *Nachal'nyy period voyny* [The war's initial period] (Moscow, 1974), 72, 203.

[70] A. M. Belikov, "Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Oborony i problemy sozdaniya slazhennoy voennoy ekonomiki" [The State Defense Committee and problems of creating a well-coordinated war economy], in P. N. Pospelov, ed., *Sovetskiy tyl v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne* [The Soviet rear in the Great Patriotic war], I (Moscow, 1974), 77.

[71] *Ibid.*, 70.

[72] Colonel A. N. Lagovskiy, *Strategiya i ekonomika* [Strategy and the economy] (Moscow, 1957), 194.

[73] McConnell (fn. 9), 25-26, 60-63; McConnell (fn. 63), 52-55.

[74] V. V. Larionov, "Perspektivy budushchego i opyt istorii. K 40-letiyu nachala Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Prospects for the future and the experience of the past: The 40th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic war], *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (No. 6, 1981), 11.

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that a swift victory can be expected.[75] This is not to suggest that NATO should not repair its posture to meet a sudden Soviet thrust from a standing start or quicker mobilization. The West should simply not imagine that, once NATO's posture is repaired, the whole problem is resolved. It is time Western analysts turned their attention to the reserves that Moscow might be squirreling away for protracted conflict, in hopes of outlasting NATO.

Skeptical attention might be directed to the official Soviet explanation for the unprecedented cuts in investment growth rates in both the 1976–1980 and 1981–1985 planning periods—by over one-third and one-half, respectively. They were not made for the benefit of the consumer. Nor can they be attributed to a policy of "guns over growth":[76] *at that very same time*, according to the C.I.A.'s calculations, the growth rate in the value of hardware deliveries to the armed forces was cut in half for all major categories.[77] The cuts in both investment and military hardware coincided in time with the Soviet shift to a much longer conventional phase, and then to an independent protracted conventional option. It has been suggested that state reserves have been the real winner from the investment cutbacks,[78] but evidence for this proposition is lacking. At the same time, the unprecedented emphasis Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov now puts on improving the mobilization infrastructure and on increasing stockpiles of matériel for war industry should be noted.[79]

Nuclear Implications of the Conventional Option

While conventional warfare seems to be the basic Soviet option, it is not the only one. Moscow has not abandoned its intercontinental counterforce option,[80] and it has only modified its theater-nuclear option. Confronted with the imminent U.S. deployment of the Pershing II and Tomahawk, Brezhnev agreed in 1981 to recouple the European theater

[75] See the presumably surrogate view attributed to Secretary of Defense Weinberger in I. Perov (fn. 64), 10-11.

[76] Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982/83), 167 ff.

[77] "Soviets Seen Slowing Pace of Arming," *Washington Post*, November 20, 1983, p. A14.

[78] *Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales* (April 1981), 1 ff., trans. in *USSR Report: Military Affairs No. 1619* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 79061, September 25, 1981), 64 ff.

[79] Ogarkov (fn. 63), 57-68; N. Ogarkov, "Na strazhe mirnogo truda" [On guard over peaceful labor], *Kommunist* (No. 10, 1981), 89-91; N. Ogarkov, "Tvorcheskaya mysl' polkovodtsa," *Pravda*, October 2, 1982, p. 3; I. Beletskiy, "Zashchita Rodiny—dela vsego naroda" [Defending the Motherland—a cause of the entire people], *Voennyy vestnik* (No. 10, 1982), 19.

[80] McConnell (fn. 63), 67-70.

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to the superpower homelands by declaring the escalation of a theater-nuclear conflict to be "inevitable."[81] This recoupling, however, is apparently limited to a sea-based response,[82] which Moscow insists will be equal in every way to the Pershing-Tomahawk threat,[83] including tit-for-tat targeting.[84] Since American Euromissiles will not be targeted on Soviet cities and intercontinental-strategic facilities but on assets useful in theater warfare, the U.S.S.R. will presumably respond in kind. In short, Moscow evidently considers itself to have an independent theater-nuclear option, but one expanded to include the targeting of assets of theater significance located in the superpower homelands. However, the primary rationale for all Soviet nuclear options is now retaliation—the inhibition of American escalation.

This approach was reflected in Brezhnev's unilateral commitment, in June 1982, not to use nuclear weapons first.[85] The commitment met with widespread incredulity in the West. It was said to offer nothing new, with the implication that it was therefore beneath notice. But, clearly, the General Secretary *was* saying something new. His previous line had been that the U.S.S.R. would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, but as we have seen, he had by no means renounced first use against a "nuclear power" committing "aggression." The shift to a new line is quite apparent in Marshal Ustinov's reformulation: "Only extraordinary circumstances—direct nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union or its allies—could compel us to resort to a retaliatory nuclear strike as the ultimate means of self-defense."[86]

Even those in the West who acknowledge the novelty of unilateral no-first-use have tended to dismiss it as sheer propaganda. Of course, incredulity is justified to the extent that one is supposed to believe, on the strength of a purely verbal commitment, that Moscow would never

[81] "Otvety L. I. Brezhneva na voprosy redaktsii zapadnogermanskogo zhurnal *Shpigel'*," *Pravda*, November 3, 1981, p. 1; "Otvet tov. L. I. Brezhneva na pis'mo avstraliyskoy organizatsii, vystupayushchey za mezhdunarodnoe sotrudnichestvo i razoruzhenie," *ibid.*, February 25, 1982, p. 1.

[82] V. Samoylenko, "Chtoby obezopasit' sebya i soyuznikov" [Ensuring the security of ourselves and our allies], *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 9, 1983, pp. 2-3.

[83] See the remarks of N. V. Shishlin, broadcast over Moscow Domestic Service on December 9, 1983, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, December 12, 1983, III, p. CC10.

[84] Moscow broadcast to North America on December 19, 1983, *ibid.*, December 20, 1983, III, p. A2.

[85] L. Brezhnev, "Vtoroy spetsial'noy sessii General'noy Assamblei OON," *Pravda*, June 16, 1982, p. 1.

[86] D. F. Ustinov, *Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma* [We serve the Motherland and the cause of communism] (Moscow, 1982), 72; "Obuzdat' gonku vooruzheniy, predotvratit' yadernuyu katastrofu" [Curb the arms race and prevent a nuclear catastrophe], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (No. 9, 1982), 6; D. F. Ustinov, "Otvesti ugrozu yadernoy voyny," *Pravda*, July 12, 1982, p. 4.

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use nuclear weapons first. The Soviets have the full panoply of nuclear weapons and will use them if they feel it necessary, to their advantage, and worth the cost. The point is that they do not think it will be necessary. The Kremlin would not mislead its elites on a point so fundamental. Declaratory policy is normally carefully drawn to reflect the real balance of capabilities or the intention to acquire those capabilities. Only a power confident of its conventional option can afford, even verbally, to renounce nuclear first-use; given that confidence, there are extensive propaganda benefits to be derived from publicly foisting off on an opponent the odium of escalating the costs of war. Moscow cannot have forgotten its own embarrassment in the flourishing days of assured destruction when NATO was ahead in conventional weapons, and it is hardly to be expected that the Kremlim would forgo ethical self-congratulations now that the tables are turned. The Soviets hope to strike a mimetic chord in the West, hamper NATO's nuclear rearmament, and perhaps leave the alliance suspended between the nuclear and conventional stools.

As in the late Khrushchev era, no-first-use also has moral connotations. In September 1981, Foreign Minister Gromyko advocated a U.N. resolution to the effect that states and statesmen who used nuclear weapons first would be committing a very grave crime against mankind.[87] The neo-nuclear school had long drawn a distinction between the essence of war as a continuation of policy and its expedience as an instrument of policy. The former related mainly to the sociopolitical class ends of war, which were subject to moral judgment; the latter related to the means of war and were of mere pragmatic import, without trenching on ethics. Gromyko's address changed all that. Acccording to General Rybkin and his colleagues,

> a world war with the use of nuclear-missile weapons ... is absolutely unacceptable, not only for pragmatic, but above all for moral and ethical reasons, since a nuclear war would be a crime, not only against those living today, but also against future generations. ...[88]

This meant that Moscow now had two sticks for beating the bourgeois—one for his unjust ends and another for his unjust means.

Along with this went a firm denial—contradicting everything the Soviets had said for years—that it was possible to fight and win a nuclear war. Brezhnev himself launched this line at the XXVI Party Congress in February 1981 with the statement that "to expect victory in nuclear

[87] "XXXVI sessiya General'noy Assamblei OON: Vystuplenie A. A. Gromyko," *Pravda*, September 23, 1981, p. 4.

[88] E. Rybkin, I. Tyulin, and S. Kortunov, "Anatomiya odnogo burzhuaznogo mifa" [The anatomy of one bourgeois myth], *MEMO* (No. 8, 1982), 141.

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war is dangerous insanity."[89] Any appearance of equivocation in this formula had been entirely erased by the end of the year. According to Fedor Burlatskiy, not only does the U.S.S.R. not *expect* to win a nuclear war, it believes "there will be no victors in a nuclear war." Indeed, "nuclear war has no rational objectives, from whichever side of the ocean the problem is examined." He agreed that "every patriotically inclined person cannot help but favor strengthening the power of his country." However, since nuclear weaponry

> is totally destructive, it automatically increases the danger for both sides.
>
> Such is the dialectic of the poisoned thermonuke [*termoyad*]. . . . It is not at all like the logic of conventional weaponry, which remains as before: The better-armed army is still stronger than the worse-armed army, and in all circumstances the army remains the guarantee of national security. For an army with conventional weapons is in fact in a position to defend its borders and its population. Conventional weapons are instruments of security even in our day. . . .[90]

Explaining the Shifts in Soviet Views

Up to this point, we have traced the oscillations in the Soviet long-term perspective on military development without supplying an explanation for these shifts. The symmetrical action-reaction phenomenon is the usual model of the arms race; the model for stopping it is inaction-inaction. These have recently been subjected to a good deal of justifiable criticism; Moscow has gone its own way far too often, without obvious reference to American initiatives and certainly without obvious emulation of American restraint. This has brought to the fore a competing model—that there are differences in strategic culture between the two superpowers, which either encourage or inhibit one superpower, but not the other, from adopting this or that point of strategic doctrine. This explanation, too, has its drawbacks. As we have seen, Moscow over time seems to have been just as catholic in its choice of options as Washington.

The point to be noted about the two sides' interaction is that their flexibility has not been manifested in tandem. They have never put the main burden of the competition on the same option at the same time; had they done so, the arms race might well have wound down. The action-reaction model assumes the pitting of effort against effort, strength against strength. It treats as crucial that passion for competitive symmetry

[89] "Doklad General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," *Pravda*, February 24, 1981, p. 4.

[90] Burlatskiy, "Novaya strategiya? Net! Yadernoe bezumie" [A new strategy? No! Nuclear madness], *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 2, 1981, p. 14. See also Rybkin and others (fn. 88), 141; "Vystuplenie A. A. Gromyko," *Izvestiya*, October 2, 1982, p. 4.

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which is strong in each and every one of us. In both East and West, to justify an advocated course, it is usually considered sufficient to demonstrate that the enemy has trod the path ahead of you. However, in military development as on the battlefield, the smart money on both sides seems to have preferred to bet on strength against weakness, to move into spheres where the opponent is unable to go or has neglected to go, or which he has vacated.

In short, rather than action-reaction, there has been action-inaction; and, instead of inaction-inaction, there has tended to be inaction-action. Since there are numerous options, with technology periodically adding more, and since it is economically impossible to cover all of them with the same across-the-board intensity, the competitive scramble seems endless; each of the protagonists strives to nail down at least one option that he can call his own, and shifts from one end of the escalation spectrum to the other as opportunities unfold and advantages disappear. The competitive interaction is always present, though (at least on the U.S. side) with varying degrees of intensity; but the form assumed by this interaction tends to be asymmetrical, and there are startling reversals of position. Who would have ever thought that Eugene Rybkin would one day sound like Robert McNamara, while McNamara's successor was using language that Rybkin now prefers to forget?

Here is how this model has worked out in practice. In reaction against the grand strategy of the Truman era, as Gaddis points out, the central idea of the Eisenhower Administration "was that of asymmetrical response—of reacting to adversary challenges in ways calculated to apply one's own strengths against the other side's weaknesses, even if this meant shifting the nature and location of the confrontation. . . ."[91] The Soviets' great strength lay in conventional forces, which had swollen as an asymmetrical response to the U.S. nuclear monopoly. Rather than grapple with that strength, Washington chose to exploit its advantage in techniques for proliferating nuclear weapons and, above all, in the means for delivering them at vast ranges.

It was inevitable that, as the U.S.S.R. moved into the nuclear-missile era, Washington would have to abandon massive retaliation. Faced with the ultimate infeasibility of unilateral damage limiting, Secretary McNamara initially elected to exploit still another Soviet vulnerability—the U.S.S.R.'s low capacity for a cooperative damage-limiting strategy. Analysts hung up on the action-reaction model have long been puzzled by the Kennedy administration's adoption of larger missile-acquisition

[91] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 147.

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objectives even after it had become clear that the missile gap was a myth. But the aim was not simply to *neutralize* the Russians at the nuclear level. Still under the spell of the strategic assumptions of the 1950s, which despaired of matching the Russians in conventional arms, the administration sought balance in an escalatory war-waging counterforce strategy, for which parity would not suffice. The discovery of a greater-than-expected Soviet vulnerability in numbers of nuclear weapons was almost a precondition for the option, justifying the great expenditures involved.

To be sure, the fascination with counterforce did not last long, but—contrary to the general impression—this was apparently not due to the inherent disabilities of the option itself or to the objections of NATO allies. The same disabilities may be found in any limited option relying upon voluntary constraints; the opponent can always escalate, provided he is able to muster the strength of will to raise the costs of war and believes that the benefits will outweigh the costs (a difficult decision in the case of all-out-war). As for the NATO allies, they had even firmer objections to what replaced counterforce than they did to counterforce itself.

The timing of the shift away from counterforce coincided with new intelligence estimates of Soviet conventional capabilities, which opened the way for an alternative to nuclear weapons.[92] To pay the price of entry into the nuclear club, Moscow had been drawing down on its conventional strength for a decade; what had once been its greatest asset had become a source of vulnerability. In short, McNamara gave up exploiting a Soviet weakness in counterforce in favor of exploiting still another Soviet weakness in conventional warfare. The transition from one to the other—especially in declaratory policy—was not abrupt but gradual, and was complete only in early 1965.

In the U.S.S.R. it was the other way around. When Washington was pushing limited nuclear options, Moscow seemed to lean toward conventional ones; when the U.S. finally declared its conversion to conventional warfare (January 1965), the Soviet Union went resolutely nuclear (September 1965). The American exploitation of asymmetry is usually based on superior technology. The Soviets have no such comparative advantage; they compete by taking up options vacated or neglected by the West. Both their limited intercontinental and theater-nuclear options were based on the MIRV concept, and MIRV was an American inno-

[92] Milton Leitenberg, "Background Materials in Tactical Nuclear Weapons," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Tactical-Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), 12-14.

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vation. However, while the U.S. introduced these multiple warheads to bolster assured destruction,[93] the U.S.S.R. used them to pioneer in counterforce. For some time to come, the burden of proof is likely to be heavy on anyone who argues that the way to end the arms race is to set the Soviets an example of restraint. Inaction on the part of the United States is likely to encourage action by the Soviet Union.

Shifts in the development focus of both superpowers in the seventies offered another opportunity to test the hypothesis of asymmetrical response. In the case of the U.S., which moved gradually, and not always steadily, from assured destruction to damage-limiting options, it is uncertain how much of this was in response to similar Soviet initiatives and how much to compensate for trends implying that NATO would not have the long-run stamina to stick to McNamara's conventional option. Both Kissinger and Schlesinger have argued that the U.S. required limited nuclear options for extended deterrence more than the U.S.S.R., in view of the anticipated failure of Washington's conventional option.[94] As early as mid-1972 (before the Soviet MIRV tests of the summer of 1973 had demonstrated which way Moscow was moving), Kissinger had been authorized by the President to chair an interdepartmental group "to come up with additional nuclear war options."[95] Justifications of subsequent U.S. moves in this direction were largely couched in terms of the action-reaction model: the U.S.S.R. was taking the nuclear path; therefore the U.S. must, too.[96] Initially, the Carter administration was not disposed toward nuclear war-waging; Presidential Directive 59 was apparently the fruit of the increasing accuracy of Soviet missiles. Still, however cloudy the declaratory record for much of the period, one could argue in retrospect that the unfolding of the American position—from Schlesinger's selective targeting, to Carter's PD-59, to Reagan's "Star Wars" development concept—represented a natural evolution determined by the logic of the American situation: if not conventional, then nuclear.

In any event, this seems to have been the way Moscow interpreted it, and very early on at that. If the U.S.S.R. does practice competitive avoidance, then it might be expected to shift its development focus, on

[93] Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975).

[94] James R. Schlesinger, "The MX Decision," *Washington Post*, November 28, 1982, p. C8; Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 196, 200, 216-19, 391-92, 536; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 134.

[95] Desmond Ball, "Nuclear Strategy and Force Deployment," in Desmond Ball, ed., *Strategy and Defense: Australian Essays* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 64.

[96] U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Briefing on Counterforce Attacks*, 93d Cong., 2d sess., September 11, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1975), 3, 9, 24.

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the model of the sixties. Whatever the Soviet rationale, there was such a shift. In the interests of inhibiting escalation, Moscow undoubtedly hoped to hold on as long as it could to the nuclear advantage that development momentum had given it, and to offset as best it could any new American nuclear initiatives; but the basic emphasis was put on conventional.

Once again, the protracted character of the Soviet Union's conventional option must be emphasized. The greater effort implied for coping with it might discourage the NATO allies from even trying to do so, reconfirming their preference for an asymmetrical course. Moreover, if NATO does resolve to match the Russians in conventional arms, and if this resolve is accompanied by a resource crunch preventing the U.S. from reclaiming and holding on to the nuclear heights, history suggests that the U.S.S.R. is likely to shift direction once more. Moscow has pronounced the nuclear formula twice before, with varying success; the third time might be a charm. It is thus no easy matter to find a way out of the essential asymmetry of the arms race.

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THEORIES OF GENERAL WAR

By JACK S. LEVY*

THE phenomenon of general or hegemonic war has long been viewed as a distinctive kind of conflict, and one that has played a unique role in world history.[1] Robert Gilpin states:

> The great turning points in world history have been provided by these hegemonic struggles among political rivals; these periodic conflicts have reordered the international system and propelled history in new and uncharted directions. They resolve the question of which state will govern the system, as well as what ideas and values will predominate, thereby determining the ethos of succeeding ages. The outcomes of these wars affect the economic, social, and ideological structures of individual societies as well as the structure of the larger international system.[2]

These wars have been the most destructive in history and account for a disproportionate fraction of the fatalities in international violence. In spite of the importance of this phenomenon, serious attempts to define and theorize about general war have been made only recently. Now the concept is central to the long cycle theory of Modelski and Thompson, the capitalist world-economy paradigm of Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn, the power transition theory of Organski and Kugler, Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war and change, Doran's power cycle theory, Väyrynen's theory of economic cycles and the power transition, and Midlarsky's theory of hierarchical equilibrium.[3] These theories suggest different hypotheses relating to the causes and consequences of general war, cor-

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[1] The concept of general war has also been referred to as "global war," "world war," "extensive war," "systemic war," and "hyper war." In spite of some differences, these concepts refer to the same basic phenomenon and will be used interchangeably here. My own preference is for the term "general war" because it carries the least amount of conceptual baggage and best serves as the lowest common denominator.

[2] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 203.

[3] George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978), 214-35, and Modelski, "Global Wars and World Leadership Selection," paper presented at the second World Peace Science Congress, Rotterdam, June 4-10, 1984; William R. Thompson, "Uneven Economic Growth, Systemic Challenges, and Global Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (September 1983), 341-55; Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (September

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responding to the divergent theoretical assumptions upon which each of the theories is based. The competing hypotheses are very difficult to test, however. As I will demonstrate, most definitions of general war are defined in terms of the systemic consequences of those wars, so that some key causal relationships cannot be disentangled from definitions and therefore cannot be examined empirically. The task of testing these conflicting hypotheses is further complicated by the fact that each framework has produced a different list of general wars, reducing the likelihood of agreement regarding what evidence might be relevant for resolving the debate. Moreover, in spite of the traditional importance of "balance of power" and related *realpolitik* hypotheses in the study of international conflict, there is no explicitly "realist" theory of general war and no compilation of general wars based on realist assumptions. Although this does not in itself preclude a test of hypotheses on global war, it does preclude a series of critical tests against balance of power hypotheses, which have dominated the traditional and quantitative literature on international conflict.

In this study, I will first summarize the various theories of general war, and show that existing lists of general wars are not always consistent with their respective definitions. I will then offer an alternative definition of general war. After describing a modern great-power system based on a Eurocentric framework and traditional realist assumptions, I will suggest operational criteria for the identification of general wars during the five-century span of this system, and compare the resulting list of general wars with those of other frameworks.

Theories of General War

Toynbee's Balance of Power Theory

The first major attempt to construct a theory of general war was Toynbee's cyclical theory, based on a balance of power framework.[4] It

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1974), 387-45, and Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Interstate System and Capitalist World-Economy: One Logic or Two?" *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (March 1981), 19-42; A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), chap. 14; Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chap. 1; Gilpin (fn. 2); Charles F. Doran, "Power Cycle Theory and the Contemporary State System," in William R. Thompson, ed., *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), chap. 7; Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December 1983), 389-418; Manus I. Midlarsky, "A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 27-31, 1984.

[4] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, IX (London: Oxford University Press, 1954),

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holds that a bid for world domination by the leading power evokes an opposing coalition of all the other powers in the system and a "general war" to maintain the balance of power. It usually results in the defeat of the arch-aggressor and a "breathing space" of peace. This is an uneasy, transient, and "patched-up" peace because the arch-aggressor is only temporarily foiled, and the issues over which the general war was fought have not been settled and are not yet capable of resolution. A burst of short and relatively mild "supplemental wars" then follows, which resolves the outstanding issues and creates a tranquil and lasting "general peace." Ultimately, the gradual buildup of new forces explodes into a new episode of general war as a new power seeks domination, and the cycle begins anew, approximately once every century.[5]

Toynbee's Modern Western System is Eurocentric; it began in 1494 and expanded into a global system by the 20th century.[6] The aggressor power has invariably been a continental state in a central territory, and its aims have been continental hegemony. Toynbee identifies the following periods of general war: (1) 1494-1525, the Hapsburg-Valois struggle over Italy; (2) 1568-1609, when the revolt of the Netherlands against the Spanish Crown was transformed into a general war by the intervention of England; (3) 1672-1713, the wars of Louis XIV; (4) 1792-1815, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; and (5) 1914-1918, World War I.[7]

Long Cycle Theory

The most elaborate and influential theory of global war can be found in the long cycle theory of Modelski and Thompson,[8] which defines a global political system originating around 1500. This system has been characterized by regular cycles of world leadership and system man-

234-60, 322-23. Although Toynbee's theory is not as well developed as several others that will be surveyed below, it has not received the attention it deserves in the literature on general war and systemic transformation.

[5] Another interpretation of the modern European state system implicitly based on a balance of power framework can be found in Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962). Dehio posits no regular cycle or subcyclical phases, however. He identifies six instances in which an expansionist power threatened to achieve a position of hegemony on the European continent. These bids for hegemony were made by the Hapsburgs under Charles V; Spain under Philip II; France under Louis XIV, and again under Napoleon; and Germany under the Kaiser and under Hitler. Each precipitated a major war involving nearly all the great powers in an attempt to maintain the European balance of power; hegemony was avoided only because of the intervention of an insular state (the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and the United States, successively).

[6] Toynbee (fn. 4, 260-87) also applies his theory of general war to the post-Alexandrine Hellenic and post-Confucian Sinic international systems.

[7] Toynbee (*ibid.*, 255) classifies World War II as a "supplemental war," but in a footnote refers to it as a "recrudescent general war."

[8] Modelski (fn. 3, 1978); Thompson (fn. 3, "Uneven Economic Growth . . ." and *Contending Approaches* . . .).

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agement over the last five centuries. A world power emerges from a global war with monopoly control over military capabilities of global reach and control over world trade, and hence with the ability to help structure the new global political and economic systems and to maintain order. This state's position of leadership[9] gradually declines, with the deconcentration of power in the system deriving from the high debt burdens and overhead costs of the world power role, its reductions in naval capabilities as cost-cutting measures, and the emergence of new rivals. Thus, the system passes through phases of delegitimation and deconcentration until a new struggle for world leadership again results in a period of global war, and the cycle begins again.[10]

Modelski and Thompson define global wars as conflicts that determine the constitution or authority arrangement of the global political system.[11] They are succession struggles for leadership in this system, and are precipitated by the rise of challengers that threaten to gain a position of preeminence on the European continent. These wars tend to begin as localized affairs and not as direct contests between the world power and the challenger.[12] They expand into global wars when the world power fears that this continental expansion will provide the power base from which a truly global challenge might be initiated. The regional challengers have always failed: because they did not augment their land armies with military power of global reach; because they could not (at least in earlier periods) match the successful maritime powers in obtaining inexpensive credit to meet their enormous military expenses;[13] because they embarked on expansion prematurely, before the power transition had been completed; and because they underestimated the magnitude of their threat to the global position of the world power, and hence failed to anticipate the expansion of the war.[14]

[9] Modelski uses the term leadership rather than hegemony or dominance. See his "Long Cycles of World Leadership," in Thompson (fn. 3, *Contending Approaches* . . .), chap. 5. The use of the concept of hegemony by others is often so broad, however, that it is no more demanding than Modelski's criterion for leadership—the possession of a monopoly of naval power and world trade.

[10] Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 489-516. The cycles of world leadership are not necessarily of equal length, as emphasized by Thompson in "Cycles of General, Hegemonic, and Global War" (paper presented at the conference on Dynamic Models of International Conflict, Boulder, CO, October 31 - November 3, 1984).

[11] Modelski (fn. 3, 1978), 217; Thompson (fn. 3, "Uneven Economic Growth . . ."), 353. Modelski (fn. 3, 1984, 4-6) has recently expanded this definition to include criteria of duration, scope, and cause, as well as consequences: global wars are long (25-30 years), global in scope, and the result of a structural crisis in the system; they produce a new leadership structure for the global system.

[12] Thompson (fn. 3, "Uneven Economic Growth . . ."), 349.

[13] Rasler and Thompson (fn. 10).

[14] William R. Thompson, "Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of

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Modelski and Thompson identify the following periods of global wars and successor world powers: (1) 1494-1517—the Italian Wars, marking Portugal's rise as the world power; (2) 1585-1609—the War of Dutch Independence, marking the succession of the United Provinces of the Netherlands; (3) 1689-1713—the wars of Louis XIV, ending in Britain's rise as the world power; (4) 1792-1815—the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, marking the beginning of Britain's second cycle as the world power; and (5) 1914-1918 and 1939-1945—World Wars I and II, leading to the succession of the United States as the world power after the failure of the German challenges.[15]

World War in the Capitalist World Economy

World war plays a role in Wallerstein's capitalist world-economy paradigm, though it is clearly subordinated to economic processes and is less central than it is for Modelski and Thompson.[16] Wallerstein offers two similar definitions of world war: "a land-based war that involves (not necessarily continuously) almost all the major military powers of the epoch in warfare that is very destructive of land and population";[17] and "a massive land-centered, highly destructive, thirty-year-long intermittent struggle involving all the major military powers of the time."[18] Although his definition is comparable to Toynbee's, Wallerstein's list of world wars differs from both Toynbee's and Modelski's. It includes the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648; the Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815; and the combined World Wars of 1914-1945.[19]

Each world war leads to the hegemony of a core state. Hegemony is defined as the ability of one power to impose its rules and wishes on the system by virtue of its simultaneous dominance in agricultural-industrial productivity, commerce, and finance in the world market.[20]

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the Transition Model," in Albert L. Bergesen, ed., *Crises in the World System* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 93-116.

[15] Modelski (fn. 3, 1978, 1984); Thompson (fn. 3, "Uneven Economic Growth . . ."), 347. Thompson recognizes Portugal as a world power, but begins the first long cycle in 1517, after the formative global conflict.

[16] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chap. 4, and Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1983). World war is given more attention in these recent analyses than in Wallerstein's earlier work (fn. 3) on the world system—probably in part as a response to Modelski's emphasis on global war.

[17] Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1984), 41.

[18] Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1983), 58-59.

[19] Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1984), 41; (fn. 16, 1983), 59.

[20] *Ibid.*; Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1984), 38-40.

Hegemony is a concept that is widely used, but it is rarely defined with any degree of precision. Bousquet uses a comparable definition, but explicitly adds that the hegemonic power must occupy a position of political leadership in addition to being supreme in production, commerce, and finance. See Nicole Bousquet, "From Hegemony to Competition:

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Hegemony is rare and brief, and confined to the periods of Dutch, British, and American dominance after the three world wars.[21] The hegemonic powers have been primarily maritime powers, but have become land powers in order to confront major land-based challengers (the Hapsburgs, France, and Germany, successively) who are attempting to transform the world economy into a world empire. This leads to a world war that results in a major restructuring of the world system in favor of the hegemonic power. The costs of leadership precipitate a decrease in agro-industrial productivity, hegemonic decline, and erosion of the hegemon's alliance network. Two powers usually emerge as "contenders for the succession"—the winner being the one who can successfully gain the support of the declining hegemon. Hegemonic powers need not fight in all wars, but must be prepared for the climactic world war. The outcome of the hegemonic struggle, however, is basically determined by economic rather than military factors.[22]

Cycles of the Core?" in Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *Processes of the World System* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980), 49.

The definition of hegemony proposed by Keohane is similar. In his discussion of the theory of hegemonic stability, Keohane defines hegemony as "preponderance of material resources." "Hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods." See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32. Keohane qualifies this definition in several ways. He argues that hegemony requires the motivation as well as the material strength to project power, and that the internal characteristics of a state have an important effect on motivation (pp. 34-45). He then refers to the earlier and more general definition by Keohane and Nye: a hegemonial system is one in which "one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so." See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 44. In *After Hegemony*, Keohane adds a greater security component to this definition of "hegemony in the world political economy" by insisting that "[a] hegemonic state must possess enough military power to be able to protect the international political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile states," though the hegemonic power "need not be militarily dominant world wide."

A more explicitly security-oriented definition is offered by Aron: hegemony is a situation in which other states are deprived of their autonomy or their capacity to make their own decisions freely. See Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, abr. Remy Ingles Hall (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973), 62. See also the different meanings of hegemony suggested by R. Harrison Wagner, "Basic Concepts in the Study of International Relations," mimeo (University of Texas at Austin), 1984.

[21] Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1983, 58-59; fn. 16, 1984, 39-43). Bergesen defines hegemony as "the dominance of a single state in world production and political/military strength." Consequently, he argues that the Dutch dominance in 17th-century world production was not sufficient for hegemony, leaving the dominance of 19th-century Britain and 20th-century United States as the only two periods of true hegemony. See Albert Bergesen, "Cycles of War in the Reproduction of the World-Economy," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 27-31, 1984, p. 10.

[22] Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1983), 59. In his analysis of the brief Dutch hegemony in the 17th century, Wallerstein suggests that Dutch hegemony was limited relative to the later British and American hegemonies "because it was least of all the military giant of its era." See

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Chase-Dunn elaborates on Wallerstein's world-economy paradigm and conceptualization of hegemony and world war. He states that "world wars and the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers . . . can be understood as the violent reorganization of production relations on a world scale."[23] Each of the three attempts (after the Hapsburgs' of the "long 16th century") to impose a world-empire on the capitalist world-economy has led to a world war fought to monopolize trade relationships and to establish a new political framework consistent with a changing distribution of productive capabilities arising from uneven capitalist development. Chase-Dunn notes that the "second-runners" who fail in their bids for hegemony have always been "land-oriented political centralizers"; their failures resulted from the "weakness of the strategy of politicomilitary domination unaccompanied by a strategy of competitive production for sale on the market." The "Venetian model" followed by the hegemonic core powers is more efficient because it allows a more decentralized political system to bear the costs of administration while surplus extraction is accomplished by trade.[24]

In a later piece, Chase-Dunn and Sokolovsky expand the concept of world war to include "military engagements that involve rival coalitions of state forces where at least one core power is a member of each of the opposing alliances."[25] These wars do not necessarily involve attempts to seize control of the interstate system, and they do not necessarily determine who will be the leading power in the system. This broadening of the concept of world war represents a significant departure from the notion that there exists a small class of wars that are fundamentally distinct from others in terms of their characteristics or their consequences for the world system. As a result, a theory based on Chase-Dunn's revised conception of world war cannot easily be compared to other theories of global or hegemonic war.

Gilpin's Theory of Hegemonic War and Change

Hegemonic war plays an integral role in Gilpin's theory of the evolution of a global system (and earlier international systems) governed

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Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 38.

[23] Chase-Dunn (fn. 3), 23.

[24] *Ibid.*, 36, 39-40; Chase-Dunn, "Comparative Research on World-System Characteristics," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (December 1979), 608-9.

[25] Christopher Chase-Dunn and Joan Sokolovsky, "Interstate Systems, World Empires, and the Capitalist World Economy: A Response to Thompson," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (September 1983), 364-66. No list of these wars is provided, but it would be considerably longer than Wallerstein's and probably more comparable to an expanded list of European great power wars.

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by a dominant power by virtue of its military and economic strength. Gilpin offers the most comprehensive definition of hegemonic war. (1) It involves "a direct contest between the dominant power or powers in an international system and the rising challenger or challengers," and the "participation of all the major states and most of the minor states in the system." (2) "The fundamental issue at stake is the nature and governance of the system"; hence, hegemonic wars are unlimited in their ends and in their political, economic, and ideological consequences. (3) Hegemonic wars are unlimited in their means as well as their ends, and expand to encompass the entire international system.[26] A hegemonic war arises because of an increasing disequilibrium between the governance of the system and the actual distribution of power, determined largely by the law of uneven development. The dominant power finds that its expanded commitments and the costs of leadership cannot be supported by its eroding resource base. Gilpin argues that the dominant power generally tries, but fails, to reduce its commitments or expand its resource base. It still attempts to hold its dominant position, however, and may initiate a preventive war against a rising challenger.

Whether intended or not, a hegemonic war "determines who will govern the international system and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order." It leads to a redistribution of territory, a new set of rules, and a new international division of labor. The new political and economic order is not permanent, however, for the international distribution of power changes with the decline of the hegemonic power and the rise of new challengers. The dynamics of the system tend to favor states on the periphery because states directly involved in the hegemonic struggle tend to weaken each other and thus pave the way for conquest by a peripheral power. Gilpin gives greater emphasis to land-based power than do Modelski and Thompson, as indicated by his identification of France as the dominant power in the 18th century and Britain as the rising challenger.[27]

Gilpin asserts that, for premodern times, the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta and the Second Punic War between Car-

[26] Gilpin (fn. 2), 199-200. Gilpin's definition builds upon an earlier one: Raymond Aron, speaking of World War I, describes a "war of hegemony" as one that "is characterized less by its immediate causes or its explicit purposes than by its extent and the stakes involved. It affected all the political units inside one system. . . ." Hegemony is, "if not the conscious motive, at any rate the inevitable consequence of the victory of at least one of the states or groups." Aron does not systematically identify history's hegemonic wars, but does fit World War I and the Peloponnesian War into this category. World War II, however, "was not essentially a war of hegemony." See Aron, "War and Industrial Society," in Leon Branson and George W. Goethals, eds., *War* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 369.

[27] Gilpin (fn. 2), 80.

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thage and Rome satisfy his criteria for hegemonic war. In the modern period the following wars qualify: the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the wars of Louis XIV (1667-1713), the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1814), and World Wars I and II (1914-1918; 1939-1945).[28]

Doran's Cycle of Relative Power

Doran explains the evolution of the international system and the outbreak of "extensive war" in terms of the internal economic and political dynamics of the leading states of the system. The relative power of each of these states follows a regular cycle of ascendance, maturation, and decline, and this power cycle is largely a function of internal economic cycles. The nature of a state's foreign policy is a function of its position on its power cycle. National expansion and bids for hegemony—and hence, extensive war and systemic instability—result from a major power's inability to adjust to its new power position and role in the system. This is most likely to occur at the four critical points of the national power cycle (the points of maximum and minimum power and the two inflection points), where exaggerated fears, misperceptions, and overreaction are most intense.[29]

Extensive war is defined as one involving high casualties, long duration, and great magnitude. It is apparently equivalent to hegemonic war, which is "associated with the efforts of a single state to dominate the international system." Although this nominal definition is not operationalized, Doran identifies five extensive wars since the origin of the modern state system: (1) the Spanish-Austrian Hapsburg attempt to dominate Europe; (2) the wars of Louis XIV; (3) the Napoleonic onslaught; (4) World War I; and (5) World War II.[30]

Each of the theories of hegemonic war surveyed above is applicable to the entire five-century span of the modern system. There are two

[28] *Ibid.*, 200.

[29] Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980), 947-65; Doran (fn. 3); Doran, "War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December 1983), 419-20.

[30] Doran (fn. 3), 168, 178-79. Magnitude is defined by the number of belligerent states weighted by their status. The requirement that an extensive war have *all* of these characteristics, rather than just *any* of them, is an improvement over the earlier definition by Doran and Parsons (fn. 29), 958. It is not clear whether the Hapsburg bid for hegemony refers to the wars of Charles V, those of Philip II, or the Thirty Years' War. From Doran's earlier work, it appears that only the latter two qualify, but even that is somewhat ambiguous. See Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 65-66.

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other theories that clearly contribute to the debate over war and systemic change in world politics, but that are best interpreted as being restricted to the era of industrial capitalism of the last two centuries. These are Organski's theory of the power transition and Väyrynen's theory of economic cycles, power transitions, and war.[31]

Power Transition Theory

Organski's concept of the power transition, and his thesis that the likelihood of a major war is greatest when the military capabilities of a dissatisfied challenger begin to approach those of a dominant power,

[31] Other attempts to identify general or hegemonic wars during the five-century span of the modern system have been made by R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy* (London: Edward Arnold, 1928); Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); and L. L. Farrar, Jr., "Cycles of War: Historical Speculations on Future International Violence," *International Interactions* (No. 1, 1977), 161-79. These have not been discussed because none of them develops a theory of hegemonic war comparable to the others surveyed above, but their lists of hegemonic wars are relevant to our later comparisons and should be mentioned briefly.

Mowat speaks of "war on the grand scale" occurring in "great waves," with thirty- to forty-year periods of relative peace between the waves (p. 1). After the end of the Hundred Years' War between France and England in 1451, Mowat identifies the following wars on the "grand scale": the Italian Wars (1494-1559), the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), the wars of Louis XIV (1672-1713), the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War (1740-63), the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1814), and World War I. In this 1928 study, Mowat's treatment of the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars is somewhat ambiguous, but he does not appear to identify them as grand-scale wars.

Wright appears to define "general wars" as "all wars with a great power on each side which lasted as long as two years." With few exceptions, these wars have usually involved all of the great powers of the time (p. 649). Wright's definition is too broad to constitute a distinctive set of general wars, and includes such cases as the Franco-Spanish War of 1648-59 (distinct from the Thirty Years' War) and the War of the American Revolution. Elsewhere, however, Wright identifies oscillating "concentrations" of wars, which are comparable to others' conceptions of hegemonic war: the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), the War of the Spanish Succession and the associated wars of Louis XIV, the Seven Years' War (1756-63), the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War and the Wars of Italian and German nationalism of the late-19th century, and the two World Wars of this century (p. 227). Wright also suggests an even more restricted set of "great wars" which, along with the peace treaties that terminated them, have "dominated" the last five centuries of European politics (pp. 360-64): the Thirty Years' War, the wars of Louis XIV (1688-1714), the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1789-1815), and World Wars I and II (1914-45). Thus, Wright recognizes the importance of a small set of distinctive wars having profound consequences for the system; but he neither defines them clearly nor produces an unambiguous list of such wars.

Farrar distinguishes hegemonic war from "probing war" and "adjusting war"; he defines hegemonic war as a war that involves "a high level of violence and seriously threatens or in fact alters the system fundamentally, usually as a result of one power's attempt to dominate the system" (p. 163). Farrar identifies repeated cycles of war since 1494, and argues that war is functionally necessary for the system to accommodate changes in power among its members. Although Farrar's precise identification of these historical periods needs further justification, and though the causal mechanism driving the cycles needs further theoretical development, his list of periods of hegemonic war (pp. 168-69) is comparable to those surveyed earlier: 1568-1588, 1688-1714, 1789-1815, 1914-1945. The inclusion of the first two decades

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have had an enormous impact on more recent theories of global war and systemic change. The argument is that the rising challenger will initiate a war in order to gain political influence commensurate with its newly acquired power.[32] Organski and Kugler examine "major wars" whose "outcomes will affect the very structure and operation of the international system," but their conceptualization is of limited utility for a theory of general war. Their emphasis on industrialization as the primary source of changing power capabilities was a major step forward, but it restricts the direct applicability of the theory to the industrial era. Questions regarding major wars and power transitions in earlier times are left open, and too few cases are incorporated for an adequate empirical test of the theory. Organski and Kugler's set of major wars includes the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese Wars as well as the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars. The first two are not consistent with either their nominal or operational definitions, however, so that it is impossible to generalize from their empirical findings.[33] Moreover, unlike most other theories of general war, Organski and Kugler's does not develop the concepts of systemic structure, governance, and succession, and generally makes no claims to construct a more encompassing theory of global politics. The power transition theory could be generalized and tested, but in its present form it should not be treated as a theory of hegemonic war.[34]

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of the War of Dutch Independence but not the subsequent two decades involving the internationalization of the conflict is somewhat puzzling, however.

For further discussion of these conceptualizations, see Thompson's piece (fn. 10, 1984), which convinced me of the need to include discussions of Wright and Farrar in this study.

[32] Organski (fn. 3), chap. 14. Note that the power transition hypothesis used by Organski and others fits nicely into Galtung's more general rank-disequilibrium theory. The power transition idea is reflected by Thucydides' argument that the causes of the Peloponnesian War can be traced to Sparta's fear of the rising power of Athens. Howard also shares this view of the causes of war. See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research* 1 (1964), 95-119; Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1954); Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), chap. 1.

[33] Organski and Kugler (fn. 3), 45-46. Their operational criteria require major powers on each side of the conflict, an "all-out effort to win" by each (requiring the expected loss of territory or population by the loser), and a higher level of battle deaths than in any previous war. Not all of their wars necessarily affect the very structure and operation of the system (e.g., the Russo-Japanese War); in any case, their battle-death criterion is violated twice in these five cases. On the theoretical level, Organski and Kugler never make it clear exactly how these major wars affect the structure and operation of the system, since they argue that these wars have no long-term effects on the distribution of power (chap. 3). For a critique of their analysis and a different conclusion, see T. Clifton Morgan, "The Effects of War on the Economic Productivity of Nations in the Twentieth Century," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 24-27, 1982.

[34] See Thompson (fn. 14), for his test of the power transition thesis.

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Väyrynen's Theory of Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, and War

Väyrynen argues that the outbreak of major war can be explained by the interplay between long waves of economic development, economic power transitions among major powers, international political management by alliances, and domestic political pressures; he considers these variables, in turn, to be largely a function of internal economic and technological forces.[35] He posits a cycle of hegemony involving ascendance, victory, maturity, and decline, with hegemony defined in terms of both economic predominance (particularly in production) and international political leadership. Instead of long cycles of global political leadership, Väyrynen sees shorter cycles of economic hegemony, along with rivalry. The crises triggered by the long wave of economic development do not inevitably lead to hegemonic rivalry and war because the pressures generated by economic cycles are only necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for war. He argues, however, that most major wars (seven out of nine since 1825) tend to occur during the upswing phase of the Kondratieff "long wave."[36]

As it stands, Väyrynen's thesis cannot be treated as a complete theory of hegemonic war and compared directly with the others surveyed above. His definition of major war (a conflict between the great powers, involving at least ten nation-months of war and 10,000 battle deaths) is so broad that it includes the Austro-Prussian War, the internationalized Russian Civil War,[37] and the Korean War. These are clearly in a different class from the general wars identified earlier, involving neither the widespread destructiveness nor the potential systemic consequences. Moreover, Väyrynen's emphasis on the Kondratieff cycle may limit the applicability of his theory to the last two centuries only (his empirical analysis begins in 1825), for the first Kondratieff cycle begins in 1789.[38]

Conceptions of General War: Critique and Discussion

The theories of general war proposed by Toynbee, Wallerstein, Modelski and Thompson, Doran, and Gilpin share several characteristics.[39]

[35] Väyrynen (fn. 3); Väyrynen, "Economic Fluctuations, Technological Innovations and the Arms Race in a Historical Perspective," *Cooperation and Conflict* 18 (No. 3, 1983), 135-59.

[36] Väyrynen (fn. 3), 396-410.

[37] *Ibid.*, 410-11.

[38] N. D. Kondratieff, "The Long Waves of Economic Life," *Review of Economic Statistics* 17 (November 1935), 105-15.

[39] The other conceptualizations surveyed are either not fully developed, or, by defining the concept of general war too broadly, essentially deny the existence of a distinct class of general wars. In either case, I will not discuss them further.

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They are all applied to the modern state system beginning in about 1500. They all refer to dominant powers and challengers, and see hegemonic war as confirming a new distribution of power in the system, establishing a new equilibrium, and serving as a major agent of system transformation. All but Toynbee's hold that the changing distribution of power is the product of some version of the law of uneven development.[40]

The differences between these theories are more profound than their similarities, however. Each is subsumed under a more general paradigm of world politics. These paradigms begin with different assumptions and generate divergent propositions regarding the nature of international behavior and hegemonic war. The differences concern the relationship between the world's political and economic systems and the relative importance of politics and economics; the geographical scope of the system and the relative importance of Europe; the definition of hegemony and the identification of the dominant power and challengers; the definition and identification of general wars;[41] the causes of these wars; the questions of who initiates the war and why the challenger fails; and the systemic consequences of the war.

The theoretical development of these different frameworks has now progressed to the point where their conflicting propositions on global war can be subjected to systematic empirical tests, for their differences cannot be resolved by theoretical argument alone.[42] These tests require that global wars be rigorously defined and systematically identified for each theory, but this has yet to be done.

The process by which each of these lists of general wars is compiled is not made explicit. There are no obvious attempts to construct operational indicators, and it is not clear how each list is generated from the corresponding nominal definition. As a result, there are several inconsistencies between each definition and its corresponding list of wars. Toynbee, for example, shares most of the basic assumptions of realist international theory, yet his list of "general wars to maintain the European balance of power" omits the Thirty Years' War and World War

[40] Long cycle theorists recognize the importance of uneven development, but are open to the possibility of other factors also driving the system. See W. R. Thompson, "Cycles, Capabilities, and War: An Ecumenical View," in Thompson (fn. 3, *Contending Approaches* . . .), 143.

[41] See Table 2, at the end of this article, for a comparison of the various lists of general wars.

[42] Empirical work on global war within each framework has been done by Thompson (fns. 14 and 40), Väyrynen (fn. 3), Doran and Parsons (fn. 29), and Doran, "Power Cycle Theory and Systems Stability," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 27-31, 1984.

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II, two conflicts that most realists would identify as wars for European hegemony.[43]

Similarly, it is not clear how Wallerstein's exclusion of the wars of Louis XIV as well as the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War is consistent with his definition of world war as "a land-based war that involves (not necessarily continuously) almost all the major military powers of the epoch in warfare that is very destructive of land and population." The three major wars of Louis XIV each involved at least five of the six or seven great powers of the time; together, they lasted forty years and resulted in enormous fatalities.[44] These wars marked the end of Dutch and the beginning of British naval and commercial supremacy, and constituted a nearly successful attempt by France to secure hegemony over the European continent. A French victory in 1713 might have significantly changed the structure and governance of the system. These wars were global in scope and not confined to Europe and the Mediterranean. The War of the League of Augsburg merged with King William's War in North America, and the War of the Spanish Succession merged with Queen Anne's War.[45] The two great wars of the mid-18th century also involved all of the major European land powers; together, they resulted in nearly one and a half million battle fatalities, and therefore appear to fit Wallerstein's definition.

Although Modelski and Thompson are generally quite rigorous and systematic in their theoretical and empirical analysis of the long cycle of global politics, their identification of global wars does not appear to

[43] The Thirty Years' War marked the end of Spain's century-long role as the leading European power, and the succession of France. It also ended Spanish dominance in Italy and initiated the decline of Spain's global empire. The war may have begun as a religious struggle, but nearly all "realists" would agree that, by 1635 at the latest, it was primarily a struggle for the European balance of power. See, for example, S. H. Steinberg, *The Thirty Years' War and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966); Gustav Droysen, "The Statesman of 'Realpolitik,'" in Theodore K. Rabb, ed., 2d ed., *The Thirty Years' War* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1972), 89-92; Doran (fn. 30, 1971), chap. 6; John B. Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power, 1620-1715* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).

Perhaps an explanation (but hardly a justification) for the omission of World War II is that it does not fit conveniently into Toynbee's cyclical pattern.

[44] Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1984), 41. Fatalities for these three wars numbered about 2,400,000—more than those for the Thirty Years' War and roughly equal to those for the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars combined. For data, see Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), chap. 4.

[45] For analyses of the wars of Louis XIV, see Wolf (fn. 43); Wolf, *Louis XIV* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), chaps. 15-18 and 26-33; David Jayne Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, III: *The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism* (London: Longmans, Green, 1914), chaps. I-IV; Henry Kamer, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-1715* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969).

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be based explicitly on operational criteria.[46] This results in some questionable omissions from their list. Most notable are the two great wars of the mid-18th century. Both the War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession (1739-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1755-1763) involved the extensive participation of all five of the global powers defined by Modelski and Thompson. Neither of these wars was merely regional in its geographical scope or its consequences. Both were fought not only in Europe and the Mediterranean, but also in India, the Philippines, the West Indies, and on the North American continent. They confirmed Britain's mastery of the seas and secured her empire against all rivals. A decisive French victory at sea as well as on land would have had a profound effect on the European and global balance of power. It would have ended the era of Britain's dominance and could have initiated a period of French hegemony, leading to a fundamental change in the structure and governance of the global system. The fact that the outcome of these wars confirmed British dominance in the global system—rather than initiating a fundamental change in the system—is not a sufficient reason for their exclusion; if it were, Modelski and Thompson would not have included the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.[47] Their treatment of other cases is more difficult to evaluate, but questions naturally arise in the absence of more explicit operational criteria. Modelski and Thompson exclude the Dutch War of Louis XIV in spite of the fact that it involved all the global powers on their list and was the war most immediately and directly concerned with global as opposed to continental military power.[48] Finally, Modelski's identification of the Italian Wars (1494-1517), but not the later wars of Charles V (1521-1559) or the Thirty Years' War, as global war is hard to justify. The Italian Wars were primarily concerned with Italy and were indecisive;

[46] Modelski's recent criteria of duration and scope are measurable, but those of cause and consequence are not yet operational (fn. 3, 1984).

[47] Later I will argue that our focus should be on the *potential* consequences of the war for the system rather than on its actual consequences.

For analyses of the War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, see Hill (fn. 45), chaps. 6-7; Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763* (New York: Harper & Row, 1940), chaps. 4, 6-8; M. S. Anderson, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783*, 2d ed. (London: Longman, 1961), chaps. 10-13; H. Butterfield, *The Reconstruction of an Historical Episode: The History of the Enquiry into the Origins of the Seven Years' War* (Glasgow: Jackson, Son, & Co., 1951); Patrice Louis-René Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years' War," *Journal of Modern History* 40 (March 1968), 57-90; Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, IV-VIII (New York: Knopf, 1946-1952).

[48] It is revealing that the Dutch War was the only one of Louis's three major wars in which England was allied with France against Dutch naval and maritime power. In the two subsequent wars, France was such a military threat that she triggered an opposing coalition of nearly all the European great powers and secured no major allies of her own.

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the later wars of Charles V were a struggle for dominance in Europe as well as Italy—they initiated repeated English intervention and resulted in a century of Spanish supremacy; and the Thirty Years' War brought an end to Spanish dominance.[49]

Gilpin's criteria for hegemonic war are the most explicit, but it is not clear whether he followed them faithfully in generating his list of wars. Again, the exclusion of the War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War is most puzzling. Both involved all of the major states and were direct contests between the dominant power and the rising challengers in the system; they were at least as much concerned with the nature and governance of the global system as were the Thirty Years' War and the wars of Louis XIV (which Gilpin includes); and they encompassed the entire international system.[50]

These inconsistencies between each of the nominal definitions of general or hegemonic war and its respective list of wars derives from a failure to construct explicit and rigorous operational definitions. In the absence of more systematic procedures for identifying general wars, the validity of any empirical generalizations based on existing lists of wars is open to question.[51]

There is another problem with these conceptualizations of general war. For most of the theoretical frameworks surveyed above, general war is nominally defined in terms of the systemic consequences of the war. The consequences of war are open to a wide variety of interpretations, however, and are difficult to define operationally. This helps explain the lack of rigorous and systematic procedures for identifying hegemonic wars. More important, the definition of general war in terms of its systemic consequences means that one of the key propositions in most of these theories—that the constitution or authority structure of the system is determined by general war—is established by definition and becomes impossible to investigate empirically. All general wars confirm the hypothesis by definition; if wars do not have the expected

[49] For the Italian Wars and the wars of Charles V, see Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), chaps. 12-19; Hill (fn. 45), II, chaps. 3-6; F. C. Spooner, "The Hapsburg-Valois Struggle," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, II, *The Reformation, 1520-59* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), chap. 11. For the Thirty Years' War, see fn. 43.

[50] Doran's exclusion of these two mid-18th-century wars is also puzzling. The combined 1,400,000 fatalities, 17 years of fighting over 24 years, and 82 nation-years of war by the great powers (Levy, fn. 44, p. 90) would appear to satisfy the requirement of high casualties, long duration, and great magnitude. See Doran (fn. 3), 168, 179.

[51] Doran (fn. 3) and Organski and Kugler (fn. 3) have attempted to construct operational definitions. But in neither case does it appear that the resulting list of major wars is fully consistent with those criteria. Modelski's recent criteria (fn. 3, 1984) are only partly operational (see fn. 46).

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consequences, they cannot be general wars and hence do not disconfirm the hypothesis. Unless general war (the predictor variable) is defined independently of its systemic consequences (the dependent variable), the empirical utility of the concept is greatly restricted. Moreover, the tendency to interpret the causes of general war in terms of the war's functional consequences for the system generates the danger that the causes of war may also become difficult to test empirically. A similar problem arises with respect to the dispute between Modelski and others over the question whether global wars follow a regular cyclical pattern.[52] This dispute cannot be resolved until operational indicators for the identification of global war are defined independently of the hypothesized cycles. Otherwise, it is impossible to determine whether particular wars (the two mid-18th-century wars, for example) do not fit the long cycle because they are not global wars, whether they are not global wars because they do not fit the cycle, or whether they are empirical anomalies in a cyclical theory of global war.

The tendency to define general wars in terms of their hypothesized consequences, together with the failure to construct rigorous operational criteria for the identification of these wars, reduces our ability to construct internally valid tests of these theories. The theory-specific definition of general war also complicates any attempt at external validity. If different theories identify different lists of wars, then their conflicting hypotheses cannot easily be tested, for there would be little agreement on the kind of evidence that would be accepted by all as satisfying a critical test.

I am *not* suggesting that the concept of general war should be "theory-free," for I recognize that concepts have no meaning outside of their theoretical context. The problem with many of these definitions of general war is not just the fact that they are related to their respective theories; that is unavoidable. The problem lies in the fact that it is one of the central propositions of the theory—that general wars basically determine the structure and evolution of the system—that is used to define general war. This is too important a proposition simply to accept by definition and to leave immune to empirical investigation.

Definitions of general war based only on the criterion that they involve nearly all of the leading powers in the system, such as those offered by Osgood, Blainey, and others, don't really solve the problem.[53] The leading

[52] Gilpin (fn. 2, p. 205), for example, rejects the idea of cycles of war and peace; he argues that no one has suggested a satisfactory theoretical explanation that could predict such cycles. See the discussion in Thompson (fn. 10).

[53] Osgood refers to "general war involving several major powers." Blainey first defines a general war as one in which "at least five powers, of which three are major powers,

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powers cannot be defined and identified in the absence of assumptions regarding the nature of the system and the dimensions of power and hierarchy within that system. The leading actors in Wallerstein's system are different from those in Toynbee's, for example, and consequently their lists of wars involving all or almost all the major powers would probably be slightly different. The biases might be less blatant and perhaps less serious than they would be for lists of wars defined by their systemic consequences, but these biases cannot be ignored. Nor is a definition based only on other characteristics of the war fully sastisfactory, for the theoretical importance of general war is not fully captured by these characteristics. A definition based on severity or battle deaths, for example, would have to include the Korean War before the War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada (1585-1609), the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672-1678), the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), or the War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession (1739-1748). This would be true even if the fatality indicator was normalized for population.[54] The theoretical importance of the Korean War was far less than that of the others, however.[55] What is needed is a definition of general war that taps its theoretical importance for the system without defining away some of the theory's central hypotheses.

Any such conception of general war would have to come to terms with several additional problems. All analysts who use the concepts of global or hegemonic war in the context of a theory of world politics accept the proposition that these wars have a profound impact on the structure of the system. One key question is whether the systemic consequences of the war are deliberately sought by any or all of its participants. Is a conscious bid for hegemony, or even leadership, a necessary condition for global or hegemonic war?

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participate." He then offers a more rigorous definition referring to "a war involving eight states, of which at least four were major states." Mandelbaum is more demanding and requires that a general war involve "all the major states." None of these analysts identify historical cases of general war. See Robert E. Osgood, "The Expansion of Force," in Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, eds., *Force, Order, and Justice* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 52; Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 196; Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 71. See also Wright's definition (fn. 31).

[54] The data are from Levy (fn. 44), 88-91. See also fn. 78.

[55] The Korean War did contribute to the militarization and globalization of American containment policy and the reversal of an increasing American recognition of the distinctiveness of Chinese communism from that of the Soviet Union. See James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), chap. 5. The Korean War was indeed critical for the evolution of American foreign policy, but it was not comparable in its systemic consequences to the defeat of Spain in the early and mid-17th century or the defeat of France in the early and mid-18th century. The leadership role of the U.S. was not overturned as a result of the Korean War, or even as a result of America's later failure in Vietnam.

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If so, any conflict that begins with limited aims on each side but nevertheless expands into a major war which threatens the stability of the system would be excluded from the class of hegemonic wars. Although the concept of "inadvertent war" is not well developed, the concepts of the security dilemma, cyclical-sequence escalation, and the spiral model help explain how such a war might come about; there are a number of historical cases that might possibly fit this general pattern.[56] A related problem—that motivations can change over time—raises the question of how to classify wars that may be motivated by hegemonic ambitions at one time but not at others. In addition, hegemonic ambitions may be shared by some decision makers but not by others, raising the analytical problem of how to interpret the "motivations" of a divided collective decision-making unit.[57] The methodological problems involved in determining with precision the actual goals of decision makers are also very serious, and complicate the problem of identifying historical cases of hegemonic wars based on the motivations of statesmen.

Problems of this kind have led most analysts to focus on the consequences of the war rather than on the motivations for it. Thus, Aron states that a hegemonic war is "characterized less by its immediate causes or its explicit purposes than by its extent, and the stakes involved"; hegemony is "if not the conscious motive, at any rate the inevitable consequence" of the war. Thompson notes that global war may begin

[56] On the theoretical concepts, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3; Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

One historical example might be World War I, for a standard interpretation is that none of the participants in World War I deliberately sought European or world hegemony, or intended a major war. See Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols., 2d ed., rev. (New York: Free Press, 1966); Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter*, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), vols. II and III; Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell, 1962). This is a controversial case, however, particularly in view of Fischer's argument that Germany sought world domination from the beginning. See Fritz Fischer, *German Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1961); Fischer, *War of Illusions, German Politics from 1911 to 1914*, trans. Marion Jackson (New York: Norton, 1975).

Perhaps a better example would be the Seven Years' War (or at least its North American dimension). Smoke (p. 236) suggests that the escalation sequence between the British and the French "witnessed no offensive steps by any player at any time." The Peloponnesian War has also been interpreted in this general way; see Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).

[57] Both of these points are relevant to the debate over whether Germany had hegemonic ambitions that led to World War I. Epstein and others have criticized Fischer (fn. 56) for minimizing the differences among the objectives of various German decision makers, and also for his assumption that German motivations were consistent over time: evidence of hegemonic ambitions during a war is not necessarily relevant to the question of motivations on the eve of war. See Klaus Epstein, "German War Aims in the First World War," *World Politics* 15 (October 1962), 163-85.

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as localized conflicts that do not even involve the dominant global power, and that a major challenge to the system "may not have been fully intended." Gilpin argues that "men seldom determine or even anticipate the consequences of hegemonic war," that "they do not get the war they want or expect," and that "they fail to recognize the pent-up forces they are unleashing or the larger historical significance of the decisions they are making." Chase-Dunn concurs that "the real issue is not intentions but the structural consequences" of the war.[58]

Of course, many threats to the structural stability of the system may in fact be deliberate. The point is that the question of the causes of general war is important enough that it should be open to empirical investigation and not simply defined away by incorporating the motivations or causes of general war into its definition.

Given our focus on the consequences of war, another question is whether a hegemonic war need necessarily end in dominance or even leadership by a single actor. Some of the theories surveyed earlier imply that it does. Gilpin concedes, however, that it is possible that none of the victorious states has the power to reorder the international system.[59] World War I is a good example, for no single state emerged with effective control or even leadership over the system; for this reason, it presents a problem for many of the theories of global war.[60] Balance of power

[58] Aron (fn. 26), 367; Thompson (fn. 3, "Uneven Economic Growth ..."), 349; Gilpin (fn. 2), 202; Chase-Dunn (fn. 3), 36. Modelski (fn. 3, 1984), however, includes the causes of the war (but not necessarily statesmens' motivations) as a defining characteristic of global war.

[59] Gilpin qualifies this by saying: "Eventually, however, a new power or set of powers emerges to give governance to the international system" (fn. 2), 198. While not excluding the possibility that hegemonic war is a necessary condition for a new system of governance, this qualification suggests that it is not a sufficient condition. Note that Farrar includes threats to the system as well as actual alterations of the system (fn. 31), 163.

[60] Many of the theories attempt to get around this problem by defining the two World Wars of this century as a single hegemonic or global war, and identifying the U.S. as the emerging hegemonic power. See Wallerstein (fn. 16, 1984); Modelski (fn. 3, 1978); Thompson (fn. 3, "Uneven Economic Growth ..."); Gilpin (fn. 2). This interpretation would be acceptable if it were based on a set of general procedures and explicit operational criteria that were applied systematically to all conceivable cases, but other apparently similar cases are treated differently. It is not clear what theoretical grounds are used for defining the World Wars of 1914-1945 as a single global war while defining others as separate.

The duration of the interval between the wars cannot be the criterion. Although two decades separated the two World Wars, even less time separated the Revolt of the Netherlands (1585-1609) from the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), and the final resolution of the latter (Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659) from the hegemonic wars of Louis XIV (1672-1713); yet no two of these distinct conflicts are ever combined as a single hegemonic war. Nor can the role of World War II in accomplishing the final defeat of a dominant power or aspiring challenger be the criterion. Otherwise the Thirty Years' War, which was necessary for the final defeat of Spain, would have to be included with the earlier War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada. In addition, the Thirty Years' War lasted longer than the internationalized Dutch/Armada War and involved ten times the fatalities. The fatality data are from Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, III: *Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War and*

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theorists generally imply that most bids for hegemony rarely end in hegemony because of the effective operation of the equilibrating mechanism. In addition, power transition theory recognizes that under certain conditions the succession of one dominant power by another may be accomplished peacefully.[61]

For these reasons, neither the motivations for a war nor its more general causes or its actual consequences should be defining criteria for general or hegemonic war. Instead, a general war should be defined as a war in which there is a reasonable probability of a decisive victory by at least one side that could lead to the emergence of a new dominant or leading power, and hence to the structural transformation of the system.[62] This is implied by Aron's argument that hegemony is "the inevitable consequence of the victory of at least one of the states or groups." World War I was a hegemonic war, not because of the war aims of the leading actors, and not because of its actual outcome, but because a German victory was a distinct possibility and one that could have given Germany the dominant position in the system.[63] World War II was a hegemonic war for the same reason.[64] A conflict that may not threaten to impose a new hegemony, but definitely threatens to overthrow an existing one, also affects the constitution and governance of the system and constitutes a hegemonic war.

Thus, a general war is defined as one in which the decisive victory of at least one side is both a reasonable possibility and one that would

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Revolution (New York: American Book Co., 1937), 550-74. In view of the importance of this war, it is interesting that in no single compilation are both the Dutch wars and the Thirty Years' War included as general wars with the uncertain exception of Doran (fn. 3), 179; also see fn. 30. For a summary of the various compilations of general wars, see Table 2.

Finally, the postwar emergence of a hegemonic or leadership power should not be the criterion for combining the two wars, for that is precisely the hypothesis that needs to be tested empirically.

[61] See Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1955); Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power & International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962); Organski (fn. 3), 361-63.

[62] That is, a general war requires that there be one side in the conflict, but not necessarily both, for which a major victory is (1) a real possibility *and* (2) likely to result in its emergence as a new leading power or (as I qualify it below) at least in the overthrow of the existing leader.

[63] Aron (fn. 26), 367-68. Aron is unreasonable in insisting that hegemony "inevitably" follow from a mere "victory."

[64] This argument regarding World War II is clearly valid from a realist, Eurocentric perspective. It would also be true from a global perspective if a German/Japanese victory had weakened English and American naval power sufficiently for Germany to use her European hegemony to become (perhaps in cooperation with Japan) the leading global power as well. Note that Aron (fn. 26, p. 369) appears to violate his own criteria by excluding World War II from the category of hegemonic wars; instead, he calls it an "ideological" and "imperialist" war.

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be likely to result in the leadership or dominance by a single state over the system—or at least in the overthrow of an existing leadership or hegemony. The question now becomes one of determining what wars have such potential consequences. Unless specific criteria can be stipulated, such wars cannot be objectively identified and key hypotheses cannot be tested empirically.

The following defining characteristics of general war are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. First, the conflict must at some point involve the leading power in the system. Hegemony or leadership over the system is conceivable only through a major victory by the leading power or its decisive defeat by a rising challenger. Second, the war must involve the active participation of most of the major powers in the system. The major powers—whether they be the great powers from a traditional realist/continental perspective, the global powers from the long cycle perspective, or core powers from a capitalist world-economy perspective—are distinguished from other actors in part by their systemic interests. The military involvement of most of these actors is an indicator that the conflict is likely to affect the general or systemic interests of all of them rather than the particular interests of individual powers.[65] The non-involvement of most of the major powers would suggest that they did not perceive a threat to the stability of the existing system and to their strategic and economic interests in that system.[66] General wars may involve most of the minor states in the system as well as most of the major powers,[67] but that is an empirical question rather than a definitional requirement of general wars. A third criterion for general war is that it must be a substantial war involving intense combat. More limited wars do not have the potential of generating the decisive victory necessary to effect a major change in the distribution of power in the system and to establish a new hegemony or overturn an existing hegemony. The second and third criteria are related. Another reason why the active

[65] On the importance of systemic interests in defining the major powers, see Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," *International Organization* 23 (Spring 1969), 295-97; also Levy (fn. 44), 16-17. On the distinction between general and particular interests, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 424. See also Jervis's distinction between strategic interests, intrinsic interests, and commitment, in Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), 289-324, at 314-15.

[66] This is the missing link between those conceptualizations that define hegemonic war in terms of its systemic consequences and those that define it in terms of the participation of most of the major actors in the system (Osgood, Blainey, and others, fn. 53). The participation of nearly all the great powers is theoretically important because it is a good indicator of the perception of a serious threat to the stability of the system.

[67] Midlarsky (fn. 3) argues that the involvement of minor powers is the critical factor that makes great power wars likely to escalate into "systemic wars."

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participation of most of the major powers is so important is that it increases the seriousness of the war, and hence the possibility of the decisive defeat of the leading power in a way that significantly reduces its relative military capabilities.

These criteria are general and are applicable to a variety of theoretical frameworks. However, neither the leading power nor the other major powers can be identified in the absence of a specific conception of the system and the basis of power in that system. The leading power and other major powers will vary for the long cycle, capitalist world-economy, and other frameworks surveyed above. Until these criteria are operationalized, hegemonic wars cannot be systematically identified and important hypotheses on global wars cannot be tested empirically in order to determine their validity.

General War in the Modern Great Power System

A complete theory of general war in the modern great power system has yet to be constructed. The assumptions underlying the conception of this system, however, are consistent with the assumptions of balance of power theory and other *realpolitik* hypotheses. They are also consistent with the assumptions underlying the theories of global war advanced by Doran, Organski, Midlarsky, and probably Gilpin. In order to permit the analysis of balance of power and related *realpolitik* hypotheses for the critical class of general wars, and to facilitate a comparison of the hegemonic wars associated with different theoretical frameworks, I shall construct a list of these wars for the modern great power system.[68]

While the concept of political realism is extremely broad and includes a variety of specific theoretical approaches, there is a relatively small set of basic assumptions that is shared by most "realists," differentiating them from others. From these assumptions, it is possible to construct a system, define its leading actors, and identify a set of hegemonic wars.

The distinguishing characteristic of the world political system, according to realists, is its anarchic structure. Anarchy generates a high-threat environment, so that military security becomes the dominant issue and international politics becomes a struggle for power. Moreover, there is always the possibility that states may transform nonmilitary issues into military ones and attempt to resolve them through the use of force.[69]

[68] No attempt is made here to construct a complete theory of the dynamics of general war and systemic change; realist theorists have enough trouble trying to construct a balance of power theory for simple and static situations. See R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29 - September 1, 1984.

[69] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University

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The priority of military security leads to a hierarchy of actors defined primarily in terms of military power. The most powerful states determine the structure, major processes, and general evolution of the system. Because the great powers are the most powerful actors, they perceive each other as the most serious security threats and direct their primary attention toward each other. They constitute, therefore, an interdependent *system* of power and security relations, the great power system.[70] In the modern era, most of the actors and all of the great powers have been territorial states. Because of the predominance of security interests, the fact that the primary security threats come from other great powers, and the fact that prior to the 20th century basically all the great powers were European, the great power system has been Eurocentric rather than global in orientation, and European security interests have always taken precedence over global political or economic interests whenever the two have been in conflict.[71] The modern great power system originated in the late 15th century and only expanded into a global system in the 20th century.[72]

Thus, the realist great power framework is similar to the others in its emphasis on a small number of leading actors that have determined the structure and transformation of the system for the last five centuries. In the great power system, however, the dominant states are defined by their military power; the overriding issue is security; and the European system is the focus. In contrast with most theorists of hegemonic war, who emphasize the existence of a leading or dominant power and the

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Press, 1962); Jervis (fn. 56); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967); Keohane and Nye (fn. 20), chap. 2.

[70] While few realists explicitly identify a great power system composed of the dominant actors in the system, they clearly recognize the leading role of the great powers; most of their theories are constructed with the great powers in mind. Waltz (fn. 69) only formalizes what most realists argue implicitly. Others may argue, however, that the general principles guiding the behavior of all states are the same, and that only the parameters of the power configurations are different.

[71] While power and wealth are mutually reinforcing, they occasionally come into conflict, particularly in the short run. Whenever this conflict occurs, power takes precedence over wealth. Similarly, national political or economic interests always take precedence over private economic interests. (See Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *World Politics* 1 [October 1948], 1-29; Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor* [New York: Doubleday, 1935]; Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978].) Great powers have rarely given priority to global interests unless they were free from direct security threats in Europe. This was possible only for certain states at certain times (Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries, for example) because of their insular position and a dispersion of power on the continent. (Note that such states tend to be the world powers in long cycle theory.) For some of the better analyses of the reciprocal interaction between politics and economics in the world system, see Keohane (fn. 20), chap. 2; Gilpin (fn. 2); Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 1.

[72] Levy (fn. 44), chap. 2.

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importance of governance in the system, most realists emphasize the anarchic nature of the system, the absence of governance, and the importance of self-help, at least for the great powers. Whereas others identify historical cases of hegemony or leadership, most balance of power theorists would argue that hegemony is historically rare, and that the balance of power mechanism has usually functioned effectively to prevent any single state from achieving a dominant position.[73]

Let us now turn to the operational definition of general war in this Eurocentric, security-oriented great power system. I have identified the great powers elsewhere.[74] The determination of the most powerful state

[73] Interesting differences among the paradigms can be found in their respective treatments of World War I. In a realist/continental perspective, Germany was the strongest power in the system prior to World War I, and also was perceived as the primary threat to the system in 1939. (See, for example, the argument and evidence presented by A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* [London: Oxford University Press, 1954], xxv-xxxii; also Paul M. Kennedy, "The First World War and the International Power System," *International Security* 9 [Summer 1984], 7-40. Note also that the 1872-1890 period is described as one of unipolarity under Germany by Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1963], 252.) This perspective should be contrasted with those in which there is a greater emphasis on economic and global dimensions of the system, and in which Britain and then the United States are identified as the leading powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively. Väyrynen, for example, finds it "a remarkable fact . . . that the two world wars were not initiated by the power which was challenging the leading power in economic terms. . . ." He asks "why World War I was not waged between the United States and Great Britain and World War II from the beginning between Germany and the United States," since they were the leading economic powers. In his explanation for this "anomaly" in his power transition theory, Väyrynen argues that "before World War I, geographical proximity made the economic and military surge of Germany much more threatening than the rapid economic growth of the United States on the other side of the Atlantic. The U.S. military capability was, furthermore, rather modest at the turn of the century in comparison with its economic power" (fn. 3), 412.

This, of course, is not all that remarkable, and the so-called "anomalies" are not confined to this century. It was French military power rather than Dutch maritime power that was perceived as the primary threat to the system in the last two decades of the 17th century, and it was France that was the target of two successive coalitions of nearly all the great powers. Similarly, it was Revolutionary France rather than Britain, the leading economic and naval power, that was perceived as the primary threat by the other great powers at the very end of the 18th century. The great powers have always feared their rivals' military power more than their economic power, and the geographic proximity of continental powers has always caused them—and not the wealthy maritime powers removed from the continent—to be perceived as the greatest threats to the interests of the other great powers. These are basic assumptions of traditional balance of power theory and of the conception of a Eurocentric great power system. For this reason, a traditional *realpolitik* perspective provides a better explanation for the fundamental question of who fights whom in general wars than do other perspectives based on economic or global assumptions.

This argument is not necessarily inconsistent with long cycle theory. Whereas the leading state in a realist/continental system has usually been a land power and therefore threatening to other great powers, Modelski's world power is a sea power that is less threatening, but plays the central role in system management. The different functional roles of the lead actors in these divergent theories emphasizes the difficulty of constructing critical empirical tests.

[74] The great powers in this system are identified in Levy (fn. 44), chap. 2. The list includes France, 1495- ; England/Great Britain, 1495- ; Austrian Hapsburgs/Austria, 1495-1519 and 1556-1918; Spain, 1495-1519 and 1556-1808; the Ottoman Empire, 1495-1699; United Haps-

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in the system must ultimately be based on systematically generated data on military capabilities; in the absence of such data for the entire span of the system it will be necessary for now to make qualitative judgments based on the arguments of historical literature and on scattered data on army size from Sorokin and others.[75] Since most historians share a Eurocentric and military security orientation, this method will not introduce a serious bias.

The requirement of the active participation of most of the great powers in the war raises the question of what minimum threshold should be used. This is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but it seems reasonable to require that at least half of the powers perceive a significant threat and fight to block it. The minimum number of belligerent powers should then be one plus half of the remaining powers, or $1+(n-1)/2=(n+1)/2$, or a minimum ratio of $(n+1)/2n$, where n is the number of powers in the system.[76]

The requirement of a "substantial" conflict must also be quantified. The best and most widely used measure of the seriousness of war is battle deaths.[77] Since both the number of casualties and their impact on

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burgs, 1519-1556; the Netherlands, 1609-1713; Sweden, 1617-1721; Russia/Soviet Union, 1721- ; Prussia/Germany/West Germany, 1740- ; Italy, 1861-1943; United States, 1898- ; Japan, 1905-1945; China, 1949- .

Note that ten of the eleven global powers from long cycle theory are included here (all but Portugal); additional states included here but not in long cycle theory are the Ottoman Empire, Sweden, and China.

[75] Sorokin (fn. 60), 547-77. Modelski and Thompson have a more fully operational definition of the world power in long cycle theory—a state that possesses over fifty percent of global seapower over sustained periods. They systematically identify these world powers from Thompson's data on seapower. See William R. Thompson, "Seapower in Global Politics, 1500-1945: Problems of Data Collection and Analysis," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association–West, Los Angeles, March 19-22, 1980; see also Modelski and Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1983* (forthcoming).

[76] This criterion assumes that there is a single threat to impose hegemony over the system. That is a useful simplification, for there is no simple solution where there are multiple threats to dominate the system. If there were, presumably they could hold each other in check.

Note (Table 1) that this operational criterion for the minimum ratio of great powers that must be involved is relatively robust. To require less than half the great powers would be unreasonable, given the theoretical concept it is designed to tap. To require more than 60% of the powers would exclude the War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada (but only because the Ottoman Empire is identified as a great power in spite of the fact that it participated in none of the four general wars during that period). No other general war would be excluded until the minimum ratio exceeded 5/7 (War of the League of Augsburg) and then 5/6 (War of the Spanish Succession), but those wars are included by all the frameworks except Wallerstein's. Eight of the ten general wars involve over 80% of the great powers. My own two cases of general war that others are most likely to criticize—the two major conflicts of the mid-18th century—each involve *all* of the great powers in the system. It is also interesting to note that if the Ottoman Empire were excluded from the sytem, eight of my ten general wars would involve *all* of the powers in the system. For a defense of the inclusion of the Turks as a great power, see Levy (fn. 44), 35-37.

[77] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965* (New York: Wiley,

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society are functions of population and army size, a measure of battle deaths relative to population is used and defined as the intensity of war. Because population data for all the individual states are not available over the last five centuries, the population of Europe as a whole is used as a benchmark. A lower limit of 1,000 battle deaths per one million European population is used as the minimum required intensity for a general war.[78]

One final problem must be resolved before general wars in the modern great power system can be identified. Does general war refer to an *individual* war or a *period* of hegemonic conflict? While many of the theories surveyed above speak in terms of individual wars, most lists of global wars refer to periods of intensive warfare. Perhaps one reason for the latter focus is that many theorists are more concerned with building a theory of global politics than a theory of the causes of war. One could argue that the question of the causes of general war is equally important, however, and that for this purpose it is preferable to construct a compilation of individual general wars. The causes of each of the wars can then be investigated independently, without having been prejudged. It is important, for example, that we remain open to the possibility that the causes of World War II are different from those of World War I. This focus on individual wars also allows for the analytic distinction between hegemonic war and a series of distinct and more limited conflicts, which together may affect the structure and evolution of the system, but none of which by itself constitutes a threat of hegemony or

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1972), 130; Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, and Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960).

[78] Procedures for the measurement of the intensity of war, along with a justification for the use of the population of Europe as a baseline for comparison, can be found in Levy (fn. 4), chap. 4. Of the 64 wars between the great powers in the last five centuries, 22 exceed 1,000 in intensity. Of these, only ten qualify as hegemonic wars.

This minimum intensity criterion is also reasonably robust. The War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada barely qualifies, but even a threefold increase in this threshold would exclude no other case (see Table 1). Additional wars that might qualify if this threshold were lowered (see Levy, fn. 44, pp. 88-91) would be the War of the Polish Succession, 1733-1738 (intensity of 836), though England's nonparticipation might violate our first criterion; the Fourth War of Charles V (combined with the Siege of Boulogne), 1542-1546 (intensity of 736); and the Fifth War of Charles V, 1552-1556 (intensity of 668). None of these wars is included in any of the other prominent lists, however, and their exclusion does not appear to be a serious problem here.

Note that the case most sensitive to both the minimum great power ratio and the minimum intensity ratio is the War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada, which is also identified as a hegemonic war by Toynbee, Modelski and Thompson, and Doran. This was a combination of several closely related wars involving a coalition of England, France, and the Dutch against Spain, and the future of Europe rested on the outcome. See Peter Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609*, 2d ed. (London: Ernest Benn, 1958); Garrett Mattingly, *The Armada* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); J. H. Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559-1598* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pt. IV; Hill (fn. 45), II, chap. 7.

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qualifies as a hegemonic war. It also facilitates the separate analysis of simultaneous but unrelated conflicts that are distinct from the hegemonic war (e.g., the Russo-Turkish War during the Napoleonic War).

Wars in the modern great power system which have involved the leading power in the system, most of the other great powers, and substantial conflict are presented in Table 1. The fraction of the participating great powers, intensity of the war, and total number of battle deaths (severity of the war) are included.[79] A comparison of this compilation with others is provided in Table 2.[80]

Conclusion

I have argued that one problem shared by several theories of general or hegemonic war concerns the definition of their central concept. Many lists of hegemonic wars are not fully consistent with their corresponding definitions, and hegemonic war is often defined in such a way that some of the central propositions in the theory are reduced to tautologies and rendered immune from empirical testing. Important theoretical questions raised by conflicting hypotheses on the causes and consequences of hegemonic war cannot be resolved until rigorous operational criteria for the systematic identification of these wars are devised.

A general war has been defined as one in which a decisive victory by at least one side is both a reasonable possibility and likely to result in the leadership or dominance by a single state over the system, or at least in the overthrow of an existing leadership or hegemony. This definition requires that a general war involve the leading power in the system, most of the other powers, and substantial conflict.

For the modern great power system, conceived in terms of a Eurocentric framework in which military security issues are given priority, general wars are those involving the leading great power in the system, at least half of the other great powers, and an intensity exceeding 1,000 battle deaths per one million European population. There have been ten such general wars during the five-century span of the modern system.

There are many points of disagreement among the different theories

[79] This table is based on the data in Levy (fn. 44, chap. 4.) Most of these wars satisfy the definitional criteria by a considerable margin and should not generate much controversy. The more difficult cases include the two mid-18th-century wars and the War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada, which have been discussed above. Of the wars not included, only the Italian Wars (1494-1559) and the Crimean War present potential problems, and these are minor. I have dealt with each of these cases at some length in "The Definition and Identification of Hegemonic War," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 27-31, 1984, pp. 24-26.

[80] The substance of these comparisons was discussed earlier, in the criticism of the inconsistency between others' lists of hegemonic wars and their definitions of the concept.

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TABLE 1
GENERAL WARS IN THE MODERN GREAT POWER SYSTEM

War	*Dates*	*Ratio of Powers Involved*	*Intensity*[a]	*Severity (battle deaths)*
War of Dutch Independence/ Spanish Armada	1585-1609	3/5	1,060	190,000[b]
Thirty Years' War	1618-1648	6/7	20,000	2,000,000
Dutch War of Louis XIV	1672-1678	6/7	3,600	300,000
War of the League of Augsburg	1688-1697	5/7	6,900	700,000
War of the Spanish Succession	1701-1713	5/6	12,500	1,300,000
War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession	1739-1748	6/6	3,400	400,000
Seven Years' War	1755-1763	6/6	9,100	1,000,000
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars	1792-1815	6/6	21,000	2,500,000
World War I	1914-1918	8/8	58,000	7,700,000
World War II	1939-1945	7/7	94,000	13,000,000

[a] Intensity is measured in terms of battle deaths per one million European population.
[b] Includes Spanish and Dutch casualties from the War of Dutch Independence beginning in 1568.

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF COMPILATIONS OF GENERAL WARS[a]

War	*Dates*	*Levy*	*Toynbee*	*Modelski/ Thompson*	*Wallerstein*	*Gilpin*	*Doran*[b]	*Farrar*	*Mowat*
Italian Wars	(1494-1525)[c]		X	X					X
War of Dutch Independence/ Spanish Armada	(1585-1609)[d]	X	X	X			X	?	
Thirty Years' War	(1618-1648)	X			X	X	X		X
Dutch War of Louis XIV	(1672-1678)	X	X			X	X		X
War of the League of Augsburg	(1688-1697)	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
War of the Spanish Succession	(1701-1713)	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
War of Jenkins' Ear/ Austrian Succession	(1739-1748)	X							X
Seven Years' War	(1755-1763)	X							X
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars	(1792-1815)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
World War I	(1914-1918)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
World War II[e]	(1939-1945)	X		X	X	X	X	X	–

[a] Wright is not included since he appears to suggest three different lists of general wars (see fn. 31).

[b] It is not clear which wars Doran includes in the "Hapsburg attempt to dominate Europe," or which of Louis XIV's wars he includes (see fn. 30).

[c] As ending dates, Toynbee uses 1525 while Modelski and Thompson use 1517. Mowat includes the wars of Charles V by identifying 1559 as the end of the war.

[d] Toynbee uses the opening date of 1568, Modelski 1579; Thompson and Levy each wait until the internationalization of the civil war in 1585. Farrar includes the period 1568-1588 as one of hegemonic war (see fn. 31).

general war" (fn. 4, p. 255). Modelski, Thompson, Wallerstein, Gilpin, and Farrar all treat the two World Wars of this century as a single global war. Mowat's study was completed before World War II.

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of hegemonic war and world politics. While these theories are based on different assumptions and to a certain extent ask different questions, they also provide different answers to some of the same questions. They disagree over the relative importance of security interests as compared to economic interests, and of European interests as compared to global interests in the policies of leading states; over which states are perceived as the primary threats to these interests; over the critical question of the causes of hegemonic war; and over numerous other questions. Many of these conflicting propositions are testable in principle, and in fact must be tested if they are to be accepted as valid explanations for behavior in the global system.

This discussion suggests some important tasks for future research on hegemonic war. Since comparative tests of different theories are possible only with respect to those questions for which the theories suggest different answers, more attention needs to be directed to the identification of the specific areas in which these theories overlap and conflict. Though I have identified some of the areas in which critical tests might be devised, further theoretical work is necessary to generate additional testable and conflicting propositions from each of these frameworks. Of particular value would be the construction of a theory of general war associated with balance of power theory, for none presently exists.[81] Since balance of power and related *realpolitik* hypotheses have until recently dominated the literature on international conflict, they might offer a plausible alternative to existing theories of hegemonic war. Hypotheses on general war should be constructed in a way that facilitates their critical test against conflicting propositions from other frameworks. This would contribute to the resolution of the debates about hegemonic war and the structure and processes of the world system by empirical analysis as well as by theoretical argument.

[81] Even though no *theory* of general war in the modern great power system now exists, the assumptions of the realist/continental framework are sufficiently clear to permit the definition and identification of general wars in that system.

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DECISION MODES AND INTERNATIONAL REGIME CHANGE:

Western Collaboration on East-West Trade

By BEVERLY CRAWFORD and STEFANIE LENWAY*

> An international order cannot be based on power alone, for the simple reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power. An international order presupposes a substantial measure of general consent.
>
> —E. H. Carr[1]

IS consent a sure foundation upon which to build a stable world order? Under what conditions is it achieved? The burgeoning literature on international regimes and regime change[2] is beginning to address the issue E. H. Carr raised over forty years ago. Hegemonic stability theory argues that a preponderance of power provides the basis for international order.[3] Recent observers, however, have noted that order can break down even when the hegemon exercises dominance. Furthermore, stable col-

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[1] *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 235-36. First published by Macmillan (London), 1939.

[2] Informed by problems of world order and grounded in earlier studies of international law and organization, studies of international regimes are beginning to proliferate. The first important study was Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). See also Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), 357-405, and Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), 331-56. A recent attempt to define and illustrate the regime concept more carefully can be found in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., "International Regimes," a special issue of *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982). Scholars are also beginning to use the regime concept in empirical analyses of specific international issues. See, for example, Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, eds., *The Global Political Economy of Food* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), and George Quester, ed., "Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain," a special issue of *International Organization* 35 (Winter 1981).

[3] See Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 131-62.

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laboration can be achieved in the face of declining hegemony.[4] The exercise of power alone cannot lead to a stable international order.

We assume that some measure of cooperation among states is necessary for international stability. We know very little, however, about the internal dynamics of cooperation, how they change, what kind of change leads to stability, or how "general consent" can best be achieved. In this article, we offer a framework within which to examine those dynamics. We build our argument on realist theories of regime change. Our aim is to "repair" those theories by showing how international cooperation is affected not only by changes in the distribution of power, but by conflict or convergence of goals and policy instruments and by changes in the kind of information available for decision. In this way, we show how structural and cognitive forces interact to produce the dynamics of joint decision.[5]

The problem of international cooperation, in which one party seeks the agreement of others on common activities, arises when the need for joint action thwarts the pursuit of the goals of one (or more) of the parties. The immediate rewards of cooperation are higher for one party than for others. Consideration of the long-run relationship, however, affects negotiations for agreement on any specific issue. These negotiations involve both a conflict of goals and the incentive to cooperate. We will explore the negotiating problems that arise when the party seeking cooperation is more powerful than the others, and how those problems differ when power is equally balanced.

We address this issue by examining the collective efforts of Western countries to regulate their trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. East-West trade embraces both economic and security concerns. All Western states restrict exports of military goods to the East. There is dispute, however, over the export of industrial goods that may or may not have strategic significance. We do not examine the domestic sources of this policy conflict. Instead, we inquire how the problem of cooperation on this issue is solved, and how lasting those solutions are.

The United States consistently presses for collective trade restrictions.

[4] It has been widely accepted, for example, that the decline of U.S. hegemony in the postwar international economy led to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Charles Lipson, however, has demonstrated that a breakdown in various GATT procedures and norms began while the United States still held a dominant position in the world economy. Certain GATT norms have been strengthened, even in the face of America's decline. See Charles Lipson, "The Transformation of Trade," in Krasner (fn. 2), 417-55. For the most complete statement of this position, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[5] For a statement of the structural approach, see Keohane (fn. 3); for the cognitive approach, see Haas (fn. 2).

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More deeply involved in Eastern markets and suspicious of inconsistent U.S. policies, Western Europe often balks at U.S. demands. In general, Europe presses for a joint policy that allows for trade expansion. Although cooperation on broad restrictions appears to have a higher value for the United States than for Europe, all states concerned wish to reach agreement for the sake of alliance unity.

Our argument draws on behavioral theories of organization. Although there has been little dialogue between students of complex organizations and students of international regimes, organization theory permits useful insights into the problem of international cooperation. Theorists in both fields have made strikingly similar observations: both recognize that the goals of potential collaborators are rarely unitary, and both make similar arguments about the importance of exchange of resources and information between the organization and its participants, to ensure the attainment of collective over individual goals. An overarching goal of collective action, noted by theorists in both fields, is the reduction of uncertainty.[6]

Like all complex organizations, international regimes are purposeful systems constructed to achieve goals that single actors cannot achieve alone. Their chief function is to make and implement joint decisions in order to achieve collective aims and reduce uncertainty. The survival and effectiveness of long-term cooperation depends on successful decision formulation and implementation. The problem of effective joint decision is central to the analysis of complex organizations. The explicit study of decision processes, however, is neglected by students of international regimes even though decision analysis in the international context is crucial in any attempt to understand the dynamics of international cooperation. Regime stability and effectiveness depend on successful decision formulation and implementation.

In treating regimes as complex organizations, we develop a set of analytic techniques that distinguish different patterns of joint decision. We call the pattern of joint decision the decision mode.[7] Three forces

[6] The pioneering works within this tradition in organization theory are Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938); Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1965); and James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). In the regime literature, Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Krasner (fn. 2), 345-54, has emphasized the importance of uncertainty reduction as a function of international collaboration. The problem of achieving collective over individual goals is recognized in all of the regime literature, but the role of exchange between the regime and its participants in order to channel individual behavior into collective purpose has been assumed rather than systematically studied.

[7] The concept of the "decision mode" is based on the discussion by Herbert Simon, *ibid.*, 1-19 and 220, and Chester Bernard, *ibid.*, 185-99.

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interact to produce the decision mode: (1) *power* relationships that structure interaction among states; (2) *goals* and policy instruments within a specific issue area; and (3) the way *information* is generated and disseminated about the power structure, the goals of others, and the possible consequences of decision. *Power, goals*, and *information* make up the decision mode. Power can either be concentrated or diffused. Goals can conflict, converge, or coexist. Two kinds of information are important for decision: information about the preferences of others, and technical information about the consequences of various policies.[8] Both kinds can be either distorted or straightforward. In pursuing their goals and bringing their power to bear on the behavior of others, states may strategically distort both their preferences and the technical information upon which joint decisions will be based. If they value the future of their relationship, however, they are less likely to distort information.

We are concerned with how some decision modes can lead to stable cooperation and how others can lead to its demise. Therefore, in examining how and why decision modes change, we look for the ability of states to formulate and successfully implement joint policies over time, as measures of stable cooperation.

Three decision modes are identified: *compliance, compromise*, and *problem solving*.[9] Each has a different impact on stable cooperation. Compliance is the decision mode when a hegemon, much like an executive in a large organization, holds most of the power in negotiations. But, because goals clash, participants balk at cooperation. The way the hegemon uses his command over needed resources and technical knowledge provides others with information for a joint decision. Cooperation breaks down when the hegemon no longer provides incentives for joint action.

Compromise is the decision mode when there is a more equal distribution of power, but goals are still at odds. Information is no longer distributed from the top down, and it may be fragmented and distorted. Self-interest dictates what is communicated and what is not. Each state uses only that information which will affect others' calculations to *its*

[8] J. Hirshleifer and John G. Riley, "The Analytics of Uncertainty Reduction and Information—An Expository Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature* 17 (December 1979), 1375-1421.

[9] This three-fold distinction is based on Mary Parker Follett, *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*, ed. Henry C. Metcalf and Luther Urwick (New York: Harper & Row, 1942), and Kenneth Arrow, *The Limits of Organization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 68-73. Arrow distinguishes between authority, bargaining, and consensus, although he does not develop the implications of these categories.

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own advantage. Cooperation will be more solid when the overall relationship is valued by all. In this case, information will be less distorted and will thus create a more stable foundation for future cooperation.

Finally, problem solving is the decision mode when divergent goals can peacefully coexist. A stable compromise precedes problem solving. Here, the joint decision does not rest on the distribution of power, which may either be equally distributed or concentrated in one state. Information is collectively generated and available to all. Thus, there is less chance of its distortion.

The examination of negotiating processes is essential to our argument. Preferences, even preferences of states, are never definitely formed. We often discover what we want by finding out what we can get, and by learning the consequences of our actions. The revelation of one state's preferences provides information to the others. As states gain additional information of any kind, they reevaluate the net benefits attached to the pursuit of alternative policies. Thus, their policy preferences may shift. Shifting preferences, changing distribution of power, and changes in the kinds of information available for decisions trigger change in the decision mode. By examining how decision modes change, we will show how both compliance and problem-solving give way to compromise. We will then explore the conditions under which compromise can be a stable basis for cooperation. The willingness of states to compromise is dependent upon convergent interests in the long-term value of cooperation. The stability of cooperation is in turn dependent upon the decomposition of issues and the concentration of ongoing negotiations within organizations.

Change from one decision mode to another can often be observed in the wake of a crisis. Crises may expose an underlying shift in the distribution of power, a deep divergence of goals, or changes in the preference ordering of goals. The exploration of a particular crisis and its resolution within a regime offers a rich field for understanding how the internal dynamics of cooperation are transformed and for observing the impact of change on stable cooperation. A crisis tests the stability of cooperation. To examine change, we will analyze a particular crisis in Western collaboration on East-West trade: the dispute, in 1982, among NATO allies over the construction of the trans-Siberian natural gas pipeline. European firms contracted to build this pipeline with U.S. technology and equipment, in exchange for supplies of natural gas from the Soviet Union. The U.S. opposed both the export of energy-related technology and the gas imports, and therefore attempted to halt the

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pipeline's construction. The European states refused to comply, and a crisis erupted in the alliance.[10] Change in the decision mode throughout the postwar history of East-West trade created constraints on America's efforts to extract compliance from its allies and finally set the stage for the resolution of the pipeline crisis.

We begin with a discussion of our framework of explanation by fleshing out each of the three decision modes. We then illustrate the framework through a historical examination of East-West trade and an analysis of the pipeline crisis, and we conclude with suggestions on how the framework can be used to synthesize and expand structural and cognitive theories of regime change.

I

Compliance

A central question raised by students of complex organizations has been how executives can integrate the goals of participants into the goal of the organization, *as they define it*. They do this by modifying the utility that others attach to various courses of action in such a way that they pursue the organization's goal.[11] Like these executives, hegemonic states attempt to extract cooperation from lesser powers when unilateral action is not effective. Cooperation is assured when the hegemon controls a wide range of resources upon which other states are dependent, and can offer or withhold them in exchange for compliance with his preferred

[10] William Gore has argued that crises within organizations create disequilibrium, perceptions of threat to organizational survival, open conflict, changes in leadership, and the adoption of new modes of behavior; see Gore, *Administrative Decision Making: A Heuristic Model* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964). See also Arrow (fn. 9), 52. On the role of crisis in regime change, see Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Krasner (fn. 2), 292. For general propositions on the role of crises in international relations that may be applied to regimes, see Charles F. Herman, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1969), 409-21. Herman argues that threat, time pressure, surprise, and decision making at high levels of government all indicate crises. The pipeline dispute meets most of these criteria. Although military threat was not involved, alliance cohesion was threatened, the embargo took the West Europeans by surprise, the time available for response was short, and decisions during and after the embargo were taken at higher levels of government.

[11] Amitai Etzioni has argued that there are three kinds of incentives or compliance mechanisms that assure cooperation in organizations: identitive controls, remunerative controls, and coercive controls. The discussion that follows adapts his framework to compliance with hegemonic states in international regimes. See Etzioni, "Organizational Control Structures," in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organization* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 650-77. Michael Mastanduno uses a similar framework for analyzing U.S. policies toward Europe with regard to East-West trade. See Mastanduno, "In Pursuit of Closure: American East-West Trade Strategy, 1949-58," mimeo (Clinton, NY: Hamilton College, 1983).

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policy. If hegemonic states can unilaterally raise the cost of defection, others will reevaluate the net benefits attached to the self-serving pursuit of conflicting goals. When the cost is too high, they will comply.

A hegemon often begins to elicit compliance by acting unilaterally. He may "exert leadership" and "raise consciousness" through a lone symbolic action, in the hope that others will follow in his path.[12] This provides important information about the hegemon's goals and is intended to reduce the fears of others that the hegemon may defect if they cooperate. In its nuclear nonproliferation policy, for example, the Carter administration deferred domestic thermal nuclear reprocessing in the effort to persuade others to do the same. In the trans-Siberian pipeline case, the United States began with a unilateral embargo on energy equipment bound for the Soviet Union, in the hope that the European states would follow with an embargo of their own.

When goals conflict, however, and the cost of following the leader is too high, the hegemon must expend resources to compensate others for the losses incurred by compliance.[13] In the early Bretton Woods regime, for example, the United States allowed discrimination against its exports to alleviate the balance-of-payments problems associated with participation in an open international economy. In its attempt to construct a nonproliferation regime, Washington offered to contribute to an international fuel bank that would assure secure supplies of nuclear fuel for those states that adhered to the non-proliferation policy. In the issue of East-West trade, the U.S. offered defense contracts to firms whose governments would agree to restrict the sale of technology to the East. These lucrative contracts were intended to compensate for the loss of the Eastern market.

By exacting compliance through compensation, dominant powers do not fundamentally modify the immediate preferences of others. Compensation is a sophisticated form of bribery; compliance will last only as long as it is assured. When compensation is no longer forthcoming, others begin to pursue conflicting goals. Cooperation breaks down, or the decision mode must change.

A more costly route to compliance is coercion. Here, the dominant state threatens to withdraw needed resources if others do not comply. In 1978, for example, the United States called for a cut-off of nuclear

[12] See Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 113; Barnard (fn. 6), 281-84; Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining a Non-proliferation Regime," *International Organizations* 35 (Winter 1981), 20.

[13] For an examination of the role of compensation as a compliance strategy in complex organizations, see Barnard (fn. 6), 150-53.

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materials to countries that did not adhere to U.S. nonproliferation policy. Nevertheless, compliance was not forthcoming. In the pipeline case, the United States penalized European firms that did not go along with the new trade restrictions; European governments would still not join in a multilateral embargo.

Since coercion threatens the overall tone of the relationship and reduces the potential for agreement in other issue areas, it is the most costly and destabilizing way to achieve compliance. It is never a sufficient condition for lasting agreement.[14] Coerced parties may learn that they can do without the withheld resources, or they may search for alternative ways to meet their needs. Incentives to defect and to cheat are high, and coercive policies are ineffective in the long run. In short, coercion is the exercise of naked power, and others will find a way to revolt. This revolt is more evident when others lessen their dependence upon the resources controlled by the hegemon or when his control over needed resources declines.

Finally, the hegemon may believe he is powerful enough to act outside the agreement and still extract the compliance of others. In 1982, the United States continued to sell grain to the Soviet Union while at the same time calling for a multilateral embargo on energy equipment. This behavior, too, is information, which raises the incentive for others to defect rather than to take the "sucker's payoff." Thus, it may undermine the basis for future cooperation in pursuit of the hegemon's goals.

In general, when compliance is the decision mode, available information supports the hegemon's preferences. It is communicated to others in the form of unilateral policy, compensation, threats of coercion, or intermittent defection. When goals conflict, much of this information can lead to defection and cheating. Unilateral policy on the part of a dominant power may encourage free riding, with cheating on the side.[15] Compensation in the form of bribery does not bring lasting cooperation, and coercion encourages rebellion. When the hegemon defects from cooperation, others feel justified in their own decision to defect. All of this has happened in efforts to regulate East-West trade. The United States achieved formal compliance with a total embargo policy and East-West trade was drastically reduced; but West European traders found ways to cheat, and their governments did not enforce the embargo. Although the European states did not formally defect, goods were smuggled and transshipped to the East.

[14] *Ibid.*, 150; Arrow (fn. 9), 72.

[15] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 5-43.

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Compromise

When power is more equally distributed and the organization of cooperation is less hierarchical and more pluralistic, conflicts in values, goals, and objectives are resolved according to a different decision process. In negotiating, each state modifies its self-serving policy on one or more of the issues under consideration. This does not necessarily mean that states change their goals. Instead, they recognize that the pursuit of those goals is too costly when policy preferences conflict. They therefore compromise so that the *substance* of joint policy does not reflect any one actor's preferences. For example, if the United States government changes its mind about curtailing all trade with the U.S.S.R., it does not mean that it places a lower value on hurting the Soviets. It does mean that Washington has re-estimated the costs of a more restrictive policy in light of information about how its allies will behave, and has therefore formulated a less restrictive policy. The key to compromise is to find some areas of overlap among acceptable outcomes in which everyone can pursue policies that do the least harm to the goals of others.

Problems arise, however, because all states want to appropriate the most gains from agreement for themselves. They do this by engaging in bargaining tactics that distort information, such as concealing their own preferences in order to extract the most from the compromise.[16] Thus, information often is manipulated and distorted simply in order to get an agreement. A case in point is the Versailles summit in 1982, where the United States extracted an agreement from France to tighten credit restrictions on the Soviet Union. In exchange, the U.S. offered to intervene in international financial markets in order to stabilize exchange rates. This compromise fell through because each side had dissembled about its preferences and neither had information on the true preferences of the other. The U.S. negotiators said they would agree to France's demands only because France agreed to comply with America's East-West trade policy preferences; France engaged in the same bargaining tactic. When one party backed out, the other defected as well. It was this breakdown of agreement that triggered the crisis over the trans-Siberian pipeline.[17]

Consideration of the overall relationship, however, reduces the incentive to distort information. International regimes coexist in a wider

[16] This point is made in Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 60.

[17] Interview, July 1983, with a Reagan administration participant in the Versailles summit negotiations. Not for attribution.

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political context. That is, the issue under negotiation within the regime is not viewed by the actors in isolation, but is negotiated with an eye to the impact of agreement or disagreement on the overall relationship. How a particular issue is resolved will structure the attitudes of participants toward one another.[18] These attitudes will have an impact upon the next set of negotiations or on the strengthening or weakening of other regimes. Under such conditions, no one likes to get caught in a lie. Frequent, long-term interaction increases the odds of getting caught, which in turn reduces the liar's credibility. Lies revealed provide information on the liar's intent to defect from cooperation, and thus increase the odds that others will defect.

Dominant states tend to believe that they control overall interaction. This belief reduces their incentive to be honest. But when one state no longer controls others, and when parties expect frequent, long-term interaction, everyone's incentive to be honest increases. In the long run, compromise based on undistorted information is a more stable basis for cooperation than compliance, because it involves a measure of mutual consent.

Problem Solving

If compromise leads to areas of overlapping agreement, then problem solving becomes the decision mode in ongoing negotiations. After compromise has been reached, the joint policy problem is defined in roughly the same way by all, and policy formulation is relatively easy. It is effective implementation that may be problematic. Joint policy implementation can be obstructed for two reasons: uncertainty about consequences, and misunderstandings about the terms of agreement. The problem-solving mode relies on the collective search for information to resolve uncertainty and clear up misunderstandings.[19]

Uncertainty obstructs joint decision because actors may not be aware of the domestic political and economic consequences of a joint policy. Technical information may be used to evaluate different courses of action and their consequences explicitly. Technical information can also be

[18] Walton and McKersie (fn. 16, pp. 184-221), argue that negotiating parties share a relationship pattern that is valued for its own sake. Each bargaining situation sets the tone for future negotiations, and negotiators bargain with an eye to how the outcome will structure the relationship in the future. The more this consideration of maintaining the relationship impinges upon the specific negotiating situation, the more willing the parties will be to cooperate. See also Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 59-62.

[19] For the argument about the importance of gathering and processing information for organizational survival, see Thompson (fn. 6), 9. For a statement of the importance of information within international regimes, see Keohane in Krasner (fn. 6), 347, 349.

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useful as a basis for shared meanings of the terms of agreement. Ongoing communication is dependent upon shared meaning.[20] Within CoCom (Coordinating Committee–Consultative Group), for example, technical information is used to evaluate the strategic consequences of East-West trade in technology, and to specify the meanings of key terms. The term "strategic," for instance, can lead to disagreement over which items should be restricted for "strategic" reasons. Discussion takes place over the meaning of the terms "technology" and "technology transfer"; current negotiations embody attempts to arrive at common definitions.

The availability of technical information, however, does not always ensure that a joint policy decision can be reached and implemented. It may reveal consequences that are unacceptable. When states attach different utilities to different consequences, conflicts of interest may still arise, as is evident in CoCom negotiations. Changes in the embargo list are made so that Europeans, who have a higher stake in their trade with the East, will not be hurt, while the United States is assured that trade does not harm Western security. But if the consequences of joint policy cause too much domestic discontent, technical information cannot be the chief basis for joint decision, and problem solving cannot be the chief decision mode. The decision mode must move back to compromise.

Conditions for Change and Stable Cooperation

What are the conditions under which new decision modes replace old ones? Building on the structural model of regime change, our case supports the thesis that the relative decline of U.S. economic power, combined with Europe's conflicting goals and interests, partially explains the move from compliance to compromise. We thus observe change in the substance of joint East-West trade policy away from the preferred policy of the United States. But, because of continued U.S. military dominance within NATO and the fact that East-West trade raises security concerns, we can expect the U.S. to continue intermittent attempts to exact compliance. Convergent security interests lead Europeans to compromise on East-West trade issues, but not necessarily to comply with specific American demands. Washington, too, finds that, on the whole, it is forced to compromise.

States will compromise their conflicting goals in one set of issues if they find that they have mutual interests and convergent goals in another issue area. These convergent goals raise the value of the overall relationship and create the incentive to compromise when a specific conflict

[20] Walton and McKersie (fn. 16), 140.

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arises. Once convergent interests have been articulated and compromise is reached, states can begin to engage in problem solving. Recognition of convergent security interests among NATO allies permits a search for compromise in their policies on trade with the adversary.

There are two keys to stable cooperation: the recognition that convergent goals raise the value of the overall interaction, and the use of undistorted information for decision. We have argued that the value of the overall relationship reduces incentives to lie and cheat. In addition, there are two kinds of institutional arrangements that facilitate the use of high-quality information and agreement on specific issues: the *decomposition* of those issues in which there is overlap among acceptable outcomes, and the *concentration* of negotiations within a single-issue organization.[21]

When issues are decomposed into small segments (e.g., separate negotiations on technology transfer, credits, energy, industrial cooperation, countertrade, etc.), the chances of distorted information and deception are reduced. This observation may be surprising because, within multilateral negotiations over a whole range of issues, one might expect that it would be more difficult for potential liars to tell different stories to the same audience, and that it would be easier to reach agreement if trade-offs among issues could be made. Decomposition, however, reduces the tactical linkage among different issues that may create opportunities for states to distort information and destabilize long-term cooperation.[22]

States often attempt to link tactically unrelated issues in negotiations, so that sacrifices are made on issues that are lower on each state's preference ordering. When states reach a negotiating impasse in one issue area, they may attempt trade-offs across issues of concern to all. This kind of linkage is unstable because states may bluff, or lie, about their preferences on one issue in order to extract bigger sacrifices on others. Furthermore, their ability to carry out sacrifices (or threats) across issues may not be credible. That is what happened at the Versailles summit in 1982; agreement broke down when negotiators tactically linked East-West trade to international monetary issues.

Decomposition of issues circumscribes negotiations and reduces tactical issue linkage. When issues are decomposed, negotiating power is

[21] Axelrod (fn. 18), 126-32.

[22] The concept of tactical issue linkage was developed by Kenneth A. Oye, "The Domain of Choice: International Constraints and the Carter Administration Foreign Policy," in Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World* (New York: Longman, 1979), 13-17. Tactical issue linkage can take place in both the compliance and compromise modes.

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usually more equally distributed, because one state cannot bring its overall resources to bear on the specific negotiations.[23] When negotiations take place *within* an issue instead of *across* issues, all states are encouraged to modify their policies on a single problem of joint decision. Once they have found an area of overlapping agreement, they can use technical information to explore possible consequences of joint policy.

Concentration of negotiations on conflictual issues *within organizations* also reduces the opportunity to distort information, mainly because the parties meet one another regularly and know they will meet in the future.[24] The creation and utilization of ongoing organizations or regimes can thus lead to more stable cooperation. Furthermore, organizational rules can be created that make it more difficult for one power to dominate the organization. Weaker participants may strengthen their commitment to a multilateral organization in order to defend their interests against a compliance-seeking hegemon. As organizational commitment on the part of all participants is strengthened, the ability to formulate and implement joint policy increases.

A crisis often provides actors with the opportunity to consider whether the collective desire for long-term cooperation on issues of mutual concern can lead to the resolution of a specific dispute. The pipeline crisis arose outside of the ongoing negotiations on technology transfer and credits, and the United States attempted to link those issues to European energy imports from the Soviet Union. Those linkages obscured ongoing compromise and problem solving that was taking place within the separate organizations. Linking the issues in its argumentation, the U.S. attempted to halt the pipeline construction, but it failed. Uncertainty about the outcome was high for U.S. policy makers, but the crisis resolution revealed that ongoing negotiations were quietly bringing about certainty and policy coordination on the sub-issues of East-West trade.

II

The problem of Western collaboration on East-West trade has its roots in the tension between the principles of free trade (in which all trading parties benefit), and the principles of international politics (in which each state tries to increase its own benefits from interaction, and thus its own power over others). This tension gave rise to two conflicting

[23] Power, however, may still be distributed asymmetrically within certain issues. See Keohane and Nye (fn. 2), 49-52.

[24] Axelrod (fn. 18), 130-31.

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goals that have characterized disputes between the United States and Europe over East-West trade from the very beginning.[25]

In their trade with the East, the European countries continued to pursue their prewar policies of *export promotion* of nonmilitary goods. The United States urged its alliance partners to pursue *trade restriction* instead as part of the overall goal of military and economic dominance over the Soviet Union. U.S. officials argued that any trade that would benefit the U.S.S.R. would increase its power, and thus reduce Western security.

Because of its dominance after World War II, the United States had the resources to enforce compliance with its goal of trade restriction. Exercising "leadership," the U.S. embargoed more goods to the East than it expected others to restrict. Although there was some congressional alarm over this inequality, it was intended to reduce potential European fears about taking the "sucker's payoff" for cooperation. Further, the United States provided Europe with compensation for loss of the Eastern market. It offered Marshall Plan funds, discrimination against its own exports, and ample reserves for the European Payments Union, not only to build up Western economies, but to cut off old trading patterns with the East.

In addition, there were threats of concern in the Mutual Defence Export Control Act of 1951, which stipulated that all aid to states who exported strategic and even non-military goods to Communist nations would be curtailed.[26] Two years earlier, the United States had taken the lead in creating CoCom, an international regime, to administer a co-ordinated Western embargo policy toward the Communist bloc. The joint policy pursued by CoCom mirrored U.S. policy on trade restriction. The European states initially agreed to these broad trade restrictions—both because the U.S. extracted compliance with its own preferences and because the Soviet threat appeared particularly ominous in the early cold-war period.

For a brief time, until 1955, compliance was achieved, and East-West trade declined while total Western trade expanded. The Soviet Union redirected its trade toward Eastern Europe and created its own trading bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In the West, it looked as if compliance would be the decision mode and broad trade restriction would be the joint policy.

[25] On the history of this conflict in the 1950s, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare* (Stockholm: Alquest & Wikesell, 1968).

[26] *Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, U.S. Code* (1951), 65 Stat. 644, chap. 575 (Public Law 213, 82d Congress, 1951).

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Cheating, however, had been in evidence all along; in 1950, the U.S. Commerce Department blacklisted 1500 firms that transshipped goods to the Soviet Union. Most of them were European. By 1955, U.S. economic and military aid to Western Europe began to increase. With the decline in compensation and the recovery of the West European economies, trade between Western Europe and the CMEA began to expand.[27] Still, Europe continued to restrict trade in military goods.

CoCom rules have made compliance strategies difficult to pursue. Within CoCom, all decisions on what is embargoed must be unanimous. When the net benefits of West European compliance declined with the decrease of compensation by the United States, CoCom members began to ensure through their veto power that regime rules would reflect their own preferences. Until 1954, the list of embargoed items had grown, reflecting Washington's preference for increasing trade restriction. After 1954, however, items were subtracted from the list with every review. Increasingly, joint decisions deferred to the European goal of trade expansion. By 1960, only 118 restricted items remained on the list, down from 270 in 1950.[28] The United States found itself engaging in compromise to reach agreement within the CoCom organization.

Throughout the 1960s, East-West trade continued to expand as the substance of CoCom policy came to reflect a compromise between trade restriction and expansion. CoCom members agreed in general to restrict only goods and technologies with strategic significance, and to allow expansion of trade in nonmilitary goods. Gradually, this compromise began to insinuate itself into U.S. export control policy. By 1965, President Johnson had created the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to explore the role of peaceful trade in "building bridges" between the United States and the Soviet bloc. In 1969, a fundamental change in policy was reflected in the new Export Administration Act. The term "export administration" replaced the term "export control," and the new law attempted to balance economic and political benefits of trade with strategic concerns.

[27] Adler-Karlsson (fn. 25), 45-59, 55. Mastanduno (fn. 11, pp. 22-23), disagrees with this assessment. He argues that the logic behind the policy of economic warfare weakened after the end of the Korean War, and that the European states could not be persuaded of the necessity of a strategic embargo as easily as they could earlier. European economic recovery, however, is perhaps the strongest explanation for the resumption of trade with the East. Exports began as soon as Europe became less dependent on U.S. economic resources.

[28] Between 1955 and 1965, the value of West European exports to the East increased from $1 billion to $5 billion. See Adler-Karlsson (fn. 25), 46, and Angela E. Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 110.

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From that time on, the United States pursued inconsistent policies on East-West trade. Kissinger's detente goals of trade expansion, intended to give the Soviet Union a "stake in the network of relationships with the West,"[29] dissolved into the notion of trade as leverage. With this policy, the United States tactically linked trade to other issues and threatened trade restrictions if the Soviets did not comply with U.S. goals in other issue areas. These objectives were concurrent with trade restrictions to enhance military security. It was unclear, both within the U.S. government and to the West European allies, which goal the United States would pursue next.

Starting in the mid-1970s, lack of success in capturing a significant share of the Eastern market,[30] the demise of detente, the clash of detente strategy with President Carter's human rights policy, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan moved the United States back to its original goal of trade restriction. Once again, the United States attempted to extract compliance from Western Europe with an extensive embargo. By this time, however, the issue of East-West trade had split into three distinct issue areas: technology transfer, credit, and energy trade. In the organizations in which these sub-issues were discussed, the Europeans balked at compliance, and the United States was forced to compromise.

Technology Transfer

Even though the compromise mode had taken hold within CoCom, the United States once again began to press for compliance with restrictions on technology transfers. Earlier, the U.S. and the West European countries had debated over what constituted a "strategic item." Washington argued that any item that contributed to Soviet industrial power should be considered strategic. Western Europe wished to restrict the use of the term "strategic item" to those goods that had military significance. As technology became a dominant issue in East-West trade in the 1970s, these negotiations became discussions on "strategic technology."[31]

[29] "Detente with the Soviet Union: The Reality of Competition and the Imperative of Cooperation," *Department of State Bulletin*, October 14, 1974, p. 508.

[30] The value of machinery and transport equipment exports alone from OECD to CMEA countries jumped from $1,022 million in 1965 to $10,283 million in 1977. During 1974, CMEA machinery and equipment imports from the West increased by 35% from 1973 levels, and in 1975 the increase was 55% over 1974. Eugene Zaleski and Helgard Wienart, *Technology Transfer Between East and West* (Paris: OECD, 1980), 66. The U.S. share of this expanded trade, however, increased only from 0.2% to 2.7% of the total between 1965 and 1977. Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and East-West Trade* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1979), 39.

[31] On the early debates, see Adler-Karlsson (fn. 25), 53. The U.S. negotiating position on strategic technology in CoCom after 1979 was based on the Defense Science Board Task

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While the West Europeans argued that technology should be narrowly defined as "machinery and transport equipment," the United States pushed to expand the definition to include knowledge, skill, and information. Furthermore, the U.S. pushed for CoCom control over certain "active" technology transfer mechanisms, such as joint ventures, turnkey plants, and long-term technical training. The Europeans resisted broad definitions of technology that would lead to greater restrictions.[32] Thus, the decision mode alternated between problem solving to facilitate communication and to create shared meanings of key terms, and compromise to avert harm to domestic industry.

Up to 1979, the United States had little success in persuading other CoCom members to accept its definition of strategic technology transfer. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, Washington pushed harder for compliance, outside of CoCom, and even offered compensation. In late 1981, the Defense Department announced that, in exchange for their governments' compliance with U.S. CoCom demands, defense contracts would be awarded to American contractors who were engaged in joint ventures with European firms. Furthermore, America's tied aid programs would be broadened to include European firms; countries receiving U.S. aid would be allowed to buy military equipment from European firms.[33] CoCom rules, however, left little room for compliance with the demands of a single party; within the organization, the offers of compensation fell on deaf ears.

In early 1982—for the first time since the founding of CoCom—a ministerial-level meeting was held to review its effectiveness. Part of the U.S. agenda was to seek agreement within CoCom on blocking construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline. Much energy-related equipment, argued U.S. officials, was indeed strategic. West European CoCom members, however, refused to discuss the project within the CoCom framework; the disputed equipment was not on the CoCom embargo list.[34] Thus, technical discussions within the organization were separated from wider political issues in East-West trade. That insulation helped to achieve a narrow goal convergence and preserved the compromise and problem-solving decision modes. This allowed cooperation on the regulation of strategic trade to the Soviet Union to continue in spite of mounting tensions over the pipeline issue.

Report on Export of U.S. Technology, *An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, February 4, 1976).

[32] Interviews with CoCom officials, February and March, 1979.

[33] *The Economist*, November 14, 1981, p. 88.

[34] *Financial Times*, January 19, 1982, p. 4.

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At present, the United States continues to push within the organization for new definitions that would adapt CoCom policy to new technological innovations. But it is forced to compromise. For example, as part of the redefinition effort, the U.S. has urged other CoCom members to embargo ten "critical technologies" that have both military and civilian uses. In exchange for acceptance of this list and for expanded control over scientific and technical exchanges, training programs, consulting agreements, and industrial cooperation, the United States is prepared to shorten its own proposed list of embargoed items significantly.[35] In this case, compromise takes place *within* the issue, not across issues; if it is achieved, each party will modify its policies.

Credit

The financing of East-West trade also emerged as a crucial issue in the Western alliance. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union and East European states began to pursue growth strategies calling for increased imports of Western technology and capital. Because East European manufactured goods were not competitive in world markets and Eastern-bloc currencies are not convertible, this growth in trade involved increased borrowing from the West. Western banks were only too willing to meet the needs of the Eastern-bloc states. Their accumulation of petrodollars after 1973 provided the needed loan capital, and between 1974 and 1980 net liabilities of the CMEA to the West jumped from $6.7 billion to $45 billion. In 1982, the total CMEA debt to the West amounted to $60 billion. By mid-1984, the OECD estimated it to be $72 billion.[36]

Western competition for Eastern business meant credit expansion and a scramble to provide low-interest loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance. It was not long before the United States began to argue that it made no economic sense to subsidize the Soviet economy when such a high proportion of its resources were devoted to military spending.[37] Expansion of credit portended an even wider expansion of East-West trade, which would in turn threaten Western security.

[35] This was the recommendation of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology (fn. 31). The specific negotiations were reported in the *Financial Times*, October 1, 1982, p. 4.

[36] For a discussion of the Western banks' role, and the role of East European import strategies in the creation of the East European debt problem, see Richard Portes, "East Europe's Debt to the West: Interdependence is a Two-Way Street," *Foreign Affairs* 55 (July 1977), 751-82. For recent statistics on the growth of the East European debt, see *The Economist*, May 22, 1982, p. 56; *Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 1984, p. 20, and June 15, 1984, p. 18.

[37] *Wall Street Journal*, November 3, 1982, p. 3.

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Unable to achieve Western agreement on a direct embargo of technology to the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States sought the more indirect route of restricting credit to reduce trade. In early January 1980, Washington asked the OECD countries to cut in half all official and government-guaranteed credit to the Soviet Union. Without compensation, however, there was no incentive for compliance,[38] even though the U.S. had exercised leadership with a unilateral embargo of grain and high technology and had restricted its own credit to the Soviet Union.

Again, as in the technology transfer issue, continuing negotiations on coordination of credit policies were concentrated within a single institution. Guidelines for negotiations were set by a multilateral agreement on credit within the OECD, which had existed since 1976.[39] Formally known as the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credit, and informally known as the Consensus, this 22-state agreement coordinated member-states' lending to other nations. Part of the coordination effort included agreement on minimum interest rates. The interest rates varied according to whether the borrower was classified as rich, middle income, or poor. Until 1982, CMEA countries as a whole were classified as middle income.

In February 1982, European Foreign Ministers told Secretary of State Alexander Haig that credit was the East-West trade issue on which allied agreement was most likely to be achieved. Here, areas of overlap could be found among mutually acceptable policies, and technical knowledge could provide the basis for policy. Joint decisions could be based on sound business practices without considering the "political" dimension of lending. Below-market interest rates leading to a dangerously high level of CMEA debt would threaten Europe's trade expansion goals in the long run. And clearly, subsidized credit did not serve the U.S. goal of trade restriction. This convergence of interests led to problem solving within the Consensus.

In May 1982, the Consensus classified the Soviet Union as a rich borrower.[40] This satisfied the United States, since the decision would make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to finance its trade with the West and force the Soviets to pursue market-based trade relations. It

[38] These events were reported in the *Wall Street Journal*, January 8, 1980, p. 3, and January 11, 1980, p. 20.

[39] This section is taken from interviews with Consensus negotiators, June 14 and 15, 1983, at the EC Commission in Brussels.

[40] Instead of interest as low as 7.8%, with a maturity on loans of 8.5 years, the Consensus agreed to charge the Soviet Union between 12.2% and 12.4%, with maturities between 5 and 8.5 years. See OECD, "Consensus: Taux d'intérêt minimum," mimeo (Brussels, June 7, 1982).

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also satisfied the Europeans, because they had begun to worry about dangerous export credit competition. The change was based on an "objective" classification scheme determined by the per capita GNP of potential borrowers. Thus, the Soviet Union was not singled out for special treatment, and the decision did not appear to be "politicized."

At the time this agreement was reached the Concensus regime was strengthened. Before May 1982, members had simply informed the group when they wished to negotiate loans outside of the guidelines. After that date, they were required to adhere to the guidelines set by the organization. The issue of subsidized export credits to the Soviet Union was on its way to a solution. But even these strengthened multilateral agreements did not prevent the United States from trying to halt the pipeline construction. The pipeline conflict itself centered on the issue of energy trade.

Energy

The energy sector has been the source of recurring conflict concerning East-West trade between the United States and Western Europe. The four-fold price increase of OPEC oil in 1973 triggered the West European search for alternative energy supplies, and the Soviet Union appeared to be an increasingly attractive supplier. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. was looking to the West for markets for its vast energy supplies, especially natural gas.

As early as 1971, Soviet leaders had recognized that the lack of an indigenous gas pipeline production capability would be the central constraint on the production of natural gas, and had sought to import Western steel pipe. These steel pipe exports by the West increased throughout the 1970s, while Soviet production and export of natural gas also rose dramatically. Between 1970 and 1980, Soviet gas exports to Western Europe increased from 1.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 24.5 bcm.[41]

Unlike oil, which often changes hands within commodity markets, natural gas flows from fixed point to fixed point and creates a direct link between importer and exporter. The relationship is reciprocal and long term; therefore, if a disagreement becomes so serious that deliveries are halted or delayed, both parties suffer. It is this mutual, long-term dependence that alarms the U.S. government when the exporter is the

[41] For two excellent studies of Soviet energy development, see Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability* (Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment, 1983), and Jonathan Stern, *Soviet Natural Gas Development to 1990* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1980). On the growth of natural gas exports to Western Europe, see the *Financial Times Energy Economist*, Issue 17 (March 1983), 7.

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Soviet Union: in the case of the gas pipeline, U.S. officials were concerned that fear of supply disruptions would allow the Soviets to exercise subtle political or commercial influence over Western Europe.

At the Ottowa Summit, in mid-1981, the United States argued that construction of the Urengoi pipeline, which would supply 7 percent of West European primary energy by 1990, would make Europe dependent on the Soviet Union for energy supplies. Further, the U.S. maintained that natural gas exports would significantly increase the Soviet Union's hard-currency earnings; its enhanced ability to finance future arms expenditures constituted a threat to the goals and interests of the United States. At the same time, Washington defended its own renewed grain trade with the Soviets by arguing that it demanded Soviet hard-currency expenditures. Western Europe, however, did not share America's political concerns and failed to appreciate its inconsistent export policy.[42]

Because there was no ongoing forum for specific negotiations on East-West energy trade, agreements could not be hammered out through frequent, long-term discussions. As the dispute became public, it revealed underlying value conflicts between the U.S. and Europe. In the course of the conflict, the U.S. tactically linked issues and urged compliance with its position on technology transfer and credits, as well as on energy trade. By then, the decision mode had clearly changed from compliance to compromise and problem-solving, and the current decision modes constrained U.S. efforts to extract compliance. In an effort to trace this change, we turn to a description of the crisis in the alliance that was triggered by the dispute.

III

The 1982 Pipeline Dispute

Expressing interest in energy cooperation with the West, Soviet leaders in 1973 proposed joint East-West development of the Western Siberian natural gas fields. By 1978, Soviet planners had entered into negotiations with Western firms to develop the Urengoi field, the largest gas field in the world. It was here that the disputed pipeline would originate. From the beginning, the Soviets had planned to construct it with turbines, compressors, pipes, and auxiliary equipment manufactured in and purchased from the West.[43]

[42] Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen: "Sanktionen oder Einbindung? Zur wirtschaftspolitischen Strategie gegenueber Osteuropa und der U.S.S.R.," *Die Neue Gesellschaft* 27 (October 1981), 888-93; Ernest B. Johnston, Jr., "Soviet Energy Development and the Western Alliance," *Department of State Bulletin* 82 (April 1982), 62-64.

[43] Edward A. Hewett, "The Pipeline Connection: Issues for the Alliance," *The Brookings Review* (Fall 1982), 22-26.

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With the negotiation of the final contracts for equipment, gas deliveries, and financing for the construction of one gas pipeline in 1981 and 1982, the divergence between American and European positions became unambiguous and irreconcilable. It erupted into a full-blown dispute when, on December 13, 1981, martial law was declared in Poland. The Reagan administration immediately imposed unilateral sanctions on U.S. oil and gas technology and equipment bound for the Soviet Union and earmarked for the now controversial pipeline.[44] With this initial unilateral embargo, U.S. officials attempted to exert leadership and to persuade the Europeans that they should go along.

Compliance was not forthcoming, however. West European response to the imposition of martial law in Poland was weak, delayed, and merely symbolic: the European Community as a whole agreed to bar only luxury goods from the Soviet Union some two months after the American sanctions were imposed.[45] If the Europeans could not be persuaded by the exercise of American leadership, the U.S. was prepared to use coercion. No compensation was ever offered.[46]

Thus, in the spring of 1982, the United States gave warning that sanctions would be extended to European firms if there was no voluntary compliance with the embargo. The Europeans responded with an attempt to reach agreement through tactical issue linkage. Knowing that the question of credit was important to the United States, they agreed to raise interest rates to the Soviet Union, but they did *not* agree to halt construction of the pipeline. This was a low-cost strategy for Europe, because, as described above, agreement on raising interest rates was negotiated within the Consensus.

The United States, however, wanted more than the European governments were willing to offer. The Reagan administration demanded that the West jointly cut the *volume* of credit available to the Soviets. This demand was pressed at the Versailles summit in June 1982. At the

[44] *Christian Science Monitor*, December 29, 1981, p. 1.

[45] Stan Woods, "Pipeline Politics," *Centerpiece* (Aberdeen: Center for Defense Studies, 1983), 14. In interviews conducted for the present study, June 14-21, 1983, EC officials admitted that this action was only intended to convey the appearance of a concession. Claiming injury to domestic producers, various EC members had already petitioned the EC Commission to obtain higher quotas on the import of these luxury goods from the Soviet Union. The embargo offered a convenient occasion to placate these demands for higher import quotas.

[46] In discussions with the Europeans, U.S. officials actually offered to expand U.S. port facilities to permit increased coal exports. This was not, however, an offer of direct compensation, but rather a suggestion for meeting Europe's increased energy needs. U.S., Senate, Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, "Proposed Trans-Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline," 97th Cong., 1st sess., November 12, 1981, p. 106. See also Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 253.

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summit's close, however, it appeared that tactical issue linkage to reach compromise was unstable. The closing statement included an agreement to reduce the amount of Western lending to the Soviet Union and to offer loans at prevailing interest rates. After the meetings, however, President Mitterrand stated that France would not support economic warfare against the Soviet Union and was not bound by the summit declaration to cut the amount of credit it extended to Moscow.[47] He then revealed a secret bilateral agreement on credit with the Soviet Union. In a tit-for-tat response, the United States unilaterally extended the sanctions to cover products sold by foreign subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. firms.

The West European states, however, refused to cooperate. Thus, the firms hit by the extension of the sanctions were caught between a rock and a hard place: they were barred by their governments from adhering to the embargo, but they were not given governmental protection from American retaliation.[48] As the United States stepped up its coercive efforts to gain compliance, tensions increased; the only thing on which there was general agreement was that the dispute must be settled for the sake of unity within the alliance.

Partly as a result of this intensified crisis, Alexander Haig resigned as Secretary of State; he was replaced by George Shultz. Haig's resignation and the continuation of U.S. grain sales made manifest the latent conflict of goals within the Reagan administration.[49] This policy inconsistency and defection from cooperation increased Europe's recalcitrance. The European states made no effort to reach a compromise. Instead, George Shultz made an overture to Europe concerning possible conditions for lifting the sanctions, thereby demonstrating that the U.S. realized compliance was no longer feasible.

One month of negotiations resulted in an agreement on November 15, 1982, which revealed the utter failure of the American compliance strategy. Its essence was consent by all parties to generate more technical

[47] *Financial Times*, June 7, 1982, p. 2.

[48] On August 12, 1982, the EC explained its position and issued a note of protest to the U.S. Department of Commerce against the embargo extension, arguing that the United States' attempt to impose extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign firms conflicted with both international legal norms and United States law. The Community argued that the terms of the contract were a matter of civil or contract law and could not be used to extend U.S. sovereignty outside the United States to abrogate lawfully concluded contracts. Furthermore, the EC maintained that the law as it was used in the embargo extension violated the norms of collaboration embodied in CoCom. See "Gas Pipeline: Comments of the European Community as Regards the Measures taken by the U.S. Government," mimeo (Brussels, August 12, 1982).

[49] Haig (fn. 46), p. 256.

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information about the disputed issues. With this consent, the United States lifted the sanctions.

The formal document stated that, in return for lifting the sanctions, studies to be conducted at the international level would be used to coordinate Western policy on the sub-issues of East-West trade. The studies included continued reassessment of the CoCom list of strategic goods banned from sale to the Soviet Union. It was also agreed to consider ways in which credit to the Soviet Union could be tightened. Both of these items were already in place and did not require concessions from the Europeans. The latter also promised not to negotiate further contracts to purchase natural gas from the Soviet Union until a study by the International Energy Agency (IEA) on European dependence on Soviet gas had been completed. Thus, the energy issue which had triggered the dispute would now be isolated from other issues and negotiated within the confines of an international organization.[50] An umbrella study on East-West trade was also initiated at NATO.

By March 1983, the IEA completed the study on the security of West European natural gas supplies. Forecasts indicated that the Soviet Union and Algeria would supply 35 percent of Western Europe's natural gas needs (excluding the United Kingdom by 1990), and that Western Europe and Japan would more than double their gas imports between 1983 and 1993. Based on this information, the IEA recommended that no single European country depend on one gas supplier for more than 30 percent of its annual gas needs.

Seeking to block the construction of a second and third strand of the trans-Siberian pipeline, the United States blatantly manipulated the recommendations resulting from the technical information by citing U.S. studies which indicated that one strand would supply between 20 and 30 percent of Western Europe's natural gas demand; three strands would increase the available supply to 40 percent. Thirty percent represented acceptable dependence, a "safety limit" which should not be exceeded. Thus, the IEA recommendations appeared to reflect continued American efforts to persuade the Europeans not to increase Soviet energy imports beyond the first pipeline strand. The final recommendation represented a U.S. view rather than a technical assessment of the desirable level of energy imports for Western Europe. Oil industry studies disputed the "30 percent safety limit," arguing that dual firing capabilities *reduced* dependence, and that dependence was not reflected in the volume of supply. Information used to resolve the dependence issue was distorted,

[50] *Financial Times*, November 15, 1982, p. 1.

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conflicting, and did not provide a consensual basis for stable agreement. The European governments did not agree to the IEA recommendations, therefore, because the study did not lead to a shared meaning of "dependence."[51]

In sum, the resolution of the crisis revealed that in the sub-issues of technology transfer and credit, goal conflict had been reduced, and compromise as the decision mode was used within separate mutilateral organizations. The crisis itself had intensified perception of the need for more technical information in order to evaluate the consequences of East-West trade. On the energy issue, however, the United States continued to seek compliance; while Europe balked, technical information was distorted. All parties finally attempted to resolve the issue because the dispute began to threaten the unity of the alliance.[52]

IV

Conclusion

We have used insights from behavioral theories of organizations to modify the realist approach to international regime change. An examination of the distribution of power within regimes, conflict or convergence of participants' goals, and the way information is used allows us to distinguish among three decision modes as indicators of internal regime dynamics. In turn, each decision mode affects the ability of regime participants to formulate and effectively implement joint policies.

Our argument offers some promise in synthesizing structural and cognitive theories of regime change. Theorists who have focused on structure have ignored the substance of participants' goals and the process by which policies can change, as well as the role of information in shaping participants' goals. Theorists who have focused on the cognitive aspects of regime change have not systematically investigated the way in which power relationships shape cognition and structure bargaining, or the way in which powerful actors can create constraints and incentives that change the behavior of others. They have ignored the impact of power relationships on the process of knowledge generation and dissemination. Our framework offers a start in explaining how cognitive and structural forces interact in a joint decision process.

Joining strands of both structural and cognitive theories, we argue that, in the face of conflicting goals and an asymmetrical distribution of power, a hegemon, acting like an executive of a complex organization,

[51] *Wall Street Journal*, May 9, 1983, p. 37.
[52] Interviews (fn. 39).

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uses his access to resources to extract compliance with his own policy. When the hegemon no longer has a monolopy on these resources, participants either defect or the joint goals shift away from the goals of the hegemon. The odds of defection decrease when agreement on other issues and the future of the relationship is important to all actors. When hegemonic power declines, the organization of cooperation is nonhierarchical, and compromise or problem solving is the decision mode. We recognize compromise as the underlying regime dynamic when the *substance* of joint policy diverges from the original preferences of the actors. Compromise provides stability when regard for the future relationship leads to the use of undistorted information for decision. The problem-solving mode, which relies heavily on technical information as a more "objective" decision basis, is initiated only after compromise has been reached. Because others can agree with the technical dimensions of the problem as defined by the hegemon, the distribution of power is not critical in determining outcome in this decision mode. The history of East-West trade suggests that compromise and problem solving provide more stable cooperation when issues are decomposed and ongoing negotiations take place within multilateral organizations.

Both cognitive and structural change explain changes in the decision mode in three sub-issues of East-West trade. In the early postwar period, U.S. attempts to extract compliance failed as American compensation declined, as European economies became stronger, and as compromise norms were institutionalized in CoCom. Moreover, since the U.S. intermittently defected from trade restriction (especially as Soviet grain trade became lucrative for U.S. farmers), European incentives to comply with the restrictions decreased. Long before the pipeline dispute, the decision mode had changed from compliance to compromise and problem solving.

Desire for alliance unity led to the search for agreement on the pipeline issue. Within the issue of technology transfer, compromise and problem solving again emerged as the dominant decision modes, in spite of continued U.S. efforts to extract compliance with its own preferred policies. The fact that CoCom continues to exist attests in part to Europe's willingness to modify policies of trade expansion even though the CoCom rules compel the U.S. to compromise on trade restrictions. On the issue of financing trade, the United States has been forced to compromise. The Consensus arrangement was strengthened and was used to legitimate the commercial preferences of Western Europe rather than the political demands of the United States. Within the Consensus, compromise and problem solving are also the dominant decision modes. Credit re-

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strictions were indeed tightened, but only in response to the rising risk imposed by the Eastern debt. By 1984, credit had begun to flow again. Within the energy issue, however, no overlap among acceptable outcomes could be found. In part this is explained by the fact that, until the pipeline crisis, negotiations on energy trade were intermittent and *ad hoc*. Although one important outcome of the crisis was that ongoing negotiations would indeed resume within the IEA, no early compromise could be reached. The initial decision process on energy trade clearly illustrates the distortion and politicization of technical information when the goals of participants diverge openly. Negotiations are continuing, however.

In all three areas, the underlying goals of participants did not change as a result of the diffusion of power or the generation of new information. Preferences became clearer, however, through collective decision making in the wake of crisis, and the preference for maintaining cooperation in other issues of joint concern led to a search for a resolution of the pipeline issue.

In the wake of the pipeline case, we find evidence that regimes whose decision mode is a mixture of compromise and problem solving have been strengthened, paradoxically, by countering unilateral pressure from the United States to extract compliance. The United States now finds that it must compromise. In addition, multilateral organizations have become vehicles for balancing power between Western Europe and the United States. The fact that separate negotiations continue within different organizations increases the odds for stable cooperation.

What remains to be explored are the domestic sources of the pipeline conflict. First, we do not explain why the United States expanded its own grain trade with the Soviet Union while continuing to press for trade restrictions in negotiations with Europe. Rather, our analysis reveals how America's hypocrisy undermined its efforts to extract compliance. Second, we do not explain why the U.S. continued to pursue an East-West trade policy that demanded compliance even though the decision mode had clearly changed. Indeed, the pipeline dispute reveals that compromise and problem solving acted as a constraint on the American strategy of exacting compliance. In CoCom and the Consensus, negotiators demonstrated their resilience to crisis and continued to formulate and implement policy in spite of the pipeline dispute.

If the United States continues to use coercive means to exact compliance from Europe with a policy of trade restriction, it will jeopardize long-term cooperation. Although continued presumption of hegemony can be expected in the face of military dominance, it threatens the alliance

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relationship. The diffusion of economic power leads to the need for compromise. The United States should heed the warning of E. H. Carr: enlightened powers make way for other states to pursue legitimate goals within the system and accept consent as a basis for order. If they do not, that order will surely collapse. That is as true of relationships among allies as it is of relationships among adversaries.

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Review Articles

STRUGGLE FOR THE TURF

By HENRY TROFIMENKO

Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, 587 pp.
Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, 541 pp.
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*. New York: Macmillan, 1984, 367 pp.

I

FOR anyone whose job is to study the United States, the memoirs of its statesmen provide more than merely entertaining reading. They not only give you a closer insight into the "kitchen" of statesmanship and political decision making; they also provide an opportunity to check the assumptions and paradigms that were constructed earlier to analyze the policy of any particular administration. The memoirs confirm that in spite of hundreds of books and thousands of articles in the U.S. press that discuss specific policies, as well as daily debates in Congress and its committees, press conferences, and official statements, the policy process is not as open as it might seem at first glance. Rather, American foreign policy is made within a very restricted circle of the "initiated"—official and unofficial presidential advisers, including selected members of the Cabinet.

Several foreign policy events discussed in the memoirs bear out this assertion. Congress, for example, knew nothing about the ending of the process of normalizing relations between the U.S. and China in 1978: its leaders found out about it within the hour of the official announcement. Secretary of State Vance evidently did not know that Deng Xiaoping, while on a visit to the United States early in 1979, had informed President Carter about China's impending military "lesson" to Vietnam; as a matter of fact, he had received a guarantee of neutrality from Carter, if not his tacit approval of that act of aggression. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, by his own admission, was a total stranger in "the administration of chums" and had no more than second-hand information about many of the President's decisions, and then only after they had been taken. Haig further recalls that Secretary of State Rogers knew nothing about President Nixon's initiative to open relations with China, and so forth. Furthermore, the Cabinet—to judge from the memoirs

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under review—is practically not functioning as a governmental institution; policy, and above all foreign policy, is made by restricted commissions and *ad hoc* groups. Now, if that is the position of the insiders in the government, foreign observers are even more restricted in their access to the American policy-making process. They not only have to piece together judgments and assessments of statesmen, but they also have to separate the grains of credible information from the chaff of disinformation such as the endless "leaks" without which, to judge from the memoirs, no U.S. government can function.

There are different kinds of memoirs. We all know the memoirs of great statesmen of the past, as a rule men of a noble spirit who retired at an advanced age and, in the retreat of their country villas, compiled lengthy and placid narrations (undisturbed by telephone calls) about their previous record, garnishing them with penetrating instructions for the benefit of posterity. The present memoirs of American politicians are an entirely different sort of record. These are the writings of men who are still in the thick of the political struggle, hankering for revenge, many of them dreaming of a comeback. (Alexander Haig, for example, has probably not given up his political ambitions.) Therefore, the memoirs under consideration are instruments of continuing political struggle—warning, explanation, and self-justification—the "caveats," as Haig has frankly declared in what is perhaps the best line of his memoirs. That quality is exactly what makes these writings valuable for a foreign observer of the policies of the largest Western power. It is not only the truth that occasionally surfaces in such writings, but a properly prepared and self-serving half-truth, which helps to provide a closer understanding of the hidden reasons behind a particular act of foreign policy and the actual (rather than declared) motives behind a particular decision, and makes possible a critical evaluation of the degree of compliance of officially declared doctrines and strategies with the true aims and intents of statesmanship.

II

From the standpoint of one who has been following U.S. foreign policy for a long time, the memoirs under review contain no particular revelations. All they do is confirm the assessments that Soviet politicians and experts have been making of Carter's and Reagan's foreign policy. However, Brzezinski, Vance, and Haig offer a good deal of additional material in their books to illustrate, in black and white, what a foreign observer could only speculate about while they were in office. The books unfortunately do not confirm, for the most part, any positive hopes and

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desires to see the better side of U.S. policy. They do provide food for reflection on the lack of principle of their authors, no matter how much they may have used the word "principle" in connection with American foreign policy.

Of the three statesmen—Brzezinski, Haig, and Vance—Cyrus Vance is the only one who tried his best to follow his principles, even though he did not always succeed in doing so. He has enough courage to admit, for example, that the U.S. vote at the U.N. for Kampuchea (Cambodia) to remain represented by the blood-stained clique of Pol Pot, rejected by the people, was "extremely distasteful" to him (p. 124). After all, the reason Vance left the administration was that its attempt at freeing the U.S. diplomats in Tehran by means of an armed raid ran counter to his principles. He understood that it was humiliating for a great nation to use, on the international scene, methods that were those of a band of terrorists, even for so noble a mission as that of rescuing its own nationals. As for Brzezinski and Haig, they invariably preferred force to principle. In fact, Brzezinski makes no secret of it: ". . . when a choice between the two had to be made, between projecting U.S. power or enhancing human rights (as, for example, in Iran), I felt that power had to come first" (p. 49). All of Brzezinski's and Haig's memoirs are but an illustration of how they consistently put this formula into effect.

III

Although the term "struggle for the turf" has been overused in American press reviews of the memoirs under consideration, I use it again because it offers the fullest possible description of their sum and substance. From a personal standpoint, this applies least to Vance; as one reads his book, he appears to be a man sure of himself, who knows his worth, and is unperturbed by how the President might have looked at him and what seat he might have been offered on the "Air Force I" aircraft. It does apply fully to Brzezinski and Haig. I catch myself wondering sometimes whether the latter two had enough time to concern themselves in real earnest with governmental affairs since they had to make so great an effort at self-advertising and grandstanding, and participated in endless palace intrigues in the tussle for personal prerogatives.

When I speak of the "struggle for the turf," however, I mean, first and foremost, the U.S. struggle world-wide to preserve its dominant positions, and Washington's consistent and systematic opposition to the process of change and its clinging to the pro-American status quo in the entire non-Socialist world.

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In the early 1970s, following the fiasco in Vietnam that was so tragic for the American national psyche, the United States seemed to be starting to adapt itself to the process of change in the world: it began to realize that its military power was not omnipotent in the resolution of international problems, and to flirt with the idea of a more equal partnership or relationship with its allies, as well as a dialogue with its potential adversaries on equal terms. That reshaping of the American approach to peace, which began at the time, led to some salubrious changes in the world scene. It made possible a detente with the Soviet Union, which has a policy of pursuing peaceful relations with the United States, governed by the principles of peaceful coexistence; the final postwar settlement in Europe (the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference); and the initiation of a "North-South" dialogue to reshape the economic relations of the capitalist West with the developing nations. The post-Vietnam reshaping also permitted the solution of a number of fundamental problems of disarmament, primarily by agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. about the limitation and progressive reduction of strategic nuclear arms and the stabilization of the Soviet-American strategic balance on the principle of equality and equal security.

But the resolution of those problems and the reluctant recognition of the world's political pluralism by the United States—involving a realization that it was impossible to have the world's problems resolved by Washington's fiat—inevitably meant that the American "turf" had to shrink. That is exactly why this accommodation ran up against stiff resistance on the part of influential groups of, to use Nixon's term, the U.S. leadership class. Little by little—from the latter half of the 1970s on—that class, having recovered from the "Vietnam syndrome," began to come back to where it had stood before, once more toying with the idea of tugs-of-war to regain the erstwhile U.S. position of strength.

IV

When the Carter administration came into office, the fundamentals of its foreign policy were shaped under the predominant and, one must say, rather ominous influence of Brzezinski—a first-generation immigrant obsessed with anti-Sovietism, who saw the representatives of the traditional American elite as weak men, and made no bones about it (Brzezinski, 480-81).

Brzezinski presumably asked Carter and the small group of individuals who were actually making policy why it should be necessary for them to adapt themselves to change. As he saw it, what they had to do

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was to conduct the process of change, directing it in a pro-U.S. way. President Carter, a man without any experience in foreign policy, increasingly tended to take Brzezinski's advice.

But how, one might wonder, were they to accomplish this? Very simply, Brzezinski explained: by means of trilateralism and under U.S. auspices, they must first and foremost unite the industrialized democracies that were operating in what was a hostile and increasingly disorganized world. Once that was done—that is, once the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan had rallied—the next thing for them was to bring collective pressure to bear on the developing countries, and to get them to accept the solution of "North-South" problems on terms that would suit the United States and its Western partners; in effect, the U.S. was using the "web of special relationships" with semi-developed countries—the new regional influentials—so as to divide the Third World. In the third stage, the United States was to confront the Soviet Union and its Socialist allies with the prospect of either joining the reformed world system on the terms of the United States or finding themselves outside the mainstream of world history.

With Carter's suggestions taken into account, Brzezinski's scheme developed into a ten-point foreign policy program of 43 pages, which he submitted to the President on April 30, 1977, as "The Book." It included such points as arms reduction, normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, human rights, and modernization of American and NATO armaments. But the essence of Brzezinski's concept remained what it had been: that of the United States initiating a "broad architectural process" to build a world system under U.S. auspices. Although Brzezinski advertises himself in his memoirs as the main architect and progenitor of "larger strategic thinking and innovation in the government" (p. 48), the few ideas he put forward were already shopworn: he had advanced them in the period of the cold war and decolonization, when the United States could still exert itself more effectively. In the context of strategic parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and rising opposition in the Third World to U.S. neocolonialism, conducting an assertive foreign policy proved to be difficult, as shown by the foreign policy record of the Carter administration.

Brzezinski put off settling scores with the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries until the third stage. (The entire scheme, as far as one can judge, was to have been carried through within the four years of Carter's presidency.) Therefore, while the United States was consolidating trilateral relations and resolving problems with developing countries, relations with the Soviet Union had to be treated as a matter of third-

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rate or even smaller importance in its foreign-policy priorities. But the more the Carter administration played down U.S.-Soviet relations, the more obsessed it became with the Soviet Union. All of the Carter administration's foreign policy turned out to be imbued with anti-Communism, and the intimidation of the public by conjuring up a "Soviet threat" became (and still is) Washington's main stratagem in its international activities aimed at regaining American leadership. "The United States" Haig writes in his memoirs, "must somehow shock its European allies into an acceptance of the Soviet threat . . ." (p. 305).

V

Let us turn to more specific areas of U.S. foreign policy concerns. In the Middle East, the stated objective of U.S. policy (if we are to believe the official pronouncements of President Carter, Vance, and again, Brzezinski) was to bring about a comprehensive peace settlement. What was it in actual fact? As Brzezinski cynically writes, the main objective was "squeezing the Soviets out of the game" (p. 113). Judging by his memoirs, he regarded even a positive step such as the publication of a joint Soviet-American statement in October 1, 1977 (on the principles of peaceful accommodation in the Middle East) as no more than a tactical move designed to lull the vigilance of the Soviet Union and give the United States more time for backstage maneuvers with a view to imposing a U.S.-Israeli scheme on the Arabs. Nothing came of that, as was only to be expected, and the U.S. set about pressing for a separate deal between Sadat and Begin, for the return of the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for an Egyptian peace treaty with Israel. When Sadat at a certain point at Camp David, having probably realized that he had betrayed the Palestinians and the Arabs, felt like giving it all up and leaving, Carter brought the bogey of the Soviet threat into play again: he told Sadat that "if he does this it will mean the Soviets will re-enter the Middle East" (Brzezinski, 272). What was the upshot, however? The United States "sold out" Sadat who, as Haig states, "had lost the love of his people" (p. 325), and reinforced its "strategic consensus" with Israel at the expense of the Egyptians, Palestinians, and all other Arabs. As I see it, even conservative Arab regimes now appear to be increasingly turning away from the U.S., realizing that Washington wants no comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

Now, what about the objective of American normalization of relations with China? According to the Carter administration's official assurances,

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it was to establish long-term friendly relations with one of the largest powers of the modern world. But according to Brzezinski, it was to obtain yet another leverage against the U.S.S.R. and to inveigle China into anti-Soviet military preparations in the Far East.

The "Soviet dimension" in the process of normalizing relations with China, Brzezinski has explicitly pointed out,

> was one of those considerations of which it is sometimes said, "Think of it at all times but speak of it never." I, for one, thought of it a great deal, even though I knew that publicly one had to make pious noises to the effect that U.S.-Chinese normalization had nothing to do with U.S.-Soviet rivalry (p. 196).

During his visit to China, Mr. Brzezinski outperformed even Nixon's Chinese overtures for the sake of the "strategic consensus" with the People's Republic of China.

What was the aim of American policy in Africa? According to Andrew Young, the Carter administration's Ambassador to the U.N., it was to establish equal friendly relations with the states of black Africa and to oppose the South African policy of apartheid. But according to Brzezinski, it was to convince the "whites that there was a future for them, particularly by opposing the Soviets and Cubans and insisting that the Africans join us in that opposition" (p. 143). How could the United States make the Africans object to Soviet and Cuban aid to Angola and a number of other states, however, when the Africans realized that without such aid neither Angola nor Mozambique could have held out in the face of the onslaught of the U.S.—which made it its business after the Second World War to "fill the vacuums" supposedly arising whenever former colonies became independent?

In short, in every area of international affairs the major U.S. objective under Carter was a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the end, that objective was officially declared—through the "Carter Doctrine"—to be Washington's overriding foreign policy guideline.

It is fashionable in the United States today to argue that the Carter Doctrine was the American response to the entry of a Soviet troop contingent into Afghanistan. I realize that many Americans have come to see this explanation as very nearly axiomatic. But there is another explanation as well: after nothing had come out of the "comprehensive" pro-U.S. settlement in the Middle East, and after the strong Arab condemnation of the separate Camp David deal, the fall of a trusted ally (the Shah of Iran), and the estrangement of even conservative Arab regimes from the United States, Washington felt it had to raise an

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American mailed fist over the Middle East in the shape of the Rapid Deployment Force, and to explain the need for this action once again by an "increased Soviet threat."

As to Afghanistan, Brzezinski's memoirs, like those of Vance, contain fairly noteworthy confessions. To begin with, Brzezinski states that in December 1978, the U.S. Defense Department started making preparations, on his initiative, for an armed operation against Iran, notably for the deployment of U.S. forces in Southern Iran (p. 372). Didn't the Soviet Union have to think of its security under the circumstances? The U.S.S.R. had warned the U.S. that it would consider any intervention in the affairs of Iran, a state bordering on it, as an act that was bound to hurt its own security interests. In spite of that, American preparations for an act of armed intervention in Iran went on at full tilt; Vance writes that in November and December 1979, "there were background news stories coming out of Washington to the effect that there was a possibility of some form of U.S. military action against Iran" (p. 387). The entry of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, as Brzezinski acknowledges, compelled the U.S. to exercise military restraint and to renounce a major military action against Iran (pp. 485, 489, 490, 500). I would argue that the important reason behind the Soviet move was to help the Afghan government resist foreign-backed counter-revolutionary forces. Anyway, if it had not been for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it is conceivable that Washington's actions might well have led to a direct Soviet-American armed clash in the region.

VI

It was, of course, not only the new alignment of forces in the world and the American-Soviet strategic parity that compelled the hawks in the Carter administration to exercise restraint in their action on the world stage. Some personalities within the administration itself gave preference to the instruments of diplomacy and were not as consumed with anti-Sovietism as Brzezinski was.

Secretary of State Vance stresses the point in his memoirs that "a flaw in our policy" in the 1960s and 1970s "was that it was too narrowly rooted in the concept of overarching US-Soviet 'geopolitical' struggle" (p. 27). For him, that was the starting premise not for "pushing" the Soviet Union into last place in the American set of priorities, but for underscoring, first, the great potentialities of Soviet-American cooperation in averting the threat of nuclear war, and second, the fact that many events and crises in the world have nothing to do with Soviet-

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American rivalry and must be considered and resolved on their own merits. It is this approach, which was sometimes shared by the President himself (who wavered between realists like Vance and ideologues like Brzezinski), that made it possible for some positive steps to be taken in American-Soviet relations during that period. The most important of these was the conclusion of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Vance gives a detailed account of the process of drafting that treaty, noting the constructive contribution that the Soviet side, accepting far-reaching compromise solutions, made toward framing it. The fact that the treaty had taken so long to draft was in part due to the "struggle for the turf." Any U.S. administration, to establish its ground, at first tries to prove that "its predecessor was totally wrong about everything, and that all its acts must therefore be canceled" (Haig, 79). For example, the Carter administration initially attempted to "jump over SALT II" (Vance, 49), by breaking the agreement concerning the framework of SALT II that had been reached at the meeting of the leaders of the two states in Vladivostok in 1974. For the Soviet government, however, Vance concedes, "Vladivostok had become politically sacrosanct" (p. 55).

Once the Carter administration reverted to the Vladivostok accords, however, it did not prove to be very difficult to arrive at an agreement, even though the opponents of an equal American-Soviet strategic arms limitation agreement sought to hold up the negotiating process all the time. In the end, the opponents of SALT II managed, under all kinds of farfetched pretexts, to put off and then kill altogether the ratification of that treaty—which, according to Vance, had been a "balanced, carefully wrought set of agreements" that opened the way to "SALT III and to negotiations leading to much deeper reductions and increased qualitative constraints on intercontinental nuclear weapons . . ." (p. 135).

What is particularly amazing is not so much the implausibility of those pretexts as the arrogance in putting them forward as "insurmountable obstacles" to the ratification of the treaty. For example, when Senator Church felt during his election campaign that he had to dissociate himself from his meeting with Fidel Castro and prove that he was not "chicken," he brought up Brzezinski's story about a "Soviet brigade in Cuba" as an "obstacle" to the process of bringing off SALT II. What good was SALT to him when he was "fighting for his political life"? (Vance, p. 361). Or let us consider the problem of the loss of electronic monitoring stations in Iran, which Vance mentions so often in his memoirs. If we are to believe the opponents of SALT, the loss of the opportunity to use those stations made it impossible for the United

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States to monitor the Soviet Union's compliance with the SALT II provisions. Does it turn out, then, that the SALT process itself is impossible if the U.S. does not have the appropriate bases in countries bordering on the Soviet Union? One can think up anything at all with that kind of "logic." Thus, the concluding report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on SALT II argued that SALT II did not take into account the throw-weight of strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which supposedly had to be equal under the Jackson Amendment to the resolution endorsing the SALT I agreements. Hence, the treaty was unacceptable.[1] Actually, the Jackson Amendment, which asked for equal levels of intercontinental strategic forces in any future U.S.-Soviet treaty, did not mention throw-weight at all.[2] Finally, Haig goes so far as to claim in his memoirs that what the Senate discussed was not the SALT II treaty, signed in Vienna by the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., but only the *draft* treaty! (p. 222). It is the arrogance of the demands, brought forth out of the blue, which is amazing and which makes one doubt the possibility of any effective accords with the U.S. American politicians may, of course, flatter themselves by referring to how they managed to have the Panama Canal Treaty amended to the advantage of the United States during the process of its ratification by the Senate—so much as to make it unrecognizable even to its creators. But they forget that the Soviet Union is not Panama!

VII

There is one more thought that this peremptoriness and total absence of fair play suggest to the Soviet reader of the memoirs. Nearly every page refers to "Soviet expansionism," "Soviet penetration of developing nations," or "Moscow's manipulation of its surrogates in the Third World," and the like. But as one reads the memoirs, one sees that it is not Moscow that is manipulating other nations and movements—this is no more than a baseless assertion—but Washington that is treating many foreign countries as if they were its own provinces. This conclusion is not a product of the wishful thinking of a Moscow critic, but of the every-day realities that Brzezinski as well as Vance and Haig write about as a self-evident situation, without even so much as noticing the revealing implications of the examples they produce. The National Se-

[1] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Military Implications of the Proposed SALT II Treaty Relating to the National Defense*, Report No. 96-1054, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1980), 3.

[2] U.S. Public Law 92-448, Legislation on Foreign Relations, March 1974 (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1974), 1173-74.

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curity Adviser offhandedly breaks into the President's conversation with the Chancellor of a foreign state to tell the latter that he is prepared "to fight" him! (Brzezinski, 310). The men assembled in the situation room of the White House in December 1978 and January 1979 plan an armed coup in Iran with an inevitable "bloodbath" as if they were talking about moving their own G.I.s from barracks to barracks (Brzezinski, 374-87). Middle East affairs are discussed as if they were the affairs of their own country. "On June 28 [1982]," Haig writes, describing how Israel was fighting in Lebanon while the U.S. sought to consolidate the gains of its aggression diplomatically,

> we sent Habib new instructions: there *must be* a cease-fire in place; all PLO leaders *must* leave Lebanon; all PLO rank-and-file *must* quit Beirut, leaving all but personal weapons behind; Israeli lines will be readjusted after an agreement is reached ... (p. 347; emphasis added).

Without any counsel from or consultations with the leaders of West European states, the President of the United States prohibits companies under the jurisdiction of those states from trading with the U.S.S.R. (Haig, 241-56). The question of El Salvador is "largely in the hands of the U.S. President" (Haig, 118). The Chinese, Haig writes, feel that they have been "used" by the United States (p. 201). Washington "mediates" in the Falklands crisis between Argentina and Great Britain, but the first offer it makes to the parties concerned is for American troops to land on the islands (Haig, 271).

All this has been going on to the persistent tune about a "Soviet determination to extinguish the history of other states and replace it with models of their own society" (Haig, 194). But who, one may ask, is "extinguishing," "replacing," and "using"? The answer is clear from the memoirs under review, which explicitly describe the U.S. leadership's treatment of other independent states and governments and their leaders.

This particular element of the behavior of the United States on the world stage reached its peak under the Reagan administration. Even as militaristically minded a man as Haig cannot fail to note how utterly uncompromising and peremptory the American proposals were at the Soviet-American nuclear arms limitation talks between 1981 and 1983. That administration, incidentally, also began to destroy the common ground for such negotiations, which had taken so much effort to prepare in the shape of the jointly agreed principles and framework, and to try to replace it with purely American "turf." The U.S. proposals at the START talks "would require such drastic reductions in the Soviet inventory [of ICBMs]," Haig admits, "as to suggest they were unnegotiable" (p. 223). As to the American so-called Zero Option with

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regard to medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, put forward by the U.S. at the Geneva talks, it could not provide the ground for the negotiations either, as Haig sees it. The proposal of the Zero Option, Haig argued when the matter was discussed at the White House, would "generate the suspicion that the United States was only interested in a frivolous propaganda exercise or, worse, that it was disingenuously engaging in arms negotiations simply as a cover for a desire to build up its nuclear arsenal" (p. 229). That was how it was eventually perceived—not only by European opinion in general, but by many political leaders of West European states as well.

By and large, however, for all of his admissions, Haig does not emerge in the best possible light in his memoirs. The image he has created is one of a petty, vain, and boastful politician rather than that of a statesman. Even the language of the memoirs appears to be borrowed; it is not the one Haig used when he was NATO Supreme Commander and U.S. Secretary of State. I had thought better of Haig before I read his memoirs.

VIII

To conclude, I cannot fail to note that there is one idea that is common to all three books under review. That is their authors' recognition of the paramount importance of relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the destiny of peace on earth and for the destiny of the planet. Whatever Brzezinski, the theorist, might have done during his "vicarage" at the White House to push Soviet-American relations into the background, in his memoirs he had to recognize the central character of these relations. True, with an approach that is typical of him, he hedges with the remark that these relations are central

> insofar as the largely negative agenda of world peace is concerned, for their essence is the mutual interest of the two competing superpowers in avoiding a nuclear war. But the truly positive agenda of world order and progress cannot wait until the United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to cooperate on a broad front . . . (p. 516).

One may wonder, however, what kind of "world order" would arise from the collision course of the two strongest powers of modern times and from spreading the nuclear arms race into space and involving more and more states. Nothing but the "order" of a nuclear winter, the serenity of the universal cemetery of humanity, as Kant said. As to the order that will allow life on earth and the human race to continue, it rests on the fruitful cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., and between all the countries of the world on a broad front in the name of preventing

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nuclear war, ending the arms race, and eventually scrapping those arms themselves; it requires cooperation in the name of making man free to work constructively for the sake of his own happiness and welfare, and that of his posterity. It is this course of action that the Soviet Union has been urging both by its principles and by its performance.

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THEORIES OF NATIONALISM AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

By ARTHUR N. WALDRON*

John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, 411 pp.
Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1983, 150 pp.
Dov Ronen, *The Quest for Self-Determination*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979, 144 pp.

SELF-PROCLAIMED nationalist movements have been active since the 19th century; the history of nations, most would agree, can be traced back a good deal further. The importance of nationalism as a force in shaping the modern world seems undeniable, and as an idea, it continues to exhibit great intellectual potency.

But capturing nationalism in a theory has proved to be a difficult task. Analytical writings on the subject raise a number of problems which, once understood, cause much of the historical literature based on the concept to lose its persuasiveness. My examination of nationalism's role in historical explanation will point out how often users of the word have assigned explanatory tasks to it that theorists of the concept would find beyond its power to carry out. Though we cannot dispense with the word, I will argue in this review that enough is unexplained about nationalism itself as to cast real doubt upon its usefulness in explanation. Still, recent literature on the subject from both the social sciences and history provides hints as to promising new approaches, both to the idea and to its application.

Nationalism as an explanatory factor made its debut in European history, where the standard works of an earlier generation described how the new sentiment dissolved the old society with its kings, clerics, and local rather than national loyalties, and then provided a common allegiance that gave the reconstructed nations an unprecedented cohesiveness. Although this sort of approach has lost favor in more recent studies of Europe, it still defines much study of the non-European world. As we shall see below, in certain theories of development and modernization the concept of nationalism plays a key role. The same is true for many analyses of the politics of the non-European world. Our ideas

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of the recent history of China, of India, or of Africa would be quite different without the concept of nationalism. Nor should we forget the popularity of the term with journalists and writers about current events and its wide usage by students year after year; both bear witness to its intuitive attractiveness and its apparent explanatory power.

Yet, despite its wide intellectual currency, the concept of nationalism is not easy to define or to explain, as an examination of works specifically dealing with its theory—such as those reviewed here—quickly makes clear. To begin with, it rests on the problematical idea of "nation," a term that, like its derivative, is easier to identify when encountered than to define in the abstract. It is scarcely surprising that some students of society have attempted to define the problems they study in such a way as to avoid using the word. "Nation," for Charles Tilly, is "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon"; he and his co-workers greatly prefer the more straightforward "state."[1] Yet none of them would deny that "nation" captures something that "state" misses: a feeling, a passion, a legitimating power that the word "nationalism" possesses to an unequaled degree. Then there is the question of what nationalism is. We can identify the phenomenon, but how do we explain it? Is it a force in its own right, a sentiment whose welling up will bend even the strongest social, economic, and political structures? Or is it a contingent phenomenon, itself the product of more basic causes, such as changes in the economy or in the ways in which information is communicated? Many historians believe intuitively that it is the latter, but the linkages are difficult to demonstrate. Why, for instance, has nationalism thrived as industrialism has spread—when one might think that the powerful, standardizing imperatives of modernization would tend to break down national differences? Finally, there is the problem of the usefulness of nationalism in analyzing or explaining history; our judgment of this problem depends on our understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism itself. If nationalism is indeed an independent force, then the potential scope of its activity as a cause is wide. If it is contingent and limited, its explanatory role must be correspondingly restricted. Unless such issues are resolved, they greatly hamper the employment of the concept of nationalism in historical analysis.

I

Conceptual problems with the term "nationalism" have been recognized since it first made its appearance, shortly after the French Rev-

[1] Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 6.

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olution.[2] Like certain empirically derived relationships known in the physical sciences, nationalism entered scholarship as a working idea at a time when theoretical understanding of it was rudimentary. The idea was used to guide thought, and even action, before being fully understood. One of the most striking examples is found in the work of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson made the concept of nationalism a guiding principle of his diplomacy, though in his own writings he did not shrink from admitting that he could not really explain it. In *Constitutional Government in the United States*, a standard text for many years, he struggled to find some definition for "nation," and finally noted that a nation was a group animated by "a common political consciousness." That was as far as he could go. He confessed to be "at a loss to define what I mean by a common political consciousness." Being a practical man, though, Wilson let himself off the hook. "Fortunately," he continued, "it does not need definition. What it is is part of the imaginative conception of every one whose mind has traveled at all in the realms of history and social experience."[3]

Wilson's exposition was in keeping with the empirical and intuitive approach that characterized most of the basic early work on the subject. The approach reflected the role of the idea of nationalism in German Romanticism, which held that "humanity is naturally divided into nations."[4] Such nations possessed "the capacity to shape destiny by the historical workings of the national will."[5] Pioneers in this area of scholarship believed that recognizing a nation was a fairly straightforward process: the defining characteristics were intuitively clear enough, though admittedly hard to pin down. The historical studies of nationalism that laid the groundwork for the field took such an approach, which continues to be employed. It is clear in the works of R. W. Seton-Watson, Carlton Hayes, Boyd Shafer, Hans Kohn, and Hugh Seton-Watson, among others—an approach devoted, above all, to comparing the particular histories of nations.[6] This school has continued to flourish and to embrace new methods, most recently those of anthropology.[7]

The books produced by scholars using this approach are nearly always

[2] See Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), 167; Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 3d ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1966), 9-19.

[3] Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921), 26-27.

[4] Smith (fn. 2), 21.

[5] *Ibid.*, 17, quoting Salo Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), 6.

[6] For a bibliography, see chap. 1 of Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966), and Smith (fn. 2).

[7] See Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

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very thick. They invoke numerous factors to explain the manifestations of nationalism—factors ranging from the very concrete to the extraordinarily abstract, generally with complex gradations and varying weights. They are reflective and analytical histories, usually with many insights, but no one insight in particular: the kinds of books that other historians enjoy reading, but that make social scientists impatient. Conclusions tend to be judicious: consider Boyd Shafer's, that nationalism "appears to be the result of the experiences of peoples developing (since around 1300) in their physical and human environment, their modern culture, and in the structures of their societies and states."[8] It is not surprising that many thinkers have tried to be more precise than that.

A number of social theorists have tackled the question of nationalism in search of a relatively simple or general explanatory mechanism. Anthony Smith has ably surveyed the range of theories.[9] Among the most influential is the one originated by Elie Kedourie, who views the history of nationalism chiefly as that of the spread of an idea that originated in Europe and was later adopted around the world.[10] Quite a different approach has been taken by economics-oriented historians, who—while admitting that no easy correlation between nationalist feeling and an obvious economic status appears possible—suggest that there may nevertheless be linkages. Thus, Eric Hobsbawm wonders whether nationalism may not have been the program of " 'middle peasants,' the rural stratum most firmly rooted in traditional agrarian society, fighting to maintain or re-establish the customary way of life."[11] An extremely influential approach to nationalism has been that of Karl Deutsch, who proposed "social mobilization" as one of the contributors to the development of nationalism.[12] Modernization (to oversimplify Deutsch a bit) stirs up hitherto undisturbed cultural sediments and brings them into the stream of historical change. Because the newly mobilized groups often outnumber the ones whose culture predominated earlier, profound shifts in national language, sentiment, and myth may accompany this process, as Deutsch demonstrates empirically. In fact, Deutsch's hypothesis has the great advantage of suggesting empirical tests; unlike nearly all the other models of nationalism that have been proposed, it has been followed up by research. Many other approaches exist—for example, those

[8] Shafer, *Nationalism and Internationalism—Belonging* (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1982), 75.

[9] Smith (fn. 2).

[10] Kedourie (fn. 2).

[11] Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on Nationalism," in T. J. Nossiter, A. H. Hanson and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences, Essays in Memory of Peter Nettl* (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), 385-406, at 400.

[12] Deutsch (fn. 6).

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that stress political or psychological factors. Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that any factor that has been invoked in any social science explanation has probably been applied to nationalism.

Nevertheless, those who develop these theories have been among the first to point out their defects. Despite almost a century of research and thinking, our understanding of nationalism remains, in the words of a definitive review, "undeveloped."[13] No single theory of nationalism has won wide acceptance, and when writers employ the word, they tend not to define it. The volumes examined here attempt to fill this gap, though in very different ways. Gellner's is perhaps the most ambitious of them: his editor states that the book makes nationalism "for the first time, historically and humanly intelligible" (Introduction, by R. I. Moore, viii).

II

Gellner begins with a question I have already mentioned: why industrialism seems to have stimulated nationalism rather than sweeping it away. Liberalism and Marxism, two of the most important systems of thought that social scientists draw on, both predicted the decline of national feeling. Liberalism expected the decline of nationalism because "[t]rade flows across frontiers; the life of the intellect ignores frontiers; and with the progress of learning, wealth, and industry, the prejudices and superstitions and fears which engender frontiers would decline."[14] Marxism foretold its decline because "industrial workers were forced to be mobile and rootless; their labour a homogeneous and undifferentiated commodity. They could have no local associations, let alone loyalties, as little as a mass-produced object can be a differentiating part of a local tradition."[15] These theories treat nationalism as an aberration. Gellner, though, attempts to demonstrate that nationalism can best be understood as a necessary consequence of the very forces described by Liberals and Marxists.

Gellner establishes a positive connection between the phenomenon of nationalism and the process of modernization by arguing that modern states require "a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population" (p. 46). He accepts, in other words, that the furnace of modernization must melt every society that falls into it, and recast it in

[13] Gale Stokes, "The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism," *World Politics* 31 (October 1978), 150-60.

[14] Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (first pub. 1965; reprint ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 147.

[15] *Ibid.*, 148.

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a standard mold; but he argues that the new standard mold is the nation, having its own particular language and culture. Though nations differ from one another, each, according to Gellner, is allowed by the modernizing process to have only one such culture and language, a fact that standardizes it internally and makes it able to modernize. He notes:

> When general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men will willingly, and often ardently, identify (p. 55).

The choice of language and culture that modernization requires is ultimately arbitrary, but usually an existing high culture is imposed generally. It is this process that leads to nationalism.

There are groups that resist this process: cultural lumps that will not fuse in the furnace. They have characteristics that keep them solid, or as Gellner puts it, inhibit "social entropy" (p. 63). "There is no limit to the number of ways in which people can be classified," Gellner observes, and "most of the possible classifications will be of no interest whatsoever" (p. 64). If education is made generally available, and careers are genuinely opened to talents, then even fairly deep differences (in language, for instance) can be overcome by the modernizing process. But there are some characteristics, or groups of characteristics, that simply will not yield. Gellner develops a theory of such traits by speculating on the role that differences in skin color, and deep-seated prejudices about them, might play in the modernization of a hypothetical state he calls "Megalomania," which contains a subpopulation of so-disadvantaged "Ruritanians" (pp. 63-87). Members of the Ruritanian subgroup will never achieve success in a modernizing Megalomania. If groups with traits like theirs are to modernize, Gellner concludes, they must have political roofs over their cultures: they must form nation-states.

The argument reverses much of the commonly accepted causality of nationalism. "It is not the case," Gellner writes, "that nationalism imposes homogeneity . . . [rather] it is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism" (p. 46). Nationalism, for Gellner, is not an anomalous by-product of modernization, but rather a positive consequence of it. "Nationalism [is] in its general forms if not in its details . . . a necessity" (p. 129).

It would be foolish to quarrel too much with Gellner's theory. It does resolve the problem with which it begins—the failure of nationalism to disappear in the age of industrialism—and it does so very reasonably, by showing how the demands for homogeneity that industrialism makes

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lead to the creation of culturally unalloyed nations. Yet there are unquestionably some problems with applying the theory to specific cases. What sense does it make to describe subgroups within a relatively uniform polity as "nationalist"? We often speak, for instance, of a rise of nationalist groups in the Japan of the 1920s and 1930s; yet Japan at the time was both a successfully modernizing and an extremely homogeneous state. Are we really to understand such groups by analogy with the Ruritanians? We do not deny that the Megalomania-Ruritania model which Gellner proposes applies in some cases (notably in the Central Europe upon which it is based)—but where is the "systematic entropy inhibition" in the Japanese case? Or we might consider Indian nationalism—a powerful movement that embraced a wide variety of different constituencies, any one of which would seem potentially as refractory as Gellner's Ruritanians. Why did not each create its own nation-state? Nor is it clear that industrialism demands quite the cultural homogeneity that Gellner posits: a state like Singapore is remarkably successful economically, even though communication among the various ethnic and dialect groups that compose it is no simple matter. Furthermore, the definitional problems with Gellner's concept of "systematic entropy inhibition" are considerable (though the term is perhaps a useful simplifier). These problems have to do not with economics or culture, but rather with the roles of consciousness and will—factors that are notoriously difficult to analyze but cannot be avoided by any student of nationalism.

Theodore Zeldin, a student of French national identity, has commented that "the history of nationalism is still in the state that the history of religion was in before the sociology of religion was invented to ask . . . how religion affected the masses and was felt by them."[16] Gellner's theory does not even approach this task. It is, however, addressed by the question that Armstrong asks about nationalism. He examines the subject at the level of deep feelings, which have long incubation periods before they are articulated or manifested.

Armstrong speaks of "the intense group identification that today we term a 'nation' " (p. 3). Intensity is important: Gellner notes how "ardently" national identification may be felt, but he really gives no account of how functional imperatives such as the ones he invokes can lead to such powerful feelings. Armstrong quite clearly does not believe that nationalism is quite as functional as Gellner would have it. His whole account is devoted to explaining the development of emotions that have

[16] Zeldin, *France: 1848-1945*, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 26.

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the capacity to serve as independent sources of action. Armstrong is trying to pin down Wilson's "common political consciousness"; in doing so, he attempts to vindicate his own "conviction that the historical record reaffirms the ways in which the human psyche shapes, for better or for worse, its own fate" (p. 283).

For Armstrong, nations are self-identified, and the origins of their common consciousnesses can be understood only by examining the ways in which material factors affected how populations thought and felt, and how these shared ways of thinking eventually became deeply rooted and widespread enough to serve as components in "the constitutive myth of the polity" (p. xxii; definition of "mythomoteur").

Armstrong draws his data from the histories of Eastern and Western Christendom and of the Islamic world. Each of the chapters seeks to illustrate the formation of some characteristic—usually one having two opposing components—that will re-emerge as an ingredient in national identity. An example would be the basic distinction between nomadic and settled ways of life, which lead to quite different organizational principles (territorial in one case, genealogical in the other). But Armstrong shows that the consequences of the basic difference do not end there: they include different forms of nostalgia, distinctive understandings of religion, and, most importantly, contrasting approaches to authority, statehood, and the creation of empire. In his exposition of specific historical examples, Armstrong seeks to connect the national identity, which is based on "myth, symbol, communication and a cluster of associated attitudinal factors" (p. 9) with its origins in such basic facts of material life.

The work continues the empirical tradition already mentioned. Armstrong's long bibliography reflects wide-ranging research in several difficult languages, and he draws heavily on the concepts of cultural anthropologists for explanation. This unfortunately burdens his text with technical terms. (He provides a useful glossary.) Still, by gradually weaving together strands ranging from the types of nostalgia felt in the Islamic world to the "*patriotisme de clocher*" of the medieval peasant, Armstrong begins to make it possible to understand how nationalism was felt, and why it was felt strongly. It is, in a sense, new wine for old bottles. Using the most contemporary social science language, Armstrong provides a new way of understanding a sound old idea: people have somehow come to be divided into groupings that they recognize—a fact that cannot be understood on any basis other than a painstaking dissection of the intuitive sense that they are "nations."

These two books differ profoundly. One can reconcile them somewhat

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by noting that each treats a different aspect of nationalism. Gellner is concerned with the phenomenon in general: with why it suddenly emerges to define "a world of nations" when it does, and not at some other time. At that task he is quite successful. But he avoids discussing the content of nationalism: all the questions of compatibility and incompatibility of cultures, the shifts of consciousness that make the nation an issue in one place and not in another, are swept up in an inclusive concept, "social entropy inhibition," with only cursory examination. One could say that Armstrong's book is an example of the kind of empirical research that must be done to give real content to Gellner's abstract phrases. It is in that sense that the books are complementary.

III

Let us return to the question of explanation, and ask whether either theory provides an intellectual foundation suitable for some of the historical analyses based on nationalism that we have already mentioned. Remember that in much of the literature, nationalism is not merely a contingent feature of a certain configuration of modernization in a situation where several cultures exist, or the consequence of the gradual accumulation of overlapping changes reflected in culture and memory which somehow reach a critical mass or are released. Rather, nationalism is a powerful force in its own right, able to transform and to remake societies, economies, and cultures. That is what Woodrow Wilson had in mind, and it is also what many of the mid-century students of the subject saw as critical. Hugh Seton-Watson, for instance, set out to understand "this force of nationalism which has continued to shake the world in which I have lived."[17] E. H. Carr spoke of the "dynamite of nationalism."[18] For certain writers, nationalism is perhaps the most important load-bearing beam of their analytical edifice. John K. Fairbank, speaking of China, makes nationalism "the principal fact confronting us."[19] Does either Gellner or Armstrong really give nationalism sufficient intellectual strength to sustain such a role?

Consider the theory of development. As we shall see below, for Europe the theory of nation-building is becoming extremely sophisticated; but in the historiography of the non-Western world, we often encounter nationalism as the primary actor, an almost magical force that dissolves

[17] Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), xi.

[18] Carr, *Nationalism and After* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 10.

[19] Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 4th ed., enlarged (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 460.

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old societies and provides cohesion for the new. It is nationalism that in a society such as the Ottoman Empire or traditional China turns patriots against the old ways. In this formulation, nationalism functions as a universal solvent, something that breaks all the old bonds—of family, of local place, of creed, and so forth—and prepares the way for a new and overarching identity. "In the early phases of modernization" writes one author, "many traditional attachments must be modified to permit more differentiated institutional structures to be set up ... [A] very generalized and powerful commitment is required to pry individuals from these attachments."[20] Nationalism makes that separation possible. And where does the new identity that succeeds those old attachments come from? From nationalism as well. Suddenly, what had been a solvent is transformed into a glue, and national feeling binds together the new society that is constructed from the raw material of the old. Anthony Smith quotes a particularly good example of this kind of argumentation:

> ... nationalism is a *sine qua non* of industrialization, because it provides people with an overriding, easily acquired, secular motivation for making painful changes. National strength or prestige becomes the supreme goal, industrialization the chief means. The costs, inconveniences, sacrifices and loss of traditional values can be justified in terms of this transcending collective ambition. The new collective entity, the nation-state, that sponsors and grows from this aspiration is equal to the exigencies of industrial complexity; it draws directly on the allegiance of every citizen, organizing the population as one community.[21]

It is hard to imagine either Gellner's or Armstrong's nationalism being strong enough to do all that.

Or consider the role of nationalism as a guide to the politics of developing states. I am most familiar with the Chinese case, but in others, too, the idea of nationalism is a great and useful simplifier. By identifying certain people as "nationalists"—presumably different from the mass of people—and following their careers, one can find a way through confusing historical periods. The 1920s in China, for instance, were a period of formidable complexity, with several competing centers of political power as well as foreign and Chinese actors engaged in a bewildering variety of temporary alliances. The temptation to discover a golden thread in nationalism and to follow it through this maze has

[20] Neil J. Smelser, *Essays in Sociological Explanation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 134; quoted in Smith (fn. 2), 44.

[21] Smith (fn. 2), 44, quoting Kingsley Davis, "Social and Demographic Aspects of Economic Development in India," in Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1955).

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proved too attractive for most historians to resist. Rather than attempting to make sense of, say, "warlord" wars (which are far from being meaningless, as is often asserted), they pick a "nationalist" figure—Sun Yat-sen, Chiang K'ai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, it makes little difference—and trace his career, showing how he made his way (and often suggesting, as he would have himself, that he was a more authentic nationalist than his rivals). It is an appealing and initially persuasive approach, but it raises a number of questions.

These problems become clear if we note, to begin with, that in political accounts such as the above, "nationalism" is being used as if it had great resolving power. In a complex situation, a group of actors—the nationalists—is identified and studied. It is an operation that is so common that we may forget its evident delicacy. For how, after all, do we know who the nationalists are? How do we distinguish them from others in the population with whom they share so many traits? True enough, sometimes they proclaim themselves, but sometimes we award them the title: whatever so-and-so may say, he is ultimately a nationalist. And who are the counterparts with whom they are being contrasted? Non-nationalists? If so, how do we recognize them? Certainly Gellner's theory provides no basis for making such distinctions. The Japanese nationalists of the 1930s, the Chinese nationalists of the 1920s—indeed almost any group one may choose as an example—will not differ enough from others in their society so as to possess an "entropy-inhibiting trait." Nor do Armstrong's general theories of nostalgia, sense of boundary, and so forth, help. His categories, like Gellner's, are too broad to be useful in this intellectual microsurgery. At a certain time in history, one might argue, "Chineseness" would have qualified as an "entropy-inhibiting trait" in a world dominated by Europeans, and thus the "nationalists" could be understood simply as the political instruments of Gellner's homogenizing process. But that approach will not take us very far either, for many more than just the "nationalists" identified in standard accounts shared similar goals.

The problems that the concept of nationalism encounters here may be understood by analogy with those of another good abstract noun: revolution. Like definitions of revolution, those of nationalism often end up either too inclusive or too exclusive. If, for purposes of theorizing, we limit our choice of "real" revolutions to, let us say, the French, the Russian, and the Chinese, we will rightly be accused of arbitrariness. Yet if we open it to include even a fraction of self-proclaimed revolutions (or other events that seem to fit the concept), we are likely to end up with a definition so broad and inclusive as to lose most of its analytical

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edge. The same is true of nationalism. If, for example, we argue in the case of China that Sun Yat-sen was the leading nationalist of the early 20th century, we may do grave injustice to other Chinese. (Who, after all, was *not* a nationalist?) If, on the other hand, we accept that a wide range of figures (including, for instance, the Japanese collaborator Wang Ching-wei, clearly a nationalist in his own way) merit the description, then we no longer have a golden thread to follow. We are back at the entrance to the maze of political history with few clues about how to proceed.

Unless another theory of nationalism can be proposed that will solve it, we will have to acknowledge the reality of the problem with which this review began. A disproportion definitely exists between the way in which nationalism is used to explain history and politics, and the explanatory capacity of the concept as outlined by its theorists. The intellectual foundations provided by the latter simply will not support the explanatory structures that have been placed on them. Nationalism in general is a powerful and comprehensible idea. Yet, while it defines general situations, it is not very useful in explicating specific events. In cases where such events have in the past been explained by invoking nationalism, we will have to search for another analysis.

IV

Interestingly enough, just such a process of change is already evident in studies of European history that treat what used to be thought of as the "Age of Nationalism." The whole trend of research into nationhood in Europe has tended to enfeeble the full-blooded concept of "nationalism" mentioned above by showing how much diversity existed in historical nations even in the recent past, and laying bare the political measures that have recently fostered new unity and new national feelings. In Italy, for instance, despite the powerful tide of national feeling that was supposed to be sweeping the country at the time, what eventually became the standard language (as opposed to dialect) was spoken at home by only 2.5 percent of inhabitants in 1860.[22] In Poland, the 1919 and 1931 censuses show that a majority of inhabitants of the Pripet Marshes responded to questions about nationality with "local" or "from here."[23] This sort of reexamination has been particularly striking for France, surely a historical "nation" if ever there was one. One section of Theodore Zeldin's absorbing historical tapestry, *France*, shows how little national feeling there was in the 19th century, and how "The

[22] Hobsbawm (fn. 11), 395.

[23] *Ibid.*, 399, n. 14.

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National Identity" was gradually imposed from the center. In 1864, schoolchildren in the relatively remote Lozère could not answer the question whether they were Russian or English.[24] A number of historians have traced the processes—ranging from the distribution of tricolors, the introduction of new textbooks, and the popularization of a new image of the past, to the development of mass armies—that contributed to the gradual knitting together of France as a nation. The weightiest contribution to this scholarly edifice is probably Eugen Weber's much-admired work, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.[25]

To juxtapose the sadly reduced nationalism that figures in these historical works to the mighty force evoked by the theorists of development quoted earlier is to discover scholars working at cross-purposes. While social scientists were steadily increasing the claimed powers of nationalism, particularly for the transformation of the developing world, historians were chipping away at the stereotypes on which such theories rested. Furthermore, if we accept the full implications of the approach taken by Weber and other historians, we begin to reverse the intuitive causality of nationalism that made the concept attractive in the first place. Instead of emergent historical nations beginning to stir, and to cast up nationalist leaders who call them into being, it seems that it is the politicians who strive to create the nations. And to what end? One is tempted to say: in order to rule them.

V

A variation of this suggestion was in fact made by Woodrow Wilson, who noted that some nations had, in effect, been created by individuals. The England of Elizabeth I was a nation that had evolved naturally and had ultimately found its embodiment in her; Wilson's evaluation of the Prussia of Frederick the Great was different. It was Frederick who had "first made it a compact and powerful kingdom, and then himself called it into consciousness."[26] Wilson's distinction is important in that it clearly prefigures our modern theories of development and nation-building. And it suggests a far greater role for politicians in the creation of nations than is generally recognized, or envisioned in theory.

In fact, even Gellner, whose general theory is above politics, invokes the political origins of nations at one point in order to get around a

[24] Zeldin (fn. 16), Vol. II, p. 3.

[25] Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[26] Wilson (fn. 3), 33.

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difficulty. The problem is the pattern of nationalism in Latin America, where the sorts of basic incompatibilities between cultural and economic imperatives that he posits as the origins of nationalism might account for the development of one or two nations, but simply do not seem to explain the development of so many nation-states. There are no obviously unassimilable cultural groups that could form the kernels of so many nations; yet, as visiting American politicians regularly discover, each state has its own clear identity. Rather than try to find some socioeconomic explanation for this fact, Gellner turns to politics. In situations such as that in Latin America, there is, he argues, an incentive to multiply states, for "the glorious unification of the nation will mean the diminution of the number of its prime ministers, chiefs of staff, presidents of the academy, managers and skippers of its football team, etc." Unification can succeed "only in those cases where the external disadvantages of fragmentation are very great and visible, and those who suffer from them can make their interests felt against those who will lose out . . ." (pp. 135-36). A strong potential constituency exists, then, for the creation of a number of nations. The process of nation-building can be used to solve the problem of finding something to rule, which besets ambitious politicians today just as finding a kingdom used to be a problem for younger sons in royal families.

Indeed, one can take the argument a step further, and observe that incentives exist for the breaking up of unitary states. We see this process in action in many parts of the world today, where the techniques of nationalist agitation are being used to divide states that are themselves the products of earlier waves of the same kind of political activity (perhaps the best example is India). How are we to understand this process—the rise of so-called "mini-nationalism"—the analysis of which is now one of the most important subfields of studies of nationalism?[27] By reversing some of the steps in Gellner's argument just quoted, we can theorize that the need for a state they can rule may lead politicians to seek to discover or create "entropy-inhibiting traits" or "national identities" to suit their own purposes. Sub-populations can do the same thing. Almost any of the host of differences that divide even the most uniform population can be seized upon: race, religion, language, or whatever. Although a process of state formation may in fact ensue, it would be unconvincing to attribute its origin to the imperatives of modernization. Rather, it would seem to be motivated by some broad

[27] See Louis L. Snyder, *Global Mini-nationalisms: Autonomy or Independence?* (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1982).

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political goal (more power for a politician, greater wealth for a population). Nationalist agitation may divide even a relatively uniform population. In China and Japan, for instance, no clear set of traits distinguished the bitterly competitive nationalist movements. In view of such examples, it is tempting to try to subsume nationalism and mini-nationalism, at least at this level, within some broader theory of politics.

VI

To understand the place of national identity in the broader political process, one can do worse than consult a thin, thoughtful book by Dov Ronen, *The Quest for Self-Determination*. This volume deals with nationalism as only one of several possible expressions of a desire for self-determination, which he locates in the individual. As Karl Deutsch writes on the book jacket, Ronen "shows how people choose their own identity or role for their 'self' in terms of nationality or class, and discuss[es] the conditions under which they tend to shift from one to the other." According to Ronen's analysis, each individual has a variety of possible sets of personal aspirations and a choice of different collective vehicles for pursuing them. Shifting circumstances mean that at different times different existing "functional aggregations" will be "activated" in order to permit people to pursue, as "conscious aggregations," one or another goal (pp. 54-62). The development of national consciousness and the setting in motion of a political struggle to create a nation, are both specific instances of this more general process. The preexisting group or "functional aggregation" activated in such cases could clearly be one sharing the sorts of common memories and feelings that Armstrong discusses, or one sharing the same "entropy-inhibiting traits," to use Gellner's terminology. What Ronen adds to their analyses is a place for conflict.

When we speak of nationalism, after all, we are often speaking of a particular political movement that struggles to achieve a specific set of goals. Although the climate in which such movements can flourish may be created, broadly, by the sorts of mechanisms described by the first two authors we have discussed, their theories throw little light on the course of actual nationalist struggles. Many nationalist movements—such as those of 20th-century Japan, or any of the "mini-nationalisms"—do not seem to fit their explanations very well. For Ronen, however, they are intelligible. Struggle, according to his theory, is not so much the ultimate consequence of other factors that first create nationalism as it is the purpose for which nationalist movements are created.

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Ronen maintains that the basic purpose of nations is to enable individuals to struggle. "Ethnic groups are born and arise because of the perception of oppression; if there were no perception of oppression, real or imagined, there would be no ethnic self-determination" (p. 95). Applying this argument to the case of Palestine, Ronen notes: "For thousands of years there had been no Palestinian identity or 'nation'; as in the case of other peoples, the identity and the nation have been created as a weapon" (p. 86).

The perception of oppression of which Ronen speaks may be due to factors familiar from the theories we have already examined. Certainly, the inability of Ruritanians to advance very far in Gellner's hypothetical state of Megalomania would qualify, as would a shared inability to express or act on deeply held feelings of identity of the more abstract kind that Armstrong explores. But such sources do not exhaust the possibilities. Ronen notes that oppression may be "real or imagined." The feeling elicits political action, of which nationalist agitation is only one possible kind.

Ronen's theory suggests two observations. First, if we accept it, we can admit an embarrassing fact of which any student of nationalism is aware, namely, the patent flimsiness and historical inaccuracy of the claims of so many nationalist movements. History as written by nationalists is usually tendentious: not surprisingly, Gellner notes early on that "Nationalism . . . above all is not what it seems to itself" (p. 56). Recent research into the history of European identities confirms the point. Ronen's theory embraces this fact, which might seem to be a potential problem, by taking the (non-historical) Palestinian nation as a prime example of how nations are produced. The second point is that the decision by individuals to adopt the nation as their preferred weapon of struggle for self-determination is affected by the general environment. The existence and acknowledged legitimacy of nations in general gives added strength to nationalist demands in the modern world. Politicians have recognized this fact. When a movement acquires the label "nationalist" (which is not hard: as our discussion has made clear, no one is quite sure what the empirical tests should be) it acquires heightened legitimacy. We live in a world in which demands expressed in the language of nationalism are difficult to resist. But since the content of nationalism is so abitrary, the potential number of such demands and of the politicians espousing them seems almost limitless, as is the number of conflicts they can create—within states that contain potential national subgroups, and between and within nations.

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VII

The approach to nationalism that Ronen adopts is likely to prove intuitively satisfying to someone who is aware of the many problems already identified by students of the subject. But acceptance means that the way in which the term is understood and used in analysis, whether of history or of current events, will have to change fundamentally. For Ronen pays little attention to the possible origins or deep roots of nationalism, concentrating rather on its role in conflict—as a weapon that can be improvised quickly when the need for it is felt. This type of nationalism seems closer to the phenomenon we have known in history than does either Gellner's or Armstrong's.

Rather frustratingly, though, Ronen does not carry his own insight as far as it will go. Instead of stopping with the "nation" as a weapon created by one group to confront another, he could have shown how nationalist groups are themselves created by politicians in order to oppose other politicians—with the goal, of course, of eventually establishing something to rule. Such a political interpretation would give real bite to some of Ronen's observations. He states, for example: "The identity does not bring about the quest; the quest rather creates an identity" (p. 96). It would also raise a series of interesting questions. The most important would have to do with leadership. What exactly is the role of the nationalist leader? Why do some succeed while others fail? Does the game of nationalist politics that they play have patterns, rules, winning and losing moves? In China, for example, "nationalist" competition often takes place through rhetoric (a cheap weapon that permits many to play in the game), and certain maneuvers can be critical: the fatal-if-successful labeling of an opponent as a traitor, for instance. Even in the United States, such "nationalist" politics are very important: President Reagan shows much skill in the game of "capture the flag."

Or one may ask how important coercion is in the struggle. Ronen omits this factor entirely in his discussion of modern African politics, rather surprisingly listing "charisma, skill, and credit [for] . . . achievements" as the attributes that enable H. K. Banda and Sékou Touré, among others, to render prospective political leaders "unable to create an effective opposing group identity" (p. 98). Ronen's basic framework, though, is very persuasive: if it were focused more specifically on politically active persons rather than on groups in general, it could facilitate the solution of some of the current problems of nationalism in historiography.

To accept this approach is of course not to exclude those of the other

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two authors. They must be borne in mind. But they operate at levels of abstraction and causal remoteness that make them less useful in understanding specific situations. Nationalism over the last century or so may have produced greater homogeneity in some societies, but certainly it has also produced struggle and differentiation: the multiplication of assertions of the right to nationhood, the repeated fissions of nationalist movements, the steady escalation of demands as those nationalist groups confront the larger state they wish to leave, or their own political rivals. Earlier writers have sometimes treated nationalism as a potential glue that will hold new societies together; Ronen's analysis explains why it so rarely serves as such, and why nationalism tends as often as not to tear them apart. Other scholars have used the concept of nationalism to simplify political analysis: they found the nationalists and followed them. But that idea, too, must be modified in light of an approach that sees the key to nationalist movements as struggle. If creating a nationalist movement is a good way to seek power, then competing groups within a society will create competing nationalist movements, as happens in so many non-European states. Far from being a source of cohesion, nationalism becomes an important source of intrasocietal conflict; far from simplifying politics, it adds yet another dimension of complexity.

These last two conclusions are most important for anyone trying to understand history. They decisively undermine the assumptions that continue to govern much of our literature, particularly concerning the non-European world. In that writing, the invocation of nationalism has often been substituted for the analysis of politics, and the adjective "nationalist" has been attached to people, movements, and sentiments in a way that is taken (usually without explanation) as distinguishing each of them meaningfully from some other variety. This attitude is based on the belief that nationalism comes first, and then nationalist struggle. If we accept the argument made above, it must be reversed: struggle comes first. But to understand that, we must go back to politics.

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

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

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

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

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